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ABSTRACT 
Over the past forty years the nonprofit sector has experienced a steady rise 
in the professionalization of its employees and its operations. Some have argued 
that this trend is in large part a reaction to the requirements foisted upon the 
nonprofit sector through the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. While some 
scholars have detailed a number of unintended consequences that have resulted 
from this trend toward professionalization, in general scholars and practitioners 
have accepted it as a necessary step along the path toward ensuring that service is 
administered in an accountable and responsible manner. I analyze the 
contemporary trend in professionalization of the nonprofit sector from a different 
angle—one which seeks to determine how the nonprofit sector came to 
problematize the nature of its service beginning in the early twentieth century, as 
well as the consequences of doing so, rather than reinforce the existing normative 
arguments. To this end, I employ an “analytics of government” from an ethical 
and political perspective which is informed by Michel Foucault’s conception of 
genealogy, as well as his work on governing rationalities, in order to reveal the 
historical and political forces that contribute to the nonprofit sector’s 
professionalization and that shape its current processes, institutions, and norms. I 
ultimately argue that these forces serve to reinforce a broad movement away from 
the charitable impulse that motivates individuals to engage in personal acts of 
compassion and toward a philanthropic enterprise by which knowledge is 
rationally applied toward reforming society rather than aiding individuals. This 
movement toward institutional philanthropy and away from individual charity 
 ii 
supplants the needs of the individual with the needs of the organization. I then 
apply this analysis to propose an alternate governing model for the nonprofit 
sector—one that draws on Foucault’s exploration of ancient writings on love, self-
knowledge, and governance—in order to locate a space for the individual in 
nonprofit life. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE END OF METHODLESS ENTHUSIASM 
Introduction 
 Over the past forty years nonprofit1 organizations have experienced a 
steady rise in the professionalization of their personnel and an increased 
rationalization of their management and administration of services. Prominent 
nonprofit scholars like Peter Dobkin Hall (1992) and Peter Frumkin (1998) argue 
that this trend is in large part a result of the requirements foisted upon the 
nonprofit sector through the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Since the 
passage of this legislation, a number of scholars have detailed some unintended 
consequences (both positive and negative) that have resulted from this trend 
toward professionalization and rationalization. As a whole, however, the nonprofit 
sector seems to have accepted it as a necessary step along the path toward 
ensuring that service is administered in an accountable and responsible manner 
(see Schambra, 2003) and as part of maintaining a complex relationship with the 
state.  
This dissertation analyzes the contemporary trend in the 
professionalization of nonprofit personnel and the rationalization of nonprofit 
management from a different angle. Rather than analyze whether these trends are 
inherently good or bad for nonprofits or why they developed, this dissertation 
seeks to determine how these particular discourses emerged and became 
                                                            
1 As will become clear through the course of this dissertation, I take the view that 
the terms benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, and nonprofit each hold a distinct 
meaning. For the purposes of this introduction, however, I will use the term 
nonprofit so as not to create any confusion as I seek to situate my research 
question within existing literature.    
 2 
constituted as authoritative and powerful. More specifically, this dissertation 
examines the following: (1) how those with authority came to problematize the 
nature of how we care for and aid others beginning in the nineteenth century; (2) 
how rationalizing service and professionalizing the personnel of nonprofit 
organizations solves the problem posed; and, (3) how these discourses ultimately 
implicate a particular form of government for contemporary nonprofit 
organizations and their constituents, and for what I call the practice of 
benevolence. 
To this end, I use what sociologist Mitchell Dean (1999) calls an 
“analytics of government” to examine the discourses related to the 
professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organization management. I 
employ this methodology from an ethico-political perspective afforded by 
historian and philosopher Michel Foucault’s conception of genealogy (Foucault, 
1984), as well as his and others’ work on government rationality (e.g., Barry, 
Osborne, & Rose, 1996b; Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991). In the end, this 
dissertation will not only help to illuminate the historical and political forces at 
work in the professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organizations and 
the practice of benevolence, but it will do so utilizing a powerful framework for 
analysis that is rarely implemented in nonprofit studies. 
Professionalizing Nonprofit Service 
 In December 1969, President Richard Nixon signed into law H.R. Bill 
13270 (Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 1970). This law is most 
commonly known as the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and while it sets forth a myriad 
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of reforms encompassing income tax law, it holds special provisions pertaining to 
foundations. More specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 sought to remedy 
purported abuses of tax exempt status by private foundations by defining very 
clearly the limits and obligations of their activities. Critics had alleged that private 
foundations abused their status in a number of distinct ways, namely through self-
dealing between foundations and private donors, inadequate distribution of funds 
to other nonprofit organizations, ownership and control of for-profit enterprises, 
market speculation, and misuse of foundation funds for non-tax-exempt activities 
(Smith & Chiechi, 1970, pp. 44-45). Accordingly, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
prohibits self-dealing between contributors and foundations, sets a standard for 
the minimum amount of income a foundation must distribute to other nonprofit 
organizations, limits foundations’ holdings in private businesses, and taxes 
foundations’ activities that might jeopardize its tax-exempt activities, including 
lobbying or any other related political activity. In addition, the law explicitly 
requires that private foundations implement administrative procedures for 
governing organizational and personal conduct related to the successful execution 
of the provisions set forth in the law. These include maintaining appropriate 
financial documentation and filing it with the Internal Revenue Service on an 
annual basis. 
While the measures laid out in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 specifically 
deal with private foundations and not all nonprofit organizations, prominent 
scholars of the nonprofit sector like Peter Dobkin Hall (1992) and Peter Frumkin 
(1998) view the passage and implementation of the law as the commencement of 
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a period of enhanced professionalization of the nonprofit sector (cf. Popple & 
Reid, 1999; Skocpol, 2004).2 Indeed, as Smith and Chiechi (1970) contend, 
nonprofit organizations in general were alarmed at the law’s imposition of 
administrative rules and the corresponding demands these posed for the staffs of 
private foundations. At that time, very few of them engaged paid employees; 
many were operated by small volunteer staffs. Ultimately the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 served to dial up the level of vigilance with which the Internal Revenue 
Service regarded nonprofit organizations of all types, especially as it relates to the 
granting of tax-exemption and the oversight of financial administration. In 
response, all nonprofit organizations were forced to raise their own managerial 
standards. No longer would “‘methodless enthusiasm’”3 suffice to keep nonprofit 
organizations going in the face of increasingly complex reporting requirements 
and funding restrictions (Hall, 1992, p. 91). Now more formality and 
complexity—indeed, more professionalization of staff and of standards—is 
required in order to demonstrate financial responsibility to both the Internal 
Revenue Service and the American public. 
                                                            
2 It is important to note here that nonprofit scholars tend to make a distinction 
between the professionalization of the nonprofit sector and the professionalization 
of charitable work. For instance, while Hall (1992) contends that the 
professionalization of the sector commenced with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
Wagner (2000) notes that the professionalization of charitable giving occurred in 
the early part of the twentieth century with the formation of a number of 
professions (e.g., social work and public administration) and the increased 
rationalization of charitable work through the establishment of foundations and 
community chests. This issue will be addressed further in Chapter 4. 
 
3 This phrase was initially popularized by historian Robert Luther Thompson to 
describe the early years of the implementation of the telegraph in the United 
States. See his Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the 
United States, 1832-1866. 
 5 
The Mechanisms of Professionalization 
 In order to appreciate the myriad ways in which professionalization has 
impacted the nonprofit sector, we must first understand what professionalization 
entails. While a number of scholars (e.g., Caplow, 1954; Goode, 1957; Larson, 
1977; Wilensky, 1964; Willbern, 1954) disagree on some of the finer details of 
what the processes of professionalization entail, they tend to agree on a number of 
fundamental themes, all of which can be found working simultaneously in the 
nonprofit sector beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century. First, there is 
the process of exclusion. That is, in the process of professionalization, members 
of an occupation must determine who is qualified for inclusion, namely who 
possesses the ability to perform the work of the occupation “correctly,” and 
exclude those who are not worthy of inclusion. For nonprofit organizations, this 
has involved delineating the paid employee from the volunteer in the management 
of the nonprofit organization. Those who are employees have been deemed more 
professional, while those who are volunteers are well-intentioned amateurs 
(Hwang & Powell, 2009).  
 Of course, determining those who are qualified versus those who are 
unqualified requires developing a formalized knowledge base through training 
and development programs—the second principle upon which scholars concur. 
Without the ability to formalize an occupation’s base of knowledge, a unified 
professional approach to the performance of tasks cannot be established. This has 
certainly been the case with nonprofit organizations, as professional training 
programs for managers in the nonprofit sector began to take hold in the 1980s in 
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the United States after the establishment of the Mandel Center at Case Western 
Reserve University in Cleveland (see Billis, 2005). Nonprofit management and 
training programs based primarily in America’s universities continue to 
proliferate with the establishment of MBA, MPA, and MSW programs with an 
emphasis on nonprofit management, as well as undergraduate and graduate 
nonprofit-specific degree programs (Mirabella & Wish, 2000; see also van Til, 
2000). In addition, scholarly journals like Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly and Nonprofit Management & Leadership—neither of which existed 
prior to the 1970s4—serve to solidify this knowledge base by disseminating 
information produced by and for graduates of these programs and their 
colleagues. 
 Scholars also concur that with the development of professional training 
programs also comes the establishment of professional associations which 
prescribe particular modes of acting through either the establishment of implicit 
norms or the institution of formalized codes of conduct for members. In the 
nonprofit sector this process began amongst fundraisers with the establishment of 
the National Society of Fund-Raising Executives (now the Association of 
Fundraising Professionals) in 1960 (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 
2010, p. 3), which developed an extensive set of rules for ethical behavior in 
fundraising, as well as corresponding punishments for breaches of these rules. 
                                                            
4 NML was established with the founding of the Mandel Center in Cleveland, 
which still oversees its publication. NVSQ, which was originally titled the Journal 
of Voluntary Action Research, was established as the journal of the Association of 
Voluntary Action Scholars, now the Association for Research on Nonprofit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action, in 1971—the same year as the founding of 
the association (see http://www.arnova.org/?section=about&subsection=history).  
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Professional associations grew thereafter through the establishment of the Council 
on Foundations, the Council for the Advancement and Support of Education 
(Salamon, 2005, p. 95), the Association of Voluntary Action Scholars, and more.  
 Finally, scholars agree that there must be ongoing political activism on the 
part of a profession to win favor from established authorities and thus perpetuate 
the longevity of the profession. In the nonprofit sector, we can see this 
development through the advancement of a nonprofit press corps (Salamon, 
2005), which includes trade publications like The Nonprofit Times, The Chronicle 
of Philanthropy, and Nonprofit Quarterly, and national federations (Trolander, 
1987) such as Independent Sector. Collectively, the trade publications and 
federations provide a fairly unified voice for their members and for the nonprofit 
sector as a whole. 
Charting the Consequences of Professionalization  
 Although there is debate as to whether nonprofit management (or 
management, in general) can be deemed a fully realized profession, there is little 
doubt that the professionalization of the nonprofit sector’s personnel and 
occupational ethos has affected its mode of service. In fact, according to 
organizational scholar W. Richard Scott (2003), professionalization cannot help 
but have a profound effect on institutional environments: 
More so than any other types of collective actors, the professions exercise 
control by defining social reality—by devising ontological frameworks, 
proposing distinctions, creating typifications, and fabricating principles or 
guidelines for action. They define the nature of many problems—from 
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physical illness to economic recession—monopolize diagnostic techniques 
as well as treatment regimes. They underwrite the legitimacy of providers 
as well as the practices. (p. 213) 
In the case of the nonprofit sector, a number of scholars (e.g., Hwang & Powell, 
2009; Frumkin, 1989) contend that the more professionalized managerial core 
which developed after the passage and implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 ultimately defined the social reality of benevolent service through its 
application of rationalist ideals. 
 Organizational rationality involves “the extent to which a series of actions 
is organized [so] as to lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency” 
(Scott, 2003, p. 33). In this model of organization, rationality equals efficiency 
(Denhardt, 2004, p. 75). The process by which organizational goals are efficiently 
implemented is defined by goal specificity and formalization. First, organizations 
define specific goals as a conception of the ends it would like to achieve. By 
making them specific in their detail, goals hold “unambiguous criteria for 
selecting among alternative activities,” which is necessary to set up clear 
“preference orderings among alternatives” to fuel “rational assessment and 
choice” (Scott, 2003, p. 34). Such a rational system of choice assumes a 
formalized organizational structure. An organization is formalized “to the extent 
that the rules governing behavior are precisely and explicitly formulated and to 
the extent that roles and role relations are prescribed independently of the 
personal attributes and relations of individuals occupying positions” within the 
organization (Scott, 2003, p. 35). This serves to make individual behavior within 
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the organization predictable. In other words, individuals become unified in their 
orientation toward organizational goals, and thus both the organization and the 
individuals within the organization become more predictable in their decision 
making and their subsequent actions. 
 Organizations and their operations become rationalized through the 
processes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). One form5 of 
institutional isomorphism is normative isomorphism, and it is fueled primarily 
through the professionalization of the members of a particular organizational or 
occupational field. Professionalization leads to isomorphism by way of formal 
education and training and through networking or collaboration between 
members. More specifically, through formalized training programs, members 
acquire a shared body of knowledge that has been agreed upon. This knowledge is 
then implemented in organizations through the establishment of organizational 
norms. These norms spread throughout the organizational field when members 
commune with one another and share ideas, oftentimes through meetings of 
professional associations. Frumkin (1989) argues that this occurred in the 
nonprofit sector as foundations established a number of professional associations, 
which themselves fueled the spread of rational, bureaucratic approaches to 
                                                            
5 The two other forms of institutional isomorphism are coercive isomorphism and 
mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism is the result of “formal and 
informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which 
they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which 
organizations function” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Similarly, mimetic 
isomorphism—defined by its modeling behavior—emerges in an uncertain 
environment in which an organization feels threatened by a lack of knowledge, 
environmental ambiguity, or symbolic uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 
151). 
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fundraising, grant management, and organization management. 
While a rationalized approach to organization management seems to have 
been generally accepted by nonprofit scholars and practitioners over time, its 
effects on organization management and the administration of services remains an 
area of critical scholarship. Indeed, a number of nonprofit scholars have been 
quick to point out both the positive and negative consequences of a more 
rationalized approach to benevolent service. On the one (more positive) hand, 
rationalized service allows organizations to be shrewder and more practical in 
their approaches to fulfilling their organizational missions (Everett, 1992). It also 
increases accountability and responsibility in the provision of service (Leat, 
1990), which helps preserve nonprofits’ legitimate status as organizations that 
exist to serve the public good (see Berger & Neuhaus, 2001; Smith & Lipsky, 
2001). In addition, rationalized management approaches serve to sustain larger 
social movements (Staggenborg, 1988) by making formerly disorganized, chaotic 
processes more formalized and cohesive. 
On the other (more negative) hand, critics of professionalization and 
rationalization note that one of the trend’s greatest drawbacks in the nonprofit 
sector is the imperiling of the special relationship that exists between nonprofit 
organizations and the public through the increased risk it runs toward 
depersonalizing relationships between nonprofit managers and their 
organizations’ constituents, whether they are donors, clients, or the general public 
(Alexander, 2000; Hall, 1990; Parsons & Broadbridge, 2004). Prominent 
nonprofit scholars like Lester Salamon (2003) have noted that nonprofit 
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organizations are involved in some of the most profound and intimate areas of 
human life. They provide services to respond to unmet needs; advocate on behalf 
of individuals and communities to bring problems to public attention; act as an 
outlet of personal expression; build communities and serve to facilitate social 
capital; and, guard collectively held organizational and societal values (Salamon, 
2003, pp. 11-14; see also Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). All of these elements tend 
to generate a great deal of personal meaning for those involved in the sector. 
Professionalization and rationalized approaches to management and service, 
however, tend to generate depersonalized relationships by way of a uniformly 
trained managerial core who can act to homogenize services and programs 
(Froelich, 1999) and marketize fundraising techniques (Eikenberry, 2009b; 
Wirgau, Farley, & Jensen, 2010). So, while increased professionalization within 
the sector has provided some benefits, it also risks separating the nonprofit 
manager and her organization from those who seek meaning through interaction 
with the organization. 
This critical viewpoint in nonprofit studies supports a larger argument 
regarding the role of professionals and professionalization in the public sector in 
which some scholars express concern (e.g., Cigler, 1990; Golembiewski, 1984; 
Willbern, 1954) over the likelihood that one can be both a member of a profession 
and a public servant. For instance, Willbern (1954) debates whether professional 
standards can mesh well with the interests of the public: 
The thing that makes a profession is that it is something different, that it is 
based on a special lore which must in some measure be esoteric and not 
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available to any Tom, Dick, or Harry. The status or social esteem which 
professionalization brings depends upon difference, on separatism. (p. 16) 
In other words, what makes one a professional is what separates her from 
others—in this case, members of the public. The argument follows that one is less 
able to respond to the will of the public if one distances herself (at least socially) 
from the public.  
Examining the Unexamined Consequences 
 This is the account of events that nonprofit scholars and practitioners have 
composed over the past forty years to explain how the nonprofit sector became 
professionalized and more rationalized in its approach to management and 
service. Alarmed by the opacity of foundations’ activities, the state enacted 
greater regulation of their management. These regulations eventually led to the 
greater professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organizations en 
masse, which has had both positive and negative consequences for benevolent 
service. The narrative unequivocally lays the responsibility for the unfolding of 
these processes and their corresponding consequences at the feet of the state by 
pinpointing the genesis of the nonprofit sector’s professionalization and 
consequent rationalization at the passage and implementation of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969.  
Three separate yet interrelated consequences have resulted from this 
narrative, and they have thus far remained unexplored. First, the narrative 
indicates a particular relationship between the state and the nonprofit sector. In 
short, the relationship is complex and—in some ways—uneasy (see Saidel, 1989; 
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Salamon, 1987). While many nonprofits have come to rely on the state for 
funding (see Lynn, 2002) and for legitimacy (primarily through legislative 
oversight, but also through the devolution of program responsibility), there is also 
a pervasive sense of resentment toward the state for the regulation that has 
resulted in the transformation of the nature of service that nonprofit organizations 
provide and which scholars assert makes them a unique part of the public 
landscape (e.g., Cohen & Ely, 1981; Kerri, 1972; Langton, 1981; Mendel, 2003). 
 This sentiment also informs the nature of the relationship between the 
nonprofit sector and the public. Contemporary nonprofit theory generally holds 
that nonprofit organizations exist either to correct the marketplace when private 
enterprise and/or Government6  institutions fail to provide public goods and 
services in an efficient and effective manner (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 
1975; Young, 2001) or to act as a third-party venue by which democratic spirit is 
nurtured and exercised (e.g., Eberly & Streeter, 2002; O’Connell, 1999). Such a 
viewpoint suggests a sense of institutional autonomy—that the nonprofit sector is 
operating outside of the normal mechanisms of the marketplace and the 
Government in order to act in the best interests of the public when the market or 
the state fails to do so. By intervening in the processes by which nonprofit 
organizations provide service to the public through legislative regulation and 
oversight, the state has not only altered these processes, but also the level of 
autonomy with which the nonprofit sector is able to act. And without a certain 
                                                            
6 Here I use Government to refer to the state and its institutions in an effort to 
conceptually distinguish it from the Foucauldian concept of government, which I 
will explore in Chapter 2. 
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level of autonomy, the nonprofit sector cannot truly act in the public’s best 
interest. To a certain extent, the relationship between the nonprofit sector and its 
public has been corrupted. 
 Finally, there is a sense in which this transformation of the sector and of 
the nature of its service and its relationship with the public is self-evident. In other 
words, the state’s regulation of the nonprofit sector and its cascading effects of 
professionalization and rationalization have come to constitute the nature of the 
sector’s reality in a way that is incontrovertible. While some scholars have noted 
the downside of professionalization and rationalization, the sector’s scholarly 
journals, trade publications, professional codes of ethics, and academic and 
professional training curricula are all infused with rhetoric advocating and 
describing rational approaches to organizational governance. And even calls for 
finding solutions to the negative effects of professionalization and rationalization 
assume that the trends cannot be wholly undone (e.g., Salamon, 1999). As such, 
the narrative that the nonprofit sector has composed and which serves to define its 
contemporary state of being is one in which the nonprofit sector and its 
constituents must “go along to get along,” especially where the state is involved. 
Clearly this narrative has played a role of paramount importance in 
shaping the nonprofit sector over the past four decades, yet few scholars or 
practitioners have critically examined its effects on the nonprofit sector and the 
nature of its service. This includes the nature of the relationships between the 
nonprofit sector and the state, and the nonprofit sector and the general public. 
Instead, the sector’s research has focused attention on finding ways to either 
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counter or accept the growth of professionalism and its accompanying 
rationalized forms of governance, ignoring the significant consequences this 
narrative holds with regard to the construction of meaning and identity within the 
sector. 
The seeming lack of critical engagement with the prevailing narrative of 
professionalization in the nonprofit sector is part and parcel of a larger issue at 
work in the study of nonprofit organizations and the role(s) they play in larger 
society. As Roelofs (1987) has observed, scholars rarely seem to employ a critical 
framework to examine the nonprofit sector, and thus “the liberal view is widely 
accepted in all quarters: that the private non-profit sector enhances pluralism and 
provides balance between business and government” (p. 39). As previously noted, 
general popular and scholarly opinion of the nonprofit sector holds that the 
prevailing role that nonprofits seem to play—whether in economic, political or 
social circles—is that of an aide. They correct the marketplace when private 
enterprise (Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1975) and/or Government institutions 
(Clark & Estes, 1992; Ferris, 1998; Young, 2001b) fail to effectively serve the 
public. They act as a trustworthy source for the provision of public goods, even to 
the most disenfranchised consumers in the marketplace (Billis & Glennerster, 
1998). They fill a creative void in the hearts and minds of ideological 
entrepreneurs (James, 2004; Young, 1983). And they provide a third-party venue 
through which members of a democratic society can not only learn about their 
civic duty, but also exercise it (Abzug, 1999). In sum, nonprofit organizations 
exist to provide balance in a political, economic, and social landscape that has 
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become unbalanced and—even more frightening—unpredictable. Without the 
presence of these organizations, we are left unable to truly know whether all 
members of society will be able to participate in either the marketplace or in 
normal democratic processes. 
Even the most critical of scholars in the field tends to affirm these 
assumptions about the nonprofit sector and assert that nonprofit organizations and 
the work in which they are engaged is generally good for larger society. While 
they might argue that these good organizations and their good work have been 
coopted and marketized7 over time by neoliberalism (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; 
Nickel & Eikenberry, 2006; Nickel & Eikenberry, 2010) or by the “non-profit 
industrial complex”8 (see INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, 2007), 
they also maintain a belief in the inherent ability of nonprofits to do good in the 
world and in the “transformative potential of philanthropy” (Nickel & Eikenberry, 
2006, p. 5) itself. Furthermore, they contend that nonprofits can thwart the forces 
of neoliberalism and capitalism—not only to reassert their own “goodness,” but 
                                                            
7 Lester Salamon (1997) first argued that the nonprofit sector was being 
marketized, that is, adopting the values and approaches of the marketplace. See 
also Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004.  
 
8 Rodriguez (2007) defines the nonprofit industrial complex (NIC) as “the set of 
symbiotic relationships that link together political and financial technologies of 
the state and owning-class proctorship and surveillance over public political 
intercourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social 
movements, since about the mid-1970s” (pp. 21-22). More specifically, the NIC is 
comprised of private foundations who—through their donations to nonprofit 
organizations—seek to maintain the elitist status quo established under the 
auspices of capitalism (e.g., Arnove, 1997; Roelofs, 1987; Roelofs, 2003; Silver, 
2006; see also Arnove, 1982; Faber & McCarthy, 2005) and the state which seeks 
to do the same through funding and regulation (see Sutton & Arnove, 2000). 
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also on behalf of the public at large—by providing spaces to facilitate 
“counterdiscourses” to the more dominant marketized discourses (Eikenberry, 
2009a) and by openly calling into question the influence of the nonprofit 
industrial complex (e.g, Ahn, 2007; Burrowes, Cousins, Rojas, & Ude, 2007; 
Tang, 2007) on charity, social justice, and individual and community well-being.  
Asserting such a viewpoint tends to signify less of a critical stance toward 
the nonprofit sector and its corresponding activities and instead represents more 
of a critique of the state and of the marketplace and their collective (negative) 
influence on the nonprofit sector. In this viewpoint the nonprofit sector maintains 
its position as the proverbial good (albeit fallible) guy while the state and the 
market play its nemeses in an old-fashioned tale of good versus evil. As such, the 
prevailing notions of the nonprofit sector are reinforced rather than critiqued. By 
simply accepting the assumptions upon which we base our understanding of the 
nonprofit sector itself and the nature of the public service in which it is engaged, 
we risk oversimplifying both the opportunities and the limitations to serving the 
public which can be afforded by nonprofits. As Kohl (2010) has observed, 
nonprofit organizations can open up spaces for enacting social change while at the 
same time acting to constrain or govern9 the conduct of others. If we understand 
nonprofit organizations solely as entities that are governed by the state and by the 
market, then we fail to understand them and the roles that they play as governors 
in larger society. Accordingly, we fail to fully comprehend the impact that 
                                                            
9 Here the term government is understood in the Foucauldian sense of the term 
(see Chapter 2). 
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nonprofits-as-governors have on the construction of meaning and identity for the 
nonprofit sector’s constituents which include employees, volunteers, donors, 
regulators, beneficiaries, and more. 
Our common understanding of the professionalization and consequent 
rationalization of the nonprofit sector falls directly in line with the prevailing 
assumptions we hold about the nonprofit sector, the nature of its service to the 
public, and its relationships with the state and the marketplace. In fact, it actively 
reinforces them and thus serves to constrain our understanding of the nonprofit 
sector. This dissertation seeks to interrogate our common understanding of the 
professionalization of the nonprofit sector in a manner that avoids unwittingly 
upholding the very foundational assumptions it seeks to question so that it 
provides a more critical—and thus broader—assessment of the contemporary 
nonprofit sector itself and the nature of its service, as well as the impact it has on 
the construction of meaning and identity for those involved with the sector. 
Therefore, this dissertation operates from the viewpoint that nothing is inherently 
good or bad, only dangerous (Foucault, 1997, p. 256, cited in Dean, 1999, p. 
40),10 including our assumptions about the nonprofit sector. In other words, the 
position of this dissertation is that all discourses which are constituted as 
authoritative and powerful have real, concrete consequences (sometimes 
widespread and life altering for many individuals), and should be examined with a 
                                                            
10 The full quotation is, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is 
dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to 
apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.” 
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correspondingly critical eye. This includes our prevailing understanding of 
professionalization in the nonprofit sector. 
So, rather than maintain the normative position that the professionalization 
of the nonprofit sector and rationalized governance has been good (or bad) for the 
sector and its constituents and rather than pursue by rote questions of why 
professionalization of the sector occurs or whether professionalization and 
rationalization are good (or bad) developments, this dissertation focuses on 
analyzing how these discourses became constituted as authoritative and powerful. 
Furthermore, it seeks to understand the consequences these discourses hold for 
our systematic care and aid of others (what I call the practice of benevolence). As 
such, this dissertation pursues the following research question: 
 How can we understand the nature of the practice of benevolence in light 
of the contemporary trends toward the professionalization and 
rationalization of nonprofit organizations? 
More pointedly, this dissertation aims to answer the following: 
 How do we currently understand the nature of the practice of benevolence, 
and how has that understanding changed over time?  
 How do we understand the relationship between nonprofit organizations 
and the practice of benevolence? 
 Why did those with authority come to see the practice of benevolence as a 
problem in the early twentieth century? How do the discourses of 
professionalization and rationalization answer this problem? 
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 By what means did professionalization and rationalization become 
constituted as powerful and authoritative discourses in the practice of 
benevolence? What role do laws like the Tax Reform Act of 1969 play in 
these processes? What role does the state play in these processes? What 
role does the market play in these processes? 
 What forms of knowledge, meaning, and identity does a professional, 
rational practice of benevolence seek to constitute? 
 Can we realize a practice of benevolence that is not professionalized and 
rationalized? 
By engaging in an examination of questions such as these, we are better 
able to understand the role the dominant discourses of professionalization and 
rationalization have played in constituting the practice of benevolence, and the 
relationships it holds with nonprofit organizations, the state, the market, and the 
public at large. In addition, by framing the questions in such a way, we are better 
able to critically engage with our preconceived notions and, thus, are less tempted 
to tender a grand judgment of the present state of affairs (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 
1996a, p. 4). This method of inquiry runs counter to the notion of a universal truth 
(Rabinow, 1984, p. 4)—a position which better enables us to question seemingly 
unquestionable motivations and experiences (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996a, p. 
6). In doing so, we allow ourselves to engage in a different kind of analysis that is 
“concerned with the limits and possibilities of how we have come to think about 
who we are, what we do and the present in which we find ourselves … [and thus] 
inaugurate a critical engagement with our present … to diagnose its practical 
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potential and constraints” (Dean, 1996a, p. 210). In other words, in changing the 
method by which we inquire into the nature of events, we find that we might not 
only increase our understanding of our object of study, but also create an 
opportunity to change what is possible to say about the nature of benevolent 
service. And when there is an opportunity to change what is possible to say, we 
also create an opportunity to “change what is possible to do, to think, or to be” 
(Cruikshank, 1999, p. 21).11  
Organization of the Dissertation 
I have employed a form of discourse analysis to examine the research 
questions posed in this dissertation.12 Therefore, Chapter 2, Employing an 
Analytics of Government, will explore the selected form of discourse analysis. It 
includes an overview of the theoretical approach which underpins the analysis and 
the methods used for analyzing the selected texts. Chapter 2 also contains the 
following: (1) a discussion of Dean’s (1999) analytics of government; (2) 
definitions of key terms, such as genealogy, problematization, government, and 
                                                            
11 This constructivist view of language and its role in generating meaning is taken 
from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) who viewed language as a toolkit 
and emphasized its practical, active use.  
 
12 Given the nature of the research questions that are explored in this dissertation, 
a qualitative approach such as discourse analysis is more suitable than a 
positivistic, quantitative one. This dissertation does not seek to predict or control 
behavior or situations—the primary aim of inquiry with quantitative methods 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 194). In addition, a qualitative approach is simply 
more suitable to the nature of the research question, for as Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) describe it, “Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature 
of reality ... and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers 
emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to questions that 
stress how social experience is created and given meaning” (p. 10, emphasis in the 
original). And it is this search for meaning—rather than prediction or control—by 
which we can better (if not fully) understand the human experience. 
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governmentality; (3) a presentation of the particular ethico-political perspective 
the analytics of government takes in this dissertation; and, (4) a description of the 
analysis of discourse undertaken. 
Chapter 3, Problematizing Benevolence, develops my conception of a 
practice of benevolence. More specifically, in this chapter, I chart the continuities 
and discontinuities of our understanding of the systematic care and aid of others 
from the nineteenth century to the present day. In doing so, I explore not only 
how those in authority came to view as a problem the nature of the practice of 
benevolence in the early twentieth century, but also how this problem of 
benevolent service was answered through the constitution of a philanthropic 
norm. Moreover, I demonstrate how the historical and political forces at play in 
liberal and neoliberal governing rationalities have worked to inform these 
developments over time.  
In Chapter 4, Strategic Governance, I explore in detail our contemporary 
understanding of the practice of benevolence. In particular, I analyze the forms of 
truth, knowledge and expertise, ways of seeing the world, and identity that the 
contemporary form of benevolence seeks to enact. Ultimately I argue that 
neoliberal governing rationalities have created a market for benevolence, which 
has in turn led to the strategization of the benevolent domain such that it places 
paramount importance on mitigating the risk nonprofit organizations face while in 
competition with one another. This development places the nonprofit organization 
at the center of concern for the practice of benevolence, making the individual of 
only secondary import.  
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Finally, in Chapter 5, Caring for Self/Caring for Others, I propose an 
alternative governing model for the practice of benevolence to counter the 
contemporary organization-centric model. More pointedly, I propose a governing 
model which draws on what Foucault (1990/1984) calls the practices of the self. I 
draw in particular on his writings that explore ancient notions of love, self-
knowledge, and governance—a practice of the self which he calls the care of the 
self (Foucault, 2001). I contend that within the notions of the care of the self, we 
can find space to reassert—at least to some extent—the importance of the 
individual within the practice of benevolence. 
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CHAPTER 2: EMPLOYING AN ANALYTICS OF GOVERNMENT 
Truth and Power/Knowledge 
In the AMC television series Rubicon, the main character Will Travers 
works as a data analyst for API, a shadowy, New York City-based intelligence 
agency. In an early episode, Travers and Truxton Spangler, the inscrutable head 
of API, travel to Washington D.C. to meet with a panel of legislators and 
members of the National Security Council in a desperate effort to convince them 
that a move toward direct Congressional oversight of API’s analysis of 
intelligence data would be a mistake. Spangler makes his argument by presenting 
a scenario in which he trades opinions with the panel chairman’s wife regarding 
the chairman’s necktie selection. Spangler asserts that the chairman cannot trust 
his wife’s opinion of his tie—even if she gives it a glowing review—because her 
opinion is inherently biased. He says:  
Maybe she has some fond memory of another time you wore it … a 
sentimental attachment. Or perhaps she knows your tie collection, and 
she’s simply glad you didn’t choose one of the ties she dislikes. Perhaps 
she just sensed you were feeling a little fragile—she felt like bucking you 
up a bit. (Robbins & Podeswa, 2010, minute 30:10)  
No such issue exists, however, with the opinions of Spangler and Travers. 
Spangler continues: 
Now, imagine for a minute you sit down here with us, and I say to you 
how much I admire that tie. Instantly you have another opinion of it, but 
you don’t know me. There’s nothing personal between us. We have no 
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sartorial history, no emotional attachment. Whose judgment are you going 
to trust—mine or your wife’s? The gentleman to my right [Travers] is a 
remarkable intelligence analyst. … [B]ut in truth, his greatest asset for you 
is that you don’t know him, and he doesn’t know you. He doesn’t … care 
… about you or your feelings. He just knows what your tie looks like. You 
can trust him. (Robbins & Podeswa, 2010, minute 30:58)  
 In other words, with his analogy Spangler is arguing that Travers’ lack of 
intimacy with his overseers engenders objectivity in his assessment of intelligence 
data. Objectivity, in turn, can lead to (at least) a close approximation of the truth. 
The closer we can get to the truth, the better able we are to act with certainty. And 
in matters of life and death, acting with certainty is paramount. 
 Of course, Travers is neither a remarkable analyst nor a valuable asset to 
the intelligence community simply by virtue of his lack of intimacy with his 
overseers. I am also not on intimate terms with the National Security Council, yet 
it is highly unlikely they would give credence to my opinion on intelligence data, 
let alone ask for it. Implicit in Spangler’s argument is the notion that his 
overseers—not to mention, we as members of the public—can trust Will Travers 
because he is an expert in analyzing intelligence data. In other words, Travers’ 
opinion carries weight by virtue of the knowledge he has acquired over time. 
More pointedly, his opinion is valued more than others’ in these circumstances 
because it has been rendered impartial through the acquisition and application of 
knowledge. In this viewpoint, both Travers and his expertise are value-free, and 
as such, he (and his expertise) holds power.  
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 The viewpoint is a widely held one, yet historian and philosopher Michel 
Foucault contends that such a viewpoint is indefensible. He argues that even 
though prevailing opinion holds that experts possess an inherent capacity for 
impartiality by way of their acquisition of knowledge, in actuality there exist a 
whole host of forces that ceaselessly act on us to inform how we think, how we 
act, and how we view the world and all the objects contained therein. More 
specifically, Foucault contends that individuals are subject to power relations that 
operate everywhere in society and in nearly every context. Individuals cannot 
escape from power1 and its effects because it “is employed and exercised through 
a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98), which—in effect—subjectifies 
us. In other words, power actively works to make us who we are and how we 
perceive the world.  
 Power relations subjectify individuals, in part, by way of discourse.2 As 
Hall (1997) points out, through everyday discourse, we as social animals come to 
learn the ways in which certain objects in society, including individuals, 
institutions, norms, and values, “can be meaningfully talked about … [and] 
                                                            
1 In contrast with more widely accepted notions of power by which power is seen 
as a commodity, a force, or an ability that allows for the influence and control 
over others (e.g., Dahl, 1989; Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959; Pfeffer, 
1992), Foucault (1990a) contends that power is a productive and not necessarily 
negative force from which no one is immune.  
 
2 Generally speaking, there have been two distinct camps with regard to defining 
discourse. The first camp follows a narrow conception of discourse as speech and 
writing, while the other camp encompasses a wider range of societal phenomena 
(see Howarth, 2000). These approaches focus on discourse as talk and talk in 
context, and discourse as a system of representation, respectively. For our 
purposes here, the latter approach to discourse is utilized, for it is in keeping with 
the Foucauldian framework for analysis which is presented.  
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reasoned about … [as well as] how ideas are put into practice … and used to 
regulate the conduct of others” (p. 44). Through the operation of discourse, the 
objects of our knowledge are created. In other words—to borrow Cruikshank’s 
(1999) phrasing3—knowledge is not born; it is made. And according to Foucault, 
knowledge is irrevocably tied to power. He unambiguously states that “power 
produces knowledge … [and] power and knowledge directly imply one another 
… there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p. 27). To be clear, this does not 
mean that power is knowledge, or that knowledge is power (a familiar mantra in 
self-help circles). Rather, what Foucault conveys is that knowledge is not free 
from the forces of power relations and that knowledge which has been constituted 
as authoritative in turn produces effects of power. Power and knowledge exist in a 
complex relationship that is irreducible.  
 So, when viewed in relation to the power/knowledge complex that 
Foucault presents, the presumption that an individual can achieve a state of 
impartiality becomes rather suspect. In Foucault’s eyes, our Will Travers is not 
simply influenced by forces outside of his control, he is in fact constituted by 
them, as is the knowledge which he seeks to objectively apply in his analysis of 
intelligence data. This of course presents something of an ontological quandary, 
to say the least. If one cannot truly be objective in the course of analyzing 
information, how then is one to go about the process of analysis? More to the 
                                                            
3 Cruikshank’s (1999) original phrase is “citizens are not born; they are made” (p. 
3). 
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point, if one cannot attain objectivity, how then can one discern the truth of our 
reality? And if one cannot discern the truth of our reality—or even closely 
approximate it—how then can we act with any kind of certainty?  
Much to the great consternation of many a scholar, the solution to this 
conundrum is to simply avoid making any claim to the ability to discover a 
universal truth. Like many so-called postmodernists, Foucault contends that one 
can engage in an empirical project that has all the trappings of a fully realized 
scientific enterprise while simultaneously denouncing the existence of a universal 
truth which is knowable. As with all other objects of our knowledge, the “truth”—
or more accurately, the truths—by which we define ourselves and our world is 
contingent upon discourse. At the same time, though, we must find ways to 
operate in and engage with the world in which we find ourselves. As Veyne 
(2010) states in his account of Foucault and his work: 
[The scientific enterprise from a Foucauldian frame of reference] can lead 
to detailed conclusions on ancient love, madness and prisons that are both 
scientifically established and perpetually provisional and revisable, just as 
are discoveries made by other sciences. Sooner or later someone will do 
better than Foucault and people will be amazed at his short-sightedness. 
But, for him, it was enough to dispel the four illusions that, as he saw it, 
were correspondence, the universal, the rational and the transcendental. (p. 
83)   
This suggests that we can pursue and know truths so long as we know and 
understand that they are provisional rather than universal. In other words, instead 
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of seeking to answer the question, “What is the truth?” the Foucauldian analyst 
seeks to determine, “How have the truths as we know them come to be, and to 
what end?” (see Veyne, 2010, p. 110).  
The Analytics of Government 
Of course, such a statement logically leads one to pose another 
challenging question, which is, How exactly does one go about investigating the 
processes by which the truth has come to be accepted and (in some cases) 
authoritative? Here we can turn to the analytic toolbox set forth by sociologists 
Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean for answers. Their approach to analyzing 
regimes of truth is called an analytics of government, and it is distinctly 
Foucauldian in its approach. It not only draws on the insights afforded by 
Foucault’s body of work, but it also actively pursues the historical and political 
underpinnings of contemporary truths in an effort to expose and critique them. In 
general terms, an analytics approach to empirical analysis of phenomena is “a 
type of study concerned with the analysis of the specific conditions under which 
particular entities emerge, exist and change” (Dean, 1999, p. 20). An analytics of 
government in particular “examines the conditions under which regimes of 
practices … or, routinized and ritualized way[s] we do things in certain places and 
at certain times … come into being, are maintained and are transformed” (Dean, 
1999, p. 21). Certainly professionalization—the process by which a technically-
based system of knowledge and set of norms for behavior in the workplace comes 
to be systematically applied by an exclusive occupational group (see Wilensky, 
1964; see also Abbott, 1988)—qualifies for such an examination. 
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An analytics of government operates from a particular understanding of 
the term government. It assumes a concept of government that moves beyond the 
commonly held state-centric notion. Working from a Foucauldian perspective, we 
come to understand government in a much broader sense—as “the conduct of 
conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). As Foucault (1983) clearly states, this broad 
understanding of government must include “not only … legitimately constituted 
forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action … which were 
destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern … is to 
structure the possible field of action of others” (p. 221). Here Foucault conjoins 
our traditional sense of government with broader themes of power and authority, 
and also reconciles it with his own notion of power as a productive and not solely 
dominating force (see Foucault, 1990/1976, pp. 93-95). As Foucault describes it, 
government is a form of power. An analytics of government, then, equips us with 
the ability to understand how and by what means we exercise this type of power 
in various attempts to constrain our own and others’ behavior. 
An analytics of government begins with identifying what Foucault 
(1990/1984) deems problematizations. Problematizations involve “the 
identification and examination of specific situations in which the activity of 
governing comes to be called into question, [and] the moments and the situations 
in which government becomes a problem” (Dean, 1999, p. 27) rather than simply 
the study of “behaviors or ideas,” or “societies and their ‘ideologies’” (Foucault, 
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1990b, p. 11). Problematizations  infrequently occur,4 and thus “should be treated 
as something relatively rare, as arising in particular circumstances, at certain 
times, in specific locations and having particular purposes” (Dean, 1996a, p. 214). 
When they do arise in history, they are pursuant to questions regarding “not only 
how to govern but who should govern and who has the right to govern,” (Ibid) 
and thus implicate that forces are at work on the nature of the self and on 
individual identity. This work on the self and identity becomes recognizable 
through the “questions it puts to aspects of conduct, the techniques it encourages, 
the ‘practices of the self’ framing it, the populations it targets, the goals it seeks 
and the social struggles and hierarchies in which it occurs” (Dean, 1996a, pp. 214-
215).  
A problematization is also a methodological approach by which the 
researcher interrogates her own contemporary position in the world, especially as 
it relates to her engagement in examining a historical problematization (see 
Alvesson & Sandberg, in press). By engaging in such an activity, one is in 
essence re-problematizing the historical problematization: “[She] engages in an 
activity which dismantles the co-ordinates of … her starting point and indicates 
the possibility of a different experience, of a change in … her way of being a 
subject or in … her relation to self—and so also, of a change of others’ selves” 
(Burchell, 1993, p. 277). Such an approach does not deny the reality of the social 
phenomena which the researcher is examining or the social situation in which the 
                                                            
4 As part and parcel of the arguments advanced here, I contend that the practice of 
benevolence was problematized in the early twentieth century. The elements of 
this argument are fully explored in Chapter 3. 
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researcher exists, however. On the contrary, a problematization shows “it was 
precisely some real existence in the world which was the target of social 
regulation at a given moment. … The problematization is an ‘answer’ to a 
concrete situation which is real” (Foucault, 1999, cited in Deacon, 2003, p. 75). 
Clearly an analytics of government differs from more modernist 
approaches to the examination of phenomena. It gives preference to “how” 
questions rather than “why” questions in an effort to reject an a priori 
understanding of government and identity, and thus makes it possible to avoid 
global and utopian statements about power and the truth. An analytics of 
government can be employed from a number of ethical and political perspectives 
(see Dean, 1999). For the analysis of the professionalization of the nonprofit 
sector which is presented here, a perspective which marries Foucauldian 
genealogy with issues of government and liberalism is employed. The framework 
for this methodological perspective is drawn from a series of studies commenced 
by Foucault himself as well as his colleagues in the 1970s (see Burchell, Gordon, 
& Miller, 1991), and from a number of scholars who have taken these studies as 
inspiration for their own work (see Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996b). The next 
section describes the tenets of genealogy and provides an overview of the concept 
of governmentality. The governmentalities of liberalism and neoliberalism, which 
are integral to the analysis presented in this dissertation, are discussed in great 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Writing “Effective History” 
Foucault’s “effective history” or genealogical analysis complements the 
analytics of government, for not only does it describe how things came to be, but 
it also affords us possibilities for action by demonstrating how history’s processes 
are not predetermined (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 225). The main tenets of genealogy 
can be found in Foucault’s (1984) seminal essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History,” in which he argues that traditional histories hold at their cores the notion 
that time is linear, that one historical event flows logically and causally into the 
next, forming a pattern which in itself holds inherent meaning (McNay, 1994, p. 
88). As historical events occur or are studied, historians place them in the 
appropriate pattern so that the overall unity of history is maintained—a unity 
which Foucault (1984) argues is false: “The world we know is not this ultimately 
simple configuration where events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, 
their final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a 
profusion of entangled events” (p. 89). Yet, not only do traditional historians 
underestimate the complexity of events, but they also unwittingly promote a 
pervasive historical sense of destiny, which has resulted in the veneration of “high 
points of historical development” (Foucault, 1984, p. 94), the perpetuation of a 
singular identity which cannot be dislodged (p. 95), and a will to knowledge 
whose pursuit cannot be deterred (pp. 95-96). In other words, traditional 
historiography privileges its own accounting of events and actively seeks to 
affirm it—so much so that alternate explanations find little more than suppression. 
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 By contrast, Foucault’s conception of genealogy does not rely on a linear 
conception of time, and thus does not privilege a particular accounting of events. 
Instead, a genealogy approaches history in this way: 
It begins with the problematization of an issue confronting the historian in 
society, and then seeks to examine its contingent historical and political 
emergence. The genealogist thus seeks to uncover the “lowly origins” and 
“play of dominations” that produced the phenomenon, while also showing 
possibilities excluded by the dominant logics of historical development. In 
this way, the genealogist discloses new possibilities foreclosed by existing 
interpretations. (Howarth, 2000, p. 73) 
Consequently, a genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’” (Foucault, 
1984, p. 77). According to Foucault (1984), a pursuit of the origins of events is a 
fool’s errand, one that is a metaphysical “attempt to capture the exact essence of 
things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities” (p. 78), 
despite the fact that events themselves have no real essence. The only essence 
possessed by a historical event is that with which we imbue it “in a piecemeal 
fashion from alien forms” (Foucault, 1984, p. 78). Thus, the genealogist 
ultimately seeks to “dispel the chimeras of the origin” (p. 80). 
 That is not to say that the genealogist is unconcerned with the transpiring 
of historical events. On the contrary, the genealogist is charged with uncovering 
the methods by which historical events become imbued with a particular essence 
over time. The genealogist interrogates the present through an examination of our 
historical past in order to chart the development of meaning. Foucault (1984) 
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argues that this notion is not a search for origins, but rather an investigation of an 
event’s descent and emergence5 (p. 80). An “analysis of descent” allows one to be 
free from the urge to synthesize events into a cohesive and (faux) meaningful 
whole (Foucault, 1984, p. 81). For “the search for descent is not the erecting of 
foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered 
immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of 
what was imagined consistent with itself” (Foucault, 1984, p. 82). Such a feat is 
accomplished by seeking “to identify the accidents, the minute deviations … the 
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to the things 
that … have value for us” rather than mapping “the destiny of a people” (p. 81).  
Of course, such a framework for analysis implies an active role for the 
genealogist, for she “recognizes the impossibility of avoiding … questions” 
regarding “the values of truth, knowledge and meaning” (Howarth, 2000, p. 72). 
In other words, one must be critically engaged in the examination of the present in 
order to uncover and chisel away at the calcified foundations of meaning that 
historical forces have developed and produced. This view of the genealogist’s 
critical role in analysis underscores Foucault’s assertion that power is and has 
been integral to the production of the discourses which constitute meaningful 
events in history: “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat 
until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces 
                                                            
5 In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault (1984) distinguishes 
between the terms Ursprung, Enstehung, and Herkunft, all of which have 
alternately been translated as “origin.” In order to make his argument that an 
analysis of descent and emergence differs from a search for origins, he asserts 
that, “we must attempt to reestablish their proper use” (p. 80).  
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warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus 
proceeds from domination to domination” (Foucault, 1984, p. 85). Thus, while the 
analysis of descent charts the accidents and errors that inform an event’s 
occurrence, an examination of an event’s emergence follows the play of these 
forces against one another. Foucault (1984) warns that we should not see the 
emergence of an event as the final occurrence in a long chain of events, but rather 
as “the entry of forces … their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage,” 
(p. 84), for “the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and punishment 
has had other purposes than setting an example” (p. 83). Forces struggle against 
one another throughout history and constantly produce events, none of which are 
culminations of meaning, but rather installments in the constant play of 
dominations over time. 
Recognition of this role that power plays in the production of discourses 
through the course of time acts, then, to strip traditional historiography of its 
constants—no longer can one declare that events in history are marching toward 
an ultimate destiny from a categorical origin. Observers of the present who 
produce traditional histories risk reinforcing society’s dominant discourses, rather 
than engage in documenting the history of conflict and domination that has served 
to constitute individuals, institutions, and discourses (Foucault, 1980, p. 117; see 
also Howarth, 2000, p. 72). The ultimate pursuit of genealogies is to counteract 
this process, and “to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to 
render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of 
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a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 85). 
No doubt this pursuit constitutes the “effective” in “effective histories.” 
Governing Rationalities 
 While Foucault’s genealogy provides us with the ethical foundation upon 
which to deploy an analytics of government, Foucault’s (1991) concept of 
government rationality, or governmentality, provides us with the means for 
gaining critical purchase (Dean, 1999). The work generated in this arena—not 
only by Foucault himself (1991), but also scholars such as Donezelot (1979), 
Dean (1996; 1999), Rose (1996a), Pasquino (1991), and Cruikshank (1999)—
provides an enlightening framework with which we can begin to trace the descent 
and emergence of the professionalization of the nonprofit sector.  
The term governmentality is not simply a neologism. It has, rather, two 
broad meanings in the literature (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 102-103; see also Dean, 
1999). First, it broadens our general understanding of the operation of government 
as a form of power. It is:  
A way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of 
government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is 
governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and 
practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was 
practiced. (Gordon, 1991, p. 3)  
The second understanding of governmentality entails a specific, historic 
accounting of the processes of government at work from the sixteenth century 
 38 
onward, which have been documented by Foucault and his colleagues (see 
Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991 for a preeminent collection of essays).  
Within this second, more specific context, Foucault (1991a) argues that 
governmentality as a concept emerged in the West as an “art of government” 
when contemporary literature—taking cues from Machiavelli’s The Prince—
began to focus on discussions of government not in relation to the sovereign and 
his authority, as had previously been the norm, but in relation to the management 
of the state itself and as a particular type of practice. Specifically, the art of 
government concerns itself with matters of order within the state—not necessarily 
with the sovereign who exists outside and independently of the state6 —and seeks 
to find the most productive method for establishing “a continuity, in both an 
upwards and downwards direction,” between the three basic forms of 
government: government of the self, government of the family, and government 
of the state (Foucault, 1991a, p. 91). Within this conceptual framework, the 
government of the family acts as the linchpin, for the art of government is 
fundamentally concerned with finding a way to introduce into the government of 
the state “the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within 
the family … and of making the family fortunes prosper” (p. 92). This process of 
managing families is also known as economy. Thus, the art of government has 
                                                            
6 Foucault (1991) asserts that the politics Machiavelli espouses in The Prince are 
underpinned by the notion that “the prince stood in relation of singularity and 
externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality. The prince acquires his 
principality by inheritance or conquest, but in any case he does not form part of it, 
he remains external to it” (pp. 89-90). As a result, the bond the prince has to his 
principality is an artificial one, and it remains eternally fragile. 
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ultimately been concerned with initiating practices of economy into the 
management of the state.  
This inauguration of economic practices into the government of the state is 
predicated upon and characterized by the materialization of a number of 
heretofore-unimagined concepts. These are the manifestation of population; the 
fusing of sovereign and disciplinary power with government into a triangle of 
authority, which targets the population; apparatuses of security that support this 
formation of power; and, the governmentalization of the state, which serves as the 
culmination of the three antecedent concepts (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 99-103; see 
also Dean, 1999, pp. 19- 20). First, the notion of population—as revealed over 
time by the increased utilization of statistics—is absolutely crucial to 
understanding the development of the art of government, primarily because it 
allows for the removal of the family unit from the central position it had occupied 
in the spectrum of applied models of government: 
Statistics … gradually reveals that population has its own regularities, its 
own rate of deaths and diseases, it cycles of scarcity … [and] a range of 
intrinsic, aggregate effects … such as epidemics, endemic levels of 
mortality, ascending spirals of labour [sic] and wealth … [as well as] 
specific economic effects. (Foucault, 1991a, p. 99) 
The advent of the notion of population, then, allows for a new interpretation of 
“the governed,” one that is constituted through a twofold image: one of “living, 
working and social beings, with their own customs [and] habits,” who are no 
longer simply subjects of the sovereign (Dean, 1999, p. 107), and one as members 
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of a “species body” (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 139) about whom one can have 
specific biological knowledge, especially through the application of statistical 
models (Dean, 1999, p. 107). Such a conception is not reducible to the family 
unit. Consequently, population begins to subsume the family, whereby the family 
unit eventually becomes an instrument of government rather than the model of it 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 100). As such, population replaces the family as the object of 
government (p. 100), a development profound enough to herald the possibility for 
this new conception of the art of government.  
The advent of population as the object of government accordingly 
necessitates a new understanding of the forces at work in society, for the rise and 
development of the art of government ultimately represents the transition from a 
solely sovereign form of rule over subjects to one in which management of the 
state is manifested through management of the population. In effect, we must 
come to understand that a new state of affairs such as this requires a more 
complex grid of authority, if individuals as subjects, as consumers, and as 
biological beings are all to be successfully managed, and managed in such a way 
as to achieve a “government of all and of each” (Gordon, 1991, p. 3). In this 
scenario, successful management of the population is successful management of 
the state. Fortunately, we can understand this process of transition by recognizing 
what Foucault (1991a) details as a new triangle of authority, one which is made 
manifest through the fusion of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and 
government, and which coalesces conclusively at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.  
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A sovereign society assumes the presence of a transcendent ruler who 
exercises power over a specific territory through legal and juridical apparatuses 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 103; see also Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 136; Dean, 1999, p. 
201). This sovereign power is embodied primarily through “the right to take life 
or let live,” and is exercised by the deduction or seizure “of things, time, bodies, 
and ultimately life itself” (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 136, emphasis in the original). 
Disciplinary power, on the other hand, involves the exercise of power not over the 
subject, but through [italics added] the individual, especially through one’s body 
(Foucault, 1995/1975), a process which is highly dependent upon “a tightly knit 
grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 104). It is essential to managing a population “in its depths 
and its details” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 102). In other words, disciplinary power 
involves regulation and order, while sovereign power concerns the exercise of 
authority. When the techniques of both disciplinary power and sovereign power 
are joined with those of government, however, what emerges is a new conception 
of governance. As this triangle of authority coalesces over time, sovereignty 
becomes “democratized and anchored in the rights of the legal and political 
subject;” discipline takes the form of a “generalized mechanism for the 
production of docile and useful subjects;” and, government entails the conduct of 
“the processes of life and labour [sic] found at the level of populations and in 
which the subject is revealed in its social, biological and economic form” (Dean, 
1999, pp. 102 – 103). 
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This triangle of discipline, sovereignty and government “has as its primary 
target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security” 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 102). In essence, the modern art of government has become 
obsessed with the security of the state, for “security … embraces the future … 
[and] implies extension in point of time with respect to all the benefits to which it 
is applied” (Bentham, cited in Gordon, 1991, p. 19). Consequently, the modern art 
of government is preoccupied with refining the techniques involved in managing 
the population. This obsession becomes embodied through the devotion of much 
of its effort towards establishing, maintaining, and growing prosperity, which is 
“a necessary condition of the state’s own security … [and] in itself … nothing if 
not the capacity to preserve and hold on to, and where possible even to enhance, a 
certain global level of existence” (Gordon, 1991, p. 19). Prosperity is made not 
only possible, but also more probable through the application of particular 
apparatuses “whose function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, 
economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population” (Foucault, 1978, 
cited in Gordon, 1991, p. 19). Generally speaking, these apparatuses present 
themselves in the form of the armed forces, police forces, spy agencies, public 
welfare and educational systems, laissez-faire-style market regulators and 
standards, and more (Dean, 1999, p. 20). In short, we find that the object of the 
modern art of government is the development and cultivation of technologies and 
knowledge that will ensure the health, wealth and safety of the population and, 
thus, the longevity of the state itself. 
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Foucault (1991a) deems the process by which these technologies and 
knowledges have come together over time to cement a definitive practice for the 
management of the population as the governmentalization of the state. More 
specifically, the governmentalization of the state is defined as “the long-term 
trajectory by which the exercise of sovereignty comes to be articulated through 
the regulations of populations and individuals and the psychological, biological, 
sociological and economic processes that constitute them” (Dean, 1999, p. 210). 
Its emergence is the consequence of the integration of population, the discipline-
sovereign-government triangle of authority, and apparatuses of security, and it is a 
necessary historical development for the eventual formation of modern forms of 
governmentality like liberalism and neoliberalism.  
Discourse and the Search for Meaning 
The professionalization of the nonprofit sector emerged—and continues to 
operate—during a time in the United States when the governing rationalities of 
neoliberalism proliferate. As such, employing an analytics of government to 
examine the rise of professionalism in the nonprofit sector from an ethico-
political perspective which is animated by critical work on power, government, 
and liberalism is appropriate. Not only this, but it is also key to understanding 
how the nature of nonprofit service was problematized in the early twentieth 
century, and the subsequent effects of doing so.   
To fully employ an analytics of government from this critical stance in 
examination of the problematization of nonprofit service, one must explore the 
discourse which is associated with professionalization within the sector. Here the 
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conception of discourse utilized is gleaned from Foucault’s later work. Within the 
genealogical framework, “the discursive and the material are linked together in a 
symbiotic relationship of the power-knowledge complex” and, as such, 
“discourse, or a particular discursive formation, is to be understood as an 
amalgam of material practices and forms of knowledge linked together in a non-
contingent relation” (McNay, 1994, p. 108).  Foucault (1980) refers to this notion 
as a dispositif, which is: 
A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. … The apparatus 
itself is the system of relations that can be established between these 
elements. (p. 194) 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) contend that Foucault’s notion of the dispositif can 
be viewed as both a methodological instrument of the analyst, designed to bring 
together disparate practices into a grid for the purposes of analysis, and the 
practices themselves, which act to constitute subjects (p. 121; see also Howarth, 
2000, p. 78). The concept of the dispositif, then, allows the genealogist to place 
discursive formations within a larger framework for analysis, and offer up a 
critique of them in relation to broader elements. More specifically, by examining 
the dispositif of nonprofit professionalization, we can illuminate the conditions 
under which the regime of practice associated with nonprofit service was 
transformed in the twentieth century.  
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 In practice this process involves assessing texts7 produced by and for the 
nonprofit sector with regard to the processes of professionalization. Using 
Caplow’s (1954) and Wilensky’s (1964) frameworks of professionalization of an 
occupation as guides, the texts selected for analysis include those that facilitate 
the creation of a body of knowledge for the nonprofit sector, especially as it 
relates to engendering a common norm or sense of understanding of what 
constitutes appropriate and ethical individual and collective behavior in the 
provision of service. This includes examining the nonprofit sector’s leading 
domestic scholarly journals, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (NVSQ) 
and Nonprofit Leadership and Management (NLM). Texts including articles, 
tables of contents, and abstracts were examined from NVSQ for years 1972 to 
2010 and from NLM from 1996 to 2010. While the years of documents examined 
from NVSQ represent all years the journal has been issued, data from the first six 
years of NLM (1990-1995) were not available for examination. Analysis also 
included examination of nonprofit training programs. Using Seton Hall 
University’s census of nonprofit management programs as a source (Seton Hall 
University, n.d.), curricula from universities and colleges offering Master’s 
degrees in nonprofit management were examined. Given the diversity and 
quantity of nonprofit-related degree programs available, only those universities 
                                                            
7 From a discourse analytic perspective, texts are analyzed as a proxy for 
discourses. As Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) state, “discourses cannot be 
studied directly—they can only be explored by examining the texts that constitute 
them” (p. 636). Studying texts, and the production and consumption of bodies of 
texts, allows us examine the relationships between discourse and social reality, 
including the ways in which particular discourses become imbued with meaning 
and authority.  
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and colleges that specifically offer nonprofit management graduate degrees were 
selected for analysis.8 In all, I examined the curricula of twenty-one Master’s 
programs.   
In order to highlight the processes by which the gap between the academic 
community and the practicing community is bridged, texts from a number of other 
sources were also assessed. First is the code of ethics and accompanying user 
guides which influence the actions of members of the Association of Fundraising 
Professionals (AFP). Founded in 1960, AFP is the first professional association 
that operates at a national level specifically for individuals working in the 
nonprofit sector (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2010, p. 3). Second, 
the contents of the sector’s leading domestic trade journals, namely The Nonprofit 
Times and The Chronicle of Philanthropy, have been analyzed. Texts including 
articles, tables of contents, and abstracts were examined from The Nonprofit 
Times for years 2000 to 2010 and from The Chronicle of Philanthropy from 1998 
to 2010, which are the years for which data were available for examination. These 
texts were analyzed primarily to determine the methods by which the service ideal 
that is promoted in both the academic community and in the AFP’s code of ethics 
is supported. Finally, those universities and colleges that offer graduate degrees in 
nonprofit management also sometimes offer professional development programs 
to practitioners in the sector. The curricula associated with these programs were 
                                                            
8 As opposed to those that offer an MBA with courses in nonprofit management; 
an MBA in nonprofit management; an MPA with courses in nonprofit 
management; an MPA in nonprofit management; or, an MSW with courses in 
nonprofit management (see Mirabella & Wish, 2000). In addition, I excluded any 
graduate certificate programs and doctoral programs.  
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analyzed as well. In all, I examined curricula from seven professional 
development programs. 
The discourse contained in these texts was analyzed in order to locate the 
meaning associated with professionalism in service. More specifically, the study 
of the discourse of professionalism in service includes locating the following 
elements, as set forth by Hall (1997): 
 Statements about “professionalism” which engender a certain kind of 
knowledge about a shared system of norms in service; 
 The rules which “prescribe certain ways of talking about these topics and 
exclude other ways—which govern what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ about” 
professionalism; 
 Individuals who personify the discourse—for instance, the professional or 
ethical manager;  
 The methods by which knowledge of professionalism acquires authority and 
begins constituting “truth”; 
 Institutional practices for dealing with those subjects “whose conduct is being 
regulated and organized according to those ideas”; 
 Acknowledgement that another discourse will supplant the current one and 
open up new discursive formations (pp. 45, 46). 
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Locating these elements allows us to focus our attention on the mechanisms9 that 
are involved in constituting the contemporary regime of practice that is associated 
with service in the nonprofit sector. 
Validity and Reliability 
The methodological approach utilized here to analyze the discourse 
associated with the professionalization of the nonprofit sector is an informal one 
(Peräkylä, 2005). More specifically, there was no reliance on a predefined 
protocol in executing the analysis. Such an informal approach is not uncommon 
with qualitative researchers who work exclusively with written texts (in this 
study, this includes scholarly articles and abstracts, course curricula, editorials, 
trade articles, and a written code of ethics and its accompanying user guides). The 
analytic approach consisted of reading and rereading the selected texts to identify 
key themes to “draw a picture of the presuppositions and meanings that constitute 
the … world of which the textual material is a specimen” (Peräkylä, 2005, p. 
870). As such, greater emphasis is placed on theoretical underpinnings that 
concern the world from which the texts were gleaned rather than on predefined 
procedures. 
Since the method of analysis is qualitative in nature, there is little concern 
regarding the issue of the reliability as it relates to the approach utilized here (see 
Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). The approach is distinctly postmodern in that it assumes 
that the social world is comprised of multiple, changing realities. Thus, replication 
                                                            
9 In an analytics of government, the mechanisms that constitute regimes of 
practices of government are referred to as the techne, the episteme, forms of 
visibility, and processes of subjectification (see Dean, 1999). Each of these 
mechanisms is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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of the results here is neither a likely nor practical assumption. In order to inspire 
confidence in readers that a right interpretation (not the right interpretation) has 
been achieved, however, and that strong efforts have been made to gather and 
produce credible data, the issue of validity must be addressed. The validity of this 
analysis is informed by Richardson’s crystal-as-metaphor approach: 
The central imaginary [for the validity of postmodern textual analysis] is 
the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite 
variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and 
angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, alter, but are not amorphous . . 
. . What we see depends on our angle of repose. Not triangulation, 
crystallization . . . Crystallization, without losing structure, deconstructs 
the traditional idea of “validity” (we feel how there is no single truth, we 
see how texts validate themselves); and crystallization provides us with a 
deepened, complex, thoroughly partial understanding of the topic. 
(Richardson, 1997, in Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208) 
Utilizing such an approach to the validity of the texts which have been analyzed 
allows us to uncover and—to some extent—overcome the hidden assumptions 
inherent in traditional views of validity. Not only this, but it is also entirely 
consistent with a Foucauldian framework for the empirical analysis of worldly 
phenomena. 
Conclusion 
 Unlike the Truxton Spanglers and Will Travers of the world, the analysis 
in which we are engaged here is one of partiality rather than objectivity. It is 
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distinctly and forthrightly critical in nature. And ultimately the truth pursued is 
not a universal one, but rather a provisional one. So, what does this afford us in 
terms of understanding the professionalization of the nonprofit sector? Currently, 
much of the literature that discusses the professionalization of the nonprofit sector 
or professionalism in general simply serves to reinforce existing normative 
positions on the issue. Professionalism has become synonymous with providing 
service in an accountable, responsible, and competent manner, and while a 
handful of scholars have noted some of its adverse consequences, few advocate 
for service provision that is a return to what Hall (1992) calls “methodless 
enthusiasm.” This is a scholarly stance which has in turn influenced practitioners 
in the field to strive to be the most accountable, responsible, and competent 
administrators of services that they can be. Such a process holds consequences 
with regard to the construction of meaning and identity within the nonprofit sector 
that have yet to be explored. 
The critical approach employed here offers the nonprofit sector, and its 
scholars and practitioners an alternative framework for viewing the 
professionalization of the sector, its organizations, and its personnel—one that 
focuses squarely on the construction of meaning and identity in the nonprofit 
sector, at least as it relates to professionalization. Rather than simply working to 
reinforce existing normative positions with regard to professionalization, an 
analytics of government affords us the opportunity to inquire into how we think of 
ourselves and the world in which we live (Dean, 1996a). More specifically, the 
approach of this analysis allows nonprofit scholars and practitioners to view the 
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mechanisms by which they have come to think of themselves as professionals in 
the sector—as well as the corresponding consequences—through a different lens. 
An analytics of government “removes the ‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ 
character of how things are done,” (Dean, 1999, p. 38), and in doing so, 
demonstrates how things can be different. Without engaging in such critical self-
examination, nonprofit administrators, institutions, and scholars might not return 
to “methodless enthusiasm,” but they might run the risk of engaging in 
“perfunctory professionalism.” 
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEMATIZING BENEVOLENCE 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I asserted my intention to engage in an 
examination of the professionalization and rationalization of the nonprofit sector 
utilizing the alternative framework afforded by the analytics of government. Here 
I begin my analysis by situating the “foundation problem”—the series of events 
involving private foundations which nonprofit scholars contend led to the passage 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969—as an issue of government. This involves not 
only recounting the events which led to the passage of the legislation, but also 
understanding why those in authority, namely the Congress, journalists, and the 
public at large, came to see foundations and their mode of operating as a problem. 
I contend that the “foundation problem” arose as the result of historical and 
political forces forcing a movement away from a more charitable mode of caring 
for and aiding others and toward a philanthropic mode of service. I also argue that 
in the late twentieth century, the state—through the passage of laws like the 
reform of the tax code which pertains to tax-exempt organizations and the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969—normalized this philanthropic mode of service to others in 
order to create a “market for benevolence.” This market for benevolence serves to 
reinforce and promote the values of the marketplace, including entrepreneurialism 
and competition, in accordance with neoliberal governing rationalities.  
An Issue of Government 
 In the early twentieth century, private foundations assumed (albeit 
reluctantly) the mantle of the proverbial bad guy in American society. It was a 
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position that they would maintain into the early 1970s. Public opinion soured on 
foundations when it became clear that there existed a fundamental disconnection 
between the reality of foundations’ activities and the much loftier manner in 
which the public regarded the nature of benevolent service in general. Popular 
discourse held that all organizations engaged in benevolent service, including 
foundations, should employ a philanthropic approach to their activities, by which 
they worked to solve society’s problems through the rational application of 
knowledge (see Gross, 2003). In actuality, foundations’ activities were much 
more opaque and unpredictable—so much so that both journalists and special 
Congressional committees launched investigations to determine what foundations 
were doing by way of the public’s goodwill. These efforts revealed that 
foundations were not actively engaged in serving the public interest, at least not to 
a degree which accorded with public expectations. In fact, more often than not 
they were working in their own best interests rather than those of the public. 
According to contemporary nonprofit scholars, it is this disconnection between 
public expectations of benevolent service and the organizations that provide it, 
and the reality of foundations’ activities in the early twentieth century that 
provided the impetus for the formulation and passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1969—a law that ultimately forced all benevolent organizations to reform their 
organizations and methods of service provision.  
 The popular accounting of the “foundation problem,” its genesis, and its 
consequences is very straightforward. Indeed, the chain of events seems perfectly 
linear: Foundations breached the public’s trust by not actively and enthusiastically 
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engaging in the promotion of a philanthropic approach to benevolent service; 
therefore, the Government regulated their activities to reform their behavior and 
to make them worthy of public trust once again. However, when the unfolding of 
events surrounding foundations in America in the twentieth century is viewed as 
an issue of government, indications of a problematization begin to emerge from 
the narrative. To recall, a problematization1 involves a situation in which the ways 
we govern and the ways in which we are governed are called into question. More 
pointedly, those with authority begin to question—to pose as a problem—the 
ways in which we conduct ourselves as well as the conduct of others. This 
particular problematization involves journalists and Congressional representatives 
calling into question the manner in which foundations provided benevolent 
service. Not only this, but—because foundations failed to actively engage in the 
expected philanthropic approach to benevolent service—the conduct of the 
recipients of foundations’ services is by proxy called into question as well. This 
includes both individuals who received direct services from foundations and other 
benevolent organizations that received funds from them.   
 As an issue of government, the “foundation problem” poses a rather 
complex set of analytic issues. First and most importantly is the emergence of the 
problem itself. How did the public, journalists, and the Congress collectively 
come to think of foundations’ activities as a problem? A philanthropic approach 
to service was clearly expected of foundations, but why? Then there is the 
resolution of the problem. How has the problem of foundations been answered? 
                                                            
1 For a more in-depth overview of problematizations, refer back to Chapter 2. 
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Contemporary nonprofit scholars have consistently pointed to the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 and its cascading effects of professionalization and rationalization as the 
answer. However, this fails to address the role this legislation plays in making a 
philanthropic governing rationality the dominant rationality in contemporary 
nonprofit discourse. Indeed, this viewpoint does not address at all how 
philanthropy came to play such a significant role in benevolent service.  
In order to gain greater understanding of the emergence of the “foundation 
problem” and the manner of its resolution, “the questions [these] authorities 
ask[ed] concerning how ‘governors’ … conduct themselves and how ‘the 
governed’ conduct themselves” (Dean, 1999, p. 27) need to be addressed.2 In 
other words, we must endeavor to understand how the popular conception of 
benevolent service and benevolent organizations emerged and then informed 
norms, values, and codes of conduct for both the governors and the governed. 
Then, we must consider how the reality of benevolent service in the early 
twentieth century conflicted with these prescribed modes of acting in and seeing 
the world. Finally, we must examine the emergence of the discourse that 
constitutes the contemporary nonprofit sector and illustrate the manner in which 
this discourse works to solve the problem that foundations initially posed in the 
early twentieth century. Only by examining both the emergence of the problem 
                                                            
2 Here the governors are understood to be those who found, oversee, and manage 
foundations, while the governed are those who are recipients of foundations’ 
services. This is said, however, with the caveat in mind that it is oftentimes very 
difficult to distinguish between the governing and the governed in a 
problematization (see Dean, 1999, pp. 27-28).  
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and its answer can we begin to understand how benevolent service is implicated 
in our own and others’ government. 
The Problem with Benevolent Service3 
 Even though the drumbeats of public discontent could be heard as early as 
1915 (see Hall, 1992), benevolent organizations did not really become the object 
of public scrutiny until the 1930s. The scrutiny then lasted through the 1960s and 
into the early 1970s. During this time, members of the public, a number of their 
Congressional representatives, and journalists questioned the loyalty of 
benevolent organizations and their purpose in American life. During the latter half 
of the nineteenth century and continuing through both world wars, the United 
States witnessed not only an unprecedented proliferation of foundations4 and 
other tax-exempt organizations, but also the reliance upon these organizations by 
the federal Government to provide much needed social services (Hall, 2003, p. 
370). The Congress passed a number of key pieces of legislation to better enable 
individuals and corporations to receive tax breaks in return for contributing to tax-
                                                            
3 I have deliberately chosen to use the term “benevolent service” here as an 
umbrella term to refer to all service aimed at caring for and aiding others. This is 
done in an effort to distinguish this more all-encompassing notion of service from 
the notions of charitable service and philanthropic service.  
 
4 Keppel (1930) articulates the difference between a foundation and a trust: “[A 
foundation is] a fund established for a purpose deemed ‘charitable’ in law, 
administered under the direction of trustees customarily operating under State or 
Federal charter and enjoying privileges with respect to taxation and continuity of 
existence not accorded to ‘non-charitable’ trust funds. The fund is to be used for a 
designated purpose, broad or narrow as the case may be” (p. 3). 
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exempt organizations.5 This—coupled with legislators’ inability to streamline the 
tax code so that it did not allow wealthy individuals to take advantage of every 
loophole contained therein to funnel their personal wealth into tax-exempt 
foundations—led to the establishment of a number of tax-exempt institutions 
whose public purpose was dubious at best (Hall, 2003, p. 370). In addition, the 
federal Government funneled increasing amounts of responsibility and public 
dollars to these organizations to achieve programmatic objectives.6 At the same 
time, however, very few regulatory mechanisms were established by which the 
public could monitor how these funds and opportunities were being put to use in 
everyday life. As a result, many saw the tax privileges enjoyed by those who 
could afford to make monetary contributions and the growing wealth of 
benevolent organizations as unfair and unreasonable (Hall, 2003, p. 371).  
 None of these organizations drew public and Congressional ire more than 
foundations, however. While many individuals viewed all benevolent 
organizations with a somewhat jaundiced eye in the early twentieth century, 
foundations were viewed with the most suspicion and, ultimately, the most 
outrage. Muckraking journalists—exerting little effort to temper their scathing 
                                                            
5 Key legislation includes the passage of a universal income tax in 1942, which 
was steeply progressive for both individuals and corporations and which created 
powerful incentives to make deductible donations to benevolent organizations 
(Hall, 2003, p. 364).  
 
6 Of paramount importance is legislation associated with the New Deal (Hall, 
2006), but also the GI Bill, which spurred growth in new institutions of higher 
learning, and legislation establishing the National Institutes of Health and 
National Science Foundation, and expanding Social Security and public social 
and health insurance, all of which provided funds for the establishment and 
growth of private organizations with a public purpose and their programs (Hall, 
2003). 
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opinions of foundations and their founders and activities—made them the subject 
of a number of investigative efforts (e.g., Coon, 1938; Keppel, 1930; Laski, 1966; 
Lundberg, 1946, 1968). Not only this, but the Congress also made foundations the 
subject of inquiry in no fewer than six special committees within a sixty-year 
timespan (see Hall, 1992). The goal of each committee was to investigate the 
nature and scope of foundations’ activities in an effort to determine whether they 
were undermining the public trust. In a fairly straightforward quid pro quo 
relationship, the public trusted that the organizations to which tax-exemption was 
granted were providing a service that in some way benefited society at large. 
While it took several decades to gather the momentum necessary to implement 
any significant changes in the way foundations were regulated by the federal 
Government, the ultimate result of these inquiries is the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
which fundamentally changed the way foundations and other benevolent 
organizations do business. 
 To our contemporary minds, such pointed attacks on foundations might 
seem rather antithetical to the generally positive view with which they are 
regarded today (Steinberg, 1997). Why such public ire? In short, at the heart of 
this public backlash against foundations is an implicit notion of what benevolent 
organizations are supposed to be and how they should conduct their business. 
Clearly members of the public—and soon thereafter the Congress—took umbrage 
at the unparalleled privilege that was afforded to foundations by way of the ease 
with which one could achieve tax-exempt status and obtain federal dollars to 
provide services of a potentially dubious public nature. This is due in no small 
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measure to the proliferation of foundations established by incredibly wealthy 
industrialists like the Rockefellers, Andrew Carnegie, Julius Rosenwald, Edward 
Filene, and more (Sealander, 2006), which had the potential to direct vast 
amounts of personal (and some would say, ill begotten) wealth at transforming 
society and which many saw as advancing private interests rather than public ones 
(Hall, 2006, p. 371). More pointedly, the public ire aimed at foundations in the 
early part of the twentieth century expresses a sense of a betrayal of trust being 
perpetrated by not only the foundations themselves, but also by the Government, 
which facilitated their unmanaged growth, and by their (sometimes) wealthy 
benefactors, who seemingly felt little obligation to demonstrate their loyalty to the 
American public. In sum, the reality of what benevolent humanitarianism had 
become did not accord with the public’s notion of what it was supposed to be. 
Advancing a Philanthropic Enterprise 
 The commonly held notion of what foundations and their activities are 
supposed to entail is well summarized in this passage from the special 
Congressional committee formed in 1952 to investigate the activities of 
foundations: 
While the important part they play and have played in palliative 
measures—that is, in relieving existing areas of suffering—must not be 
overlooked, their dominant and most significant function has been 
displayed in supplying the risk or venture capital expended in advancing 
the frontiers of knowledge. (H.R. Rep. No. 82-2514, 1953, p. 3) 
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Clearly the primary purpose of a foundation is not to provide direct assistance to 
the needy, but rather to facilitate the accumulation and distribution of knowledge 
in various fields. Indeed, the report goes on to laud foundations’ significant 
contributions in advancing knowledge in fields ranging from medicine to public 
administration, and from the social sciences to adult education (H.R. Rep. No. 82-
2514, 1953, p. 4). The foundation is best viewed, then, as a model philanthropic 
enterprise. 
 A philanthropic enterprise should not be confused with a charitable one.7 
Charity is defined as “what we give to alleviate the need, suffering, and sorrow of 
others, whether we know them or not” (Bremner, 1994, p. xi). Furthermore, 
charity “expresses an impulse to personal service; it engages individuals in 
concrete, discrete acts of compassion and connection to other people” (Gross, 
2003, p. 31). The very act of alleviating an individual’s suffering connects one 
human being to another whether a previous relationship existed or not. It comes as 
no surprise, then, that the modern-day understanding of charity draws from a 
lineage based in a Judeo-Christian ethic of benevolence toward others in service 
to God (Veyne, 1990/1976). Philanthropy, on the other hand, which has its roots 
in Enlightenment thought, seeks “to apply reason to the solution of social ills and 
needs. … [It] aspires not so much to aid individuals as to reform society. Its 
object is the promotion of progress through the advance of knowledge” (Gross, 
                                                            
7 There is debate as to whether charity and philanthropy hold the same meaning. 
Scholars like Richard Gross and Daniel Boorstin argue that a philanthropic 
approach to social service differs significantly from a charitable one while other 
scholars, such as Robert Payton, contend that charity and philanthropy are one 
and the same (see Gross, 2003, p. 31). As will become evident through the course 
of my argument, I concur with Gross’ and Boorstin’s viewpoint. 
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2003, p. 31). By advancing the rational application of knowledge to cure society’s 
ills, philanthropy hopes to make charity unnecessary and obsolete. 
Historian Richard Gross (2003) asserts that a fledgling United States 
witnessed the inauguration of a profound turn from charity to philanthropy, which 
coincided with the emergence of formal voluntary associations. In the years 
preceding the Revolutionary War, the care and development of individuals took 
place primarily within families and in communities, as there were very few formal 
institutions devoted to caring for and serving others. There existed little separation 
between those in need and the rest of the community. Indeed, the Puritans 
epitomized the spirit of charitable service in that they regarded providing 
assistance to others as the embodiment of a godly community. Aid to others was 
decidedly “direct, personal, [and] concrete” (Gross, 2003, p. 33). With the rise of 
voluntary associations, however, this approach dramatically changed.  
In his Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville captured the 
beginning of the transformation from individually-based service to institutionally-
based service when he visited the new republic in the 1830s. In fact, he famously 
marveled at the proliferation of nearly innumerable types of voluntary 
associations (Tocqueville, 1998/1840, p. 150). In the essays that he devoted to 
voluntary associations and the role that they play in American politics and civil 
society (e.g., Tocqueville, 1998/1834, 1998/1840), Tocqueville contends that in 
democratic societies like the United States, voluntary associations can play a 
fundamental role in maintaining social order. In aristocratic societies, financial 
dependence upon wealthy benefactors engenders compulsory association. In 
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democracies, however, individuals are less obliged towards compulsory 
association since they are afforded more independence in thought and action. In 
other words, in a democratic society, there exists a fundamental paradox between 
individual liberty and social obligation. While the promotion of individual 
equality is fundamental to the exercise of democracy, it also engenders a 
proclivity toward social alienation rather than cohesion. Accordingly, he also 
argues that “all … become powerless if they do not voluntarily [italics added] 
learn to help one another” (Tocqueville, 1998/1840, p. 151). It is only through 
voluntary association with other citizens that an individual truly has power in a 
democratic society. Indeed, Tocqueville believed that the power to form 
associations is even more important than the freedom of the press—which he felt 
is vital to democracy—because associations have more authority simply through 
the quantity of their members who collectively amplify one another’s zeal for a 
cause (Tocqueville, 1998/1834). 
It is perhaps for this very reason that voluntary associations were 
distrusted in the years immediately following the Revolutionary War. Some 
citizens felt that while associations might be necessary for engendering social 
cohesion in a new democracy, they also allowed certain interests to become more 
powerful than others (Hall, 2006, p. 35). Since they represented the collective will 
of individuals who were interested in pursuing certain (special) interests, 
voluntary associations did not necessarily represent the will of the majority of 
individuals. Thus, they were seen as a threat to the very democratic processes they 
embodied. So, in post-Revolutionary War America, voluntary associations 
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represented a democratic dilemma: individuals needed associations in order to be 
heard at times other than on election day, but associations also made some 
citizens more equal than others by amplifying their wealth, status, and influence 
(Hall, 2006, p. 36). This perhaps explains why the care and development of 
individuals continued to take place primarily within families, communities, and 
congregations while voluntary associations remained primarily the realm of 
contentious political activism.   
It was not until the early decades of the nineteenth century that Americans 
would turn to the voluntary association as the essential vehicle for facilitating 
their benevolent work. At that time, “economic and social change eroded 
traditional communities and family ties [such that] Americans were increasingly 
willing to experiment with new kinds of formal organizations” to facilitate the 
“caregiving, healing, [and] educating” of individuals (Hall, 2006, p. 39). This 
coincided with the aftermath of the Second Great Awakening8—essentially a 
backlash against secularism, which was fueled by a number of activist evangelical 
congregations. This widespread movement resulted in the increased formation of 
Protestant-run voluntary associations to counter the government-run and 
privately-run institutions (i.e., schools, hospitals, asylums, etc.) which emerged in 
the late eighteenth century in an effort to care for those individuals who had 
become disconnected from their families and communities as a result of social 
and economic upheaval.  
                                                            
8 The first Great Awakening was sparked by fiery evangelical minister Jonathan 
Edwards in the early eighteenth century. It emphasized individuals’ moral agency 
while also challenging Governmental oversight of religion (see Hall, 2006, pp. 
34-35). 
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In the early nineteenth century, this new trend in institutionalized charity 
co-existed alongside the philanthropic enterprises that emerged in the United 
States in the mid-1700s. Influenced by the ideas of prominent Protestant minister 
Cotton Mather,9 Benjamin Franklin took the lead in pre-Revolutionary War 
America in forming new associations to promote the general welfare and to 
provide an alternative to charity (Gross, 2003, p. 38). He saw almsgiving as self-
defeating and believed that the poor needed to be inspired in order to achieve self-
support. If one achieved self-support, then the root cause of one’s own poverty or 
other unfortunate circumstance would be cured and there would be no need for 
additional charity. It is worth quoting Franklin at length to illustrate the 
distinction between his philanthropic approach and the conventional Puritanical 
approach: 
Human felicity is produc’d [sic] not so much by great pieces of good 
fortune that seldom happen, as by little advantages that occur every day. 
Thus, if you teach a poor young man to shave himself, and keep his razor 
in good order, you may contribute more to the happiness of his life than in 
giving him a thousand guineas. The money may be soon spent, the regret 
only remaining of having foolishly consumed it; but in the other case, he 
escapes the frequent vexation of waiting for barbers, and of their 
sometimes dirty fingers, offensive breaths, and dull razors; he shaves 
                                                            
9 In the early eighteenth century, Mather redefined charity in urban areas by 
advocating “friendly visiting” of the poor, taking advantage of voluntary 
associations to support aid, and philanthropic support by the rich to aid the poor 
through the establishment of schools, colleges, and hospitals (Hall, 2006, p. 34). 
 65 
when most convenient to him, and enjoys daily the pleasures of its being 
done with a good instrument. (Gross, 2003, p. 39) 
In this passage we clearly find the philanthropic emphasis on the benefits of 
knowledge. In the scenario Franklin presents, the young man lacks the requisite 
knowledge to properly care for himself, and thus the only remedy for such a 
situation is the appropriate application of knowledge. Once this knowledge has 
been imparted to the young man, then he is free to apply it for his own continued 
benefit. In other words, knowledge is freeing for the individual. A more charitable 
act would presumably only provide the young man with short-lived relief, which 
would perpetuate his unfortunate circumstances. 
To think that a philanthropic approach to caring for individuals subsumed 
a charitable one would be a fallacy, however. Historians have dubbed the early 
nineteenth century as the Age of Benevolence, with voluntary associations 
proliferating in bids to promote both charitable and philanthropic approaches to 
humanitarianism. In fact, since the urban landscape was still fairly small and 
personal in its scope, philanthropy could easily be promoted while still being 
infused with a charitable spirit (Gross, 2003, p. 39). Many recipients of 
philanthropic assistance knew their benefactors. It would take a combination of 
religious zealotry, a landmark Supreme Court case involving Dartmouth College, 
and the spread of urban poverty to unravel the relatively amenable partnership 
between philanthropy and charity. 
First, beginning in the 1820s, public opinion began turning against 
voluntary associations that had been set up for charitable causes, especially those 
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that were founded by religious congregations (Gross, 2003, p. 42). Opinion turned 
against these particular types of organizations because some felt that they had 
stopped being responsive to public will. In some cases, religious associations 
were more interested in saving souls (a personal and denominational goal) than in 
simply feeding the poor in their soup kitchens (a public goal). As Gross (2003) 
states it, “infused with the religious zeal of the Second Great Awakening, 
evangelicals enlisted charity in the crusade for Christ. The ‘spiritual food’ of the 
gospel was now the ‘one thing needful;’ let others run soup kitchens for the poor” 
(p. 42). Over time this sentiment—once confined to small, local, community-
based associations—suffused large, national organizations which had significant 
influence across state lines, as congregations came together to found large-scale 
societies that reflected and widely promoted their beliefs. Their beliefs did not 
necessarily coincide with the majority of public opinion. 
At approximately the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a 
landmark case involving Dartmouth College—an event which seemed to support 
the public’s fear regarding private benevolent institutions’ ability to perform 
public functions. In 1816, William Plumer, the governor of New Hampshire, 
seized control of Dartmouth College, which had been founded in 1769 by the Earl 
of Dartmouth as a Congregationalist institution of higher learning, in an effort to 
make it a formally public institution (Hall, 2006, p. 36; see also McGarvie, 2003). 
Although he was a devout Baptist, Plumer saw the Second Great Awakening and 
the evangelical-run charitable voluntary associations it produced as a threat to the 
democratic principles upon which the United States had been founded. By seizing 
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control of Dartmouth College and reorganizing it, he hoped to spark a counter-
revolution to these forces. The sitting trustees of Dartmouth College 
unsurprisingly did not concur with his sentiments and contested his actions in 
court. While the New Hampshire Supreme Court initially upheld Plumer’s 
position, the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court where the lauded 
Daniel Webster argued the college’s position. The trustees of Dartmouth College 
eventually won the case on the grounds that New Hampshire had violated Article 
II, Section 10 of the Constitution, which forbids states from impinging upon 
private contractual obligations (Hall, 2006, p. 26). More specifically, while the 
trustees conceded that the college’s charter was granted by the Government, the 
Court upheld that the act of donating gifts to the college constituted a private 
contract which a state could not nullify even if the gifts were made in pursuit of a 
public purpose such as education. 
After this landmark legal decision, the Government was forced to be more 
careful in the manner with which it regarded private institutions and their ability 
to carry out public goals. As McGarvie (2003) astutely points out, “to continue to 
rely on private entities after 1819 risked creating educational, welfare, or 
infrastructure systems significantly at odds with legislative perceptions of the 
public interest” (p. 102). Since they could not necessarily control how private 
institutions carried out public goals, both the states and the federal Government 
were forced to determine their public welfare priorities, and accordingly devote 
their own resources to them. Public priorities that were deemed of lesser value 
were then left to private benevolent organizations to fulfill in their own manner. 
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Thus, at this time, the Government’s public welfare obligations were effectively 
and distinctly split from those accorded to private benevolent organizations, 
especially those of a religious persuasion. 
As far as the average citizen was concerned, though, there remained a 
viable need for private institutions to fulfill public services. As a young America 
grew and expanded its boundaries and as life became more urbanized over the 
course of the nineteenth century, traditional ties that bound together families and 
communities continued to fray. And with the fraying of those ties went sympathy 
for “the stranger” (Gross, 2003, pp. 43-44). During the nineteenth century, no 
Governmental programs existed to contend with the human consequences of a 
free-market capitalist system, and while there is no doubt that some turned to 
charitable organizations to address these issues, in general the public relied on 
organizations that were of a more philanthropic persuasion.10 Organizations that 
treated individuals on a case-by-case basis were perceived as being ineffectual in 
the long run. Only large-scale remedies could improve the large-scale problems 
that confronted the United States. Consequently, more philanthropic forms of the 
asylum, the poorhouse, the hospital, the tenement house, the reform school, and 
so on, began to take hold. 
 Around the turn of the twentieth century, the preference for philanthropic 
approaches to humanitarianism became a full-fledged movement called scientific 
                                                            
10 Philanthropic institutions were initially resisted in the South, which tended to 
value more traditional modes of life than in the North (see Gross, 2003, pp. 44-
46). Urban Southerners preferred a more personalized approach to humanitarian 
aid, while more rural Southerners did not welcome philanthropists on principle, 
for they viewed them as outsiders who were intent on incorporating the more 
traditional South into the rationalized machinery of the North. 
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giving, the goal of which is to contend with society’s issues “wholesale” rather 
than piecemeal (Sealander, 2003, p. 223). Its greatest purveyors were foundations 
which rose to great prominence in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. A number of foundations were still engaged in traditional forms of 
charitable service, but over time they became increasingly interested in finding 
ways to distance themselves from their beneficiaries and to contend with 
overarching social problems. This was particularly true for the industrial barons of 
the day like John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Julius Rosenwald, and 
Edward Filine, who sought to marry the tenets of the Social Gospel,11 with which 
they had been infused from a young age, and the lessons they had learned from 
successfully navigating the free market and the Industrial Revolution (Sealander, 
2003, p. 226). Each of them firmly believed that society could be reformed and 
that the less fortunate could be lifted up through the widespread application of the 
mechanisms that fueled capitalism, the Industrial Revolution, and, ultimately, 
their own success.  
Reining in the Social Machine 
 By the early twentieth century, foundations came to represent the 
fundamental dichotomy that had plagued voluntary associations from the 
founding of the United States. While they were seen to embody the very spirit of 
democracy in that they allowed individuals to gather together to more potently 
                                                            
11 The Social Gospel countered Social Darwinism which had become popular in 
the late nineteenth century. Social Gospel-ers, who hailed from a number of 
different religious denominations, asserted that “people should not live by the 
laws of the jungle; rather, they should strive for a higher standard and care for 
those less fortunate” (Sealander, 2003, p. 226). 
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address societal issues, they were also viewed as facilitating the rise to 
prominence of particular, special interests that were perhaps antithetical with 
those of the public will. While no one advocated for ridding the United States of 
foundations or one’s ability to form voluntary associations (that would be 
undemocratic), public fervor clearly indicated that something must be done in 
order to ensure that these organizations worked to promote the interests of the 
public. After all, they had been granted a special privilege in the form of tax-
exemption. More to the point, the public demanded of foundations that they 
implement and facilitate philanthropic projects in an effort to combat society’s ills 
in return for being afforded the privilege of not paying taxes. Not only this, but 
they wanted assurances that this was indeed taking place. Both the muckraking 
journalists and Congressional representatives of the day happily took up the 
mantle of this responsibility. 
In the wake of the publication of Sinclair Lewis’ The Jungle, a new breed 
of journalism ruled the free press. Reporters were constantly on the lookout for 
the next big story to expose corporate greed and an American Dream gone awry. 
Consequently, they were among the first to raise the alarm regarding foundations 
and their activities in the early twentieth century. Investigative reports such as 
Coon’s Money to Burn (1938) and Lundberg’s America’s 60 Families (1946) and 
The Rich and the Super-Rich (1968) were bestsellers in their day and widely read 
by the American public (see Hall, 1992). Each report detailed the financial inner 
workings of some of the biggest foundations of the day, including The 
Rockefeller Foundation, The Carnegie Foundation, and The Ford Foundation. 
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Collectively they scathingly concluded that the overwhelming majority of the 
large American foundations were little more than tax shelters for the very 
wealthy. For instance, Ferdinand Lundberg (1948) contends that foundations 
allowed the wealthiest of Americans to: (1) retain control over their personal 
funds; (2) avoid income and inheritance taxes; and, (3) perpetuate their funds by 
investing them in corporations (frequently the founders’ own companies) (p. 328). 
They certainly were not working—at least, not very diligently—to promote the 
public interest with either their funds or their programs despite the lip service they 
paid to the Social Gospel. 
 Even when they were working to promote the public interest, however, 
some journalists felt that foundations were encroaching upon areas of public life 
that were outside the purview of the benevolent domain. In The Foundation: Its 
Place in American Life (1930), Frederick Keppel argues that foundations began 
drawing unwanted attention to themselves when they became involved in areas of 
public life like education and the social sciences instead of remaining in areas that 
were more traditionally their milieu, such as the founding of libraries and 
research.12 Only The Russell Sage Foundation, along with a number of smaller 
foundations, seems to escape reporters’ harsh judgment in this arena. In 
America’s 60 Families (1948), Lundberg discusses what makes The Russell Sage 
                                                            
12 Alternatively, Laski (1966) laments the role foundations play in funding 
research. He contends that foundations’ undue influence over university research 
and administration leads to a loss of ingenuity. To some extent, Lundberg (1948) 
concurs by advancing the viewpoint that the power of foundations is so insidious 
that people, “hoping that the lightning of a foundation grant will strike them, 
consciously or unconsciously shape their attitudes so as to please potential 
donors” (p. 353). Logic follows that by shaping their attitudes, they also shape 
their research agendas. 
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Foundation in particular such an exemplar: “[It] makes social studies, interprets 
its findings, and disperses the information through publications and conferences 
with a view to helping people help themselves” (p. 345). In addition, a number of 
smaller foundations have “accorded decreasing emphasis on individual 
philanthropy, conventional relief, and conventional education; and [have] 
increasingly emphasized the … social application of science rather than its 
prostitution for private profit” (Lundberg, 1948, p. 345). The Russell Sage 
Foundation and these smaller foundations clearly represent the philanthropic ideal 
which had come to define “correct” benevolent service in the early twentieth 
century, which, as Keppel (1930) defines it, is the representation of “a faith in 
man [sic] and his possibilities for progress” (p. 18). 
 While reporters were drawing conclusions such as these, the Congress was 
not too far behind in drawing similar conclusions. As early as 1915, the Congress 
expressed alarm at the wealth and power of foundations, as well as their inability 
to regulate them. In fact, in 1915, the Congressional Commission of Industrial 
Relations issued a report which charged that a small number of foundations—The 
Rockefeller Foundation and The Carnegie Foundation among them—maintained 
wealth more than twice the size of the appropriations of federal Government for 
education and social services (Keppel, 1930, p. 27). This wealth, which was 
completely exempt from taxation, was aimed at reforming various aspects of 
public life; yet, it was not subject to any public control whatsoever. The report 
called for the Congress to institute a number of reforms and regulations of 
foundations, including inspection and publication of foundation finances, and the 
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limitation of programmatic functions, but the Congress took no further action at 
that time.13 
 With the rise of the Cold War and the influence of McCarthyism, 
however, the Congress revisited the activities of foundations in an effort to 
uncover evidence of subversive activities. In the early 1950s, several special 
Congressional committees were formed to investigate foundations. The first of 
these committees—formed in 1951 and deemed the Cox Committee in honor of 
its chairman and progenitor, Representative E. Eugene Cox of Georgia (Andrews, 
1973, p. 132)—was charged with determining whether foundations were using 
their funds for purposes other than what they were originally intended and 
whether these additional purposes included un-American and subversive activities 
(H.R. Rep. No. 82-2514, 1953, p. 2). More specifically, the Cox Committee 
investigated a number of issues with regard to foundations and their activities, 
including their use of funds, their influence over higher education, their attitude 
toward internationalism (versus promotion of American interests), their 
promotion of Communism and other subversive ideologies, and their sense of 
their own accountability toward the American public. In the end, the committee 
did not hold foundations entirely blameless for any “un-American” activities that 
occurred under their auspices, but they also did not find any evidence of 
                                                            
13 Nonprofit historian Peter Dobkin Hall (1992) contends that, during the decades 
which witnessed two world wars and a worldwide depression, the federal 
Government was loathe to irritate the great industrialists who founded and 
oversaw many of the foundations in question, since their great industrial power 
was desperately needed to facilitate the United States’ war and economic 
machines. 
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widespread malfeasance on their part.14 And while the committee recommended 
that the Government institute a number of measures aimed at reducing the opacity 
of foundations’ activities, including instituting an annual public accounting of 
foundations’ finances and reforming existing tax laws to close loopholes that 
allowed tax-exempt organizations of a dubious public purpose to persist, the 
committee advocated little additional Governmental oversight. 
This did not dissuade B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee, a member of the Cox 
Committee, from strongly advocating the formation of another special committee 
to investigate foundations. Congressman Reece argued that the Cox Committee 
had been granted insufficient time with which to conduct its investigation, and 
therefore an additional inquiry was warranted. He also asserted that the Cox 
Committee had ignored strong evidence that pointed to “Communist or 
Communist sympathizer infiltration into foundations … foundation support of 
Fabian socialism in America ... [and the fact that] thousands of foundations 
unknown to the public are set up generally to avoid payment of taxes” (C.R. No. 
1954-0802, 1954, p. 15522). The Congress granted him leave to conduct an 
inquiry in 1954, the results of which are far less generous than those of the Cox 
Committee. In a report that exceeds 400 pages (see H.R. Rep. No. 83-2681, 
1954), the members of the Reece Committee contend that they had indeed 
discovered evidence of what they were seeking—Communist infiltration of 
foundations whose new purpose (as opposed to representing the public will) was 
to overthrow the federal tax system and spread socialism via its programs and 
                                                            
14 See Andrews (1973) for a succinct summary of the Cox Committee hearings 
and final report. 
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financial influence.15 Communist hysteria aside, the Reece Committee’s report 
clearly indicates a strong continuity with popular discourse regarding the purpose 
of foundations. In no uncertain terms, the members of the Reece Committee 
firmly assert that—since they are granted tax-exemption—foundations “must be 
dedicated to public purposes,” affirm their “public dedication,” and abstain from 
becoming involved in areas of “the so-called ‘social science’ or … other areas in 
which our basic moral, social, economic, and governmental principles can be 
vitally affected” (H.R. Rep. No. 83-2681, 1954, p. 16). Those spheres are 
designated for the family, community, state or marketplace. 
Unfortunately for the Reece Committee (and likely fortunately for 
foundations), the strident McCarthyism which gripped the nation earlier in the 
decade fell into disfavor by the mid-1950s. The Reece Committee report and its 
recommendations went nowhere, and it was not until 1961 that some of the issues 
it raised were revisited. Alarmed by the unprecedented growth of tax-exempt 
foundations, Texas Congressman Wright Patman urged the Congress to take “a 
fresh look at tax-exempt foundations” in order to determine why the number of 
foundations had grown so precipitously over the course of the twentieth century 
(C.R. No. 1961-0502, 1961; see also C.R. No. 1961-0508, 1961). Whereas the 
Cox Committee and the Reece Committee primarily focused their attention on 
combating Communist subversion within foundations, Congressman Patman 
                                                            
15 In a strongly worded minority opinion, which is included as an appendix to the 
final report, Reece Committee members Wayne L. Hays and Gracie Pfost distance 
themselves from the findings of the committee and urge foundations to meet the 
challenge posed by the Reece Committee “without timidity” (see H.R. Rep. No. 
83-2681, 1954, pp. 417-432; see also Andrews, 1973, p. 147). 
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focused on economic issues, namely the ease with which individuals could cease 
contributing to the nation’s coffers through the establishment of a tax-exempt 
foundation and the economic consequences of doing so. As a result of his 
unyielding efforts throughout the 1960s—along with public ire that was stoked by 
the publication of reporter Ferdinand Lundberg’s The Rich and the Super-Rich in 
1968 and a Treasury Department report published in 1965, which questioned the 
efficacy of the tax system where it concerned benevolent organizations—the 
House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee began holding hearings 
into benevolent organizations in 1969 (Hall, 1992, p. 71). Representatives from a 
number of foundations, including The Rockefeller Foundation and The Carnegie 
Foundation, testified before the committee, and found they were completely 
unprepared for the level of public ire aimed at them. Moreover, they grossly 
miscalculated their stance toward regulation. They were utterly intransigent in 
their stance toward any proposed Governmental regulation,16 a position which 
swayed few members of Congress to their side of the debate (Hall, 1992, p. 73). 
As a result, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 passed with little opposition. 
The Practice of Benevolence 
  Problematizations emerge on the basis of particular regimes of practices 
of government (Dean, 1999). A regime of practices of government is an organized 
collection of practices which collectively facilitate the production of particular 
                                                            
16 Only F. Emerson Andrews, the former president of the Foundation Center who 
testified before the committee out of his personal and professional interest in 
foundations, acknowledged that the recommendations for tax reform and 
regulation of foundations set forth by the Treasury Department were reasonable 
and fair (Hall, 1992, pp. 72-73; see also Andrews, 1973). 
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truths by way of the development and implementation of technical and practical 
instruments (Dean, 1999, p. 18; see also Foucault, 1991b). This collection of 
practices organizes the way we govern ourselves and others in varying contexts. 
The particular regime of practice that is of interest here is the practice of 
benevolence—the systematized way we care for and aid others. During the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the practice of benevolence was 
clearly problematized. But we return to the question of why: Why was it 
necessary to ensure that all benevolent organizations engage in a philanthropic 
mode of caring for and aiding others? Answering this question requires that we 
move beyond analyses of benevolent institutions, theories of benevolence, and 
ideologies (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75) related to altruism and goodwill, and instead 
turn to examining the regime of practice that is in question in and of itself. Only 
by charting the path of the practice of benevolence over time will we be able to 
demonstrate how the accepted manner in which we engage in the practice of 
benevolence is anything but “natural, self-evident and indispensible,” but rather, 
precarious and part of a “complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical 
processes” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75). 
Such an analysis commences with recognizing and laying bare what 
Foucault (1991b) calls programmes. Programmes act on regimes of practice in a 
strategic effort to change them using “sets of calculated, reasoned prescriptions in 
terms of what institutions are meant to be organized, spaces arranged, [and] 
behaviours [sic] regulated” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 80). In other words, programmes 
set the agenda for governmental reform. The emergence of the “foundation 
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problem” in the twentieth century exposes one such programme at work. More 
specifically, it exposes a programme of philanthropy at work on the practice of 
benevolence. This philanthropic programme is comprised of technologies, 
languages, knowledges, and expertise that seek to promote a form of government 
by which individuals govern themselves and others with an aim toward solving 
society’s problems through the rational application of knowledge. Foundations—
key components of the practice of benevolent beginning in the late nineteenth 
century—became a primary target of the philanthropic programme. 
Here it is important to note that programmes emerge and operate within a 
milieu that is constituted by systematic ways of thinking about the nature of 
government (i.e., governmentalities) (Dean, 1999, p. 19). The philanthropic 
programme is no different. It emerged and took hold in a time when liberal 
governing rationalities dominated the Western world. Therefore, exploring the 
development of liberalism is crucial to understanding how the philanthropic 
programme worked to reform the practice of benevolence and how it then came to 
constitute the dispositif which defines our current understanding of benevolent 
service. 
The Governmentality of Liberalism 
 In Western society no governmentality can match the impact of liberalism, 
primarily because it functions as both a political philosophy and as a specific type 
of art of government (Dean, 1999; see also Burchell, 1996). As a political 
philosophy, one can sum up its particular ethos as: “‘One always governs too 
much’—or at least, one should always suspect that one governs too much” 
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(Foucault, 2008, p. 319). In other words, liberalism is skeptical of the benefits 
wrought by the state’s exercise of superfluous government. It holds at its core a 
critical and problematizing nature (Burchell, 1996, p. 21), which allows it to 
position itself against other forms of government and to critique them, no matter 
the circumstances in which it finds itself (Dean, 1999, p. 49). Intellectual titans 
such as Emmanuel Kant, Adam Smith, and James Steuart facilitated its historical 
development during the eighteenth century, as they produced treatises that, in 
part, focused on “knowability” (e.g., the ability of one to know the universe, or 
the ability of a sovereign to fully know the processes, institutions, and subjects 
that comprise his principality) and its limits (Gordon, 1991, p. 16). In particular, 
Kant argued that humankind is incapable of possessing full knowledge of 
anything, and thus one’s control over everything is limited—an idea Smith seized 
upon and applied to the management of the state (p. 16). In time these expositions 
led to the problematization of two existing forms of governmental rationalities 
that flourished during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—raison d’Etat (or 
reason of state) and police—which were declared as impossibilities in practice, 
thus paving the way for liberalism’s subsequent dominance in political thought. 
 Foucault (1991a) argues that raison d’Etat as an art of government first 
emerged in the sixteenth century with the publication of The Prince and the 
subsequent responses to it generated by contemporary scholars who decried its 
emphasis on the sovereign and his relationship to the kingdom he ruled. Raison 
d’Etat can be understood as a way of thinking about governing without focusing 
on the sovereign’s role, for its particular emphasis is on management of the state. 
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More specifically, governing “according to the principle of raison d’Etat is to 
arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent … wealthy, and … 
strong in the face of everything that may destroy it” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4). 
Consequently, the state itself—and not the sovereign and his relationship to his 
principality—must be considered as the target of governance, a development 
which brings the state to bear as a natural, constituted object and which 
necessitates that this art of government utilize reason alone in its governing 
processes, foregoing the pursuit of guidance from God or the sovereign (Dean, 
1999, p. 86). It is after all seeking to establish the state on its own merits and not 
those of a higher power, divine or otherwise. Accordingly, raison d’Etat must 
also recognize that its sole objective is maintenance of the state (p. 86) even 
though it respects “divine, moral, and natural laws … which are not homogeneous 
with or intrinsic to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4). To this end, individuals 
within the state are of use to raison d’Etat only with regard to their positive or 
negative influence on its pursuit of its objectives (Dean, 1999, p. 86). Of course 
maintaining a state through reason alone assumes that a certain knowledge of the 
state—primarily regarding its own strengths and weaknesses—exists and can be 
accessed (p. 86) by which the state can be armed in its struggle for survival 
against other states.  
In practice the state hones and shapes raison d’Etat through a system of 
armed forces and alliances with powerful individuals, institutions, and other 
states—a “diplomatico-military technology”—and through police (Foucault, 
1994, p. 69). While the diplomatico-military technology allows the state to 
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externally maintain the appearance of strength to other states, it is police that 
serves the state’s internal needs (Dean, 1999, p. 89). Prior to the nineteenth 
century, the word police did not have the same meaning as it does today (a force 
for maintaining law and order). Rather, it was understood as the state’s rationale 
and processes for maintaining as well as expanding upon its internal strengths 
(Pasquino, 1991, p. 115)—a concept born from the German science 
Polizeiwissenschaft, the purpose of which was to develop techniques for 
maximizing the state’s wealth by enhancing the productivity of the population 
(Gordon, 1991, p. 10). Accordingly, police must accomplish three tasks: (1) keep 
and compile statistical information on the population, territory, and the state’s 
resources; (2) develop and implement measures to grow and maintain the wealth 
of the population and the state; and, (3) maintain public felicity (Pasquino, 1991, 
p. 113). In this way police serves as a kind of “economic pastorate” (Gordon, 
1991, p. 12) in which the ancient Judeo-Christian imperative to care for all souls 
as they are shepherded toward eternal salvation—an influence that Dean (1999) 
argues is still strongly felt in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—is turned 
on its head so that the state acts to ensure the welfare of all individuals—both 
singly and as a cohesive population—as it steers them towards prosperity and 
security in this world. In other words, the knowledge and techniques of police 
must be both individual and totalizing if it is to be successful in support of raison 
d’Etat and its pursuit of the maintenance of the state. 
Liberalism, however, rejects as flawed both the underpinnings and 
pursuits of raison d’Etat and police. Couched in the work of Kant and Smith, 
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liberalism plays skeptic to the notion that the state can have full knowledge of its 
own strengths and weaknesses and thus shape its future accordingly. Liberalism 
argues that the state is in reality faced with managing its affairs in relation to the 
more “quasi-natural” domains of the marketplace and civil society (Burchell, 
1996, p. 22), as well as the rise of active citizenship (Rose, 1996a, p. 43). The 
marketplace, civil society, and the free subject all exist outside the purview of the 
state, and thus hold their own intrinsic natures and methods for self-regulation—
they do not need to be regulated by the state in order to correctly function 
(Burchell, 1996, p. 22; see also Burchell, 1991, p. 126; Dean, 1999, p. 50). In fact, 
they function at a more optimal level when left untouched.  
These domains deeply affect the state and the pursuit of its own agenda, 
however, and are in many ways necessary to its success. This is a hard reality that 
liberalism addresses through the application of the principles and techniques of 
laissez-faire—“a principle for governing in accordance with the grain of things 
[which] presupposes a specification of the objects of government in such a way 
that the regulations they need are, in a sense, self-indicated” (Burchell, 1991, p. 
127). Liberalism understands that state interference in any one of these domains 
risks adversely affecting their naturally occurring dynamics, which in turn puts 
the state itself in jeopardy; yet, at the same time, it also understands that the state 
must ensure that conditions are optimal for securing positive outcomes within 
these domains (Burchell, 1996, p. 22). Laissez-faire to a large extent solves this 
“conundrum of how to establish a viable boundary between the objects of 
necessary state action and those of necessary state inaction” and sets both the 
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“agenda and the non-agenda of government” (Gordon, 1991, p. 18, emphasis in 
the original). In doing so liberalism metamorphoses from political philosophy into 
full-fledged art of government replete with processes, technologies, and 
knowledges all its own. 
 In practice laissez-faire borrows heavily from the technologies of police in 
that it is both individualizing and totalizing in its pursuit of security of the state, 
even though it significantly differs from its predecessor by affirming “the 
necessarily opaque, dense autonomous character of the processes of population 
[while remaining] preoccupied with the vulnerability of these same processes” 
(Gordon, 1991, p. 20). More specifically, laissez-faire recognizes that the pursuit 
of individual interests à la Homo œconomicus is not only good for the individual, 
but also for the whole of society as well as the state; however, it also recognizes 
that these interests must be shaped as much as possible in order to ensure the 
predictability of individual and collective choices (Burchell, 1991, p. 127; see also 
Burchell, 1996, p. 23). Consequently, a laissez-faire government “depends upon 
the conduct of individuals who are parts of a population [as well as] subjects of 
particular, personal interests,” and thus becomes “a government of interests” at 
the level of both the individual and the population as a whole (Burchell, 1991, p. 
127).  
Foucault (1990/1978) refers to this development as the introduction of 
“bio-power” into the forces of history (p. 140). At the individual level, bio-power 
is made manifest through the “anatamo-politics of the human body,” a system by 
which disciplinary techniques—perpetrated primarily through the disciplines 
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associated with the social sciences—optimize the human body for economic 
pursuits by making it both efficient and docile (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 139; see 
also Foucault, 1995/1975). A “bio-politics of the population,” however, aims to 
supervise individuals en masse by systematizing and controlling biological 
processes like health, births, deaths, life expectancy, and anything that might 
affect them (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 139). In short, this fundamental control over 
individual and collective interests in the pursuit of state security is so complete 
that it amounts to a power over life itself. 
The creation of society. 
 To be sure, this development might indicate that liberalism is little more 
than a passive/aggressive version of raison d’Etat, yet the paramount feature of 
liberalism remains its critical nature (Rose, 1996a, p. 47). It continually questions 
itself and its intentions in the pursuit of the optimal level of government that 
exists somewhere between too little and too much. Of course, liberalism is able to 
critique itself and still survive because it does so in the name of securing the 
quasi-natural domain of civil society. By questioning in the eighteenth century the 
efficacy of police and its ability to penetrate all levels of the population in its 
pursuit of knowledge and security, liberalism recognizes the existence of a 
“society” that exists outside the purview of the state (see Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 
1996a, p. 9). Liberalism in fact constitutes civil society and allows it to take shape 
in our consciousness when confronted with the inadequacies of police.  
 Civil society, then, can be viewed as the product of the processes of 
emergence and, more specifically, as one of what Foucault (2008) calls réalités de 
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transaction (or transactional realities), the emergence and maintenance of which 
depends upon the interplay between those entities that govern and those that are 
governed (p. 297). Indeed, according to Foucault (2008), civil society is not “an 
historical-natural given which functions in some way as both the foundation of 
and source of opposition to the state or political institutions. … [I]t is something 
which forms part of modern governmental technology” (p. 297). Civil society, in 
fact, provides the non-political frame of reference (Dean, 1999, p. 110) by which 
liberalism can govern subjects that have both economic and juridical rights. 
This situation is made possible by the very characteristics by which civil 
society is defined. First, civil society establishes a boundary that is concomitant 
with the idea of a nation, for this boundary acts to establish the parameters of 
population, territory, and—more abstractly—justice, for which the state is 
responsible to govern (Dean, 1999, p. 124). Second, liberalism conceives of civil 
society as a totality, in that certain regularities in behavior, actions, and decisions 
associated at the level of a population are irreducible to a more limited level, such 
as the family or the individual (p. 124). Finally, civil society carries with it a 
“self-rendering unity” (Gordon, 1991, p. 22; see also Dean, 1999, p. 125) that 
allows both economic and non-economic interests to co-exist, and which 
promotes “cohesion and solidarity … [as well as] breakdown and dissolution,” 
such that social norms can exist even in the face of racial, ethnic, political, and 
gender divisions (Dean, 1999, p. 125). Framed in this way civil society allows 
Homo œconomicus and his self-interested nature to co-exist relatively peacefully 
with Democratic Citizen, Biological Individual, Community Member, and so on, 
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and still be manageable (Foucault, 2008, p. 296; see also Gordon, 1991, p. 23; 
Dean, 1999, p. 125). In short, with the advent of society as a formalized concept, 
liberalism solves its dilemma of how to promote the self-interested behavior that 
is so vital to the smooth functioning of the marketplace while at the same time 
retain the political and legal rights of the individual.  
The rise of the welfare state. 
Ultimately liberalism both governs and produces civil society in order to 
ensure its optimal and natural functioning (Burchell, 1996, p. 25); yet, over time 
civil society proves to be a remedy unable to withstand every problem faced by 
liberalism. Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
liberalism becomes viewed as something of a failure, for it has been unable to 
produce satisfactory economic and social norms (Rose, 1996a, p. 39). For 
example, poverty remains a troublesome issue, as concerns regarding 
pauperism—namely the demoralization of the poor, criminality, unhygienic living 
conditions and disease—arise during this time (Dean, 1999, p. 126). Liberalism 
proves ill equipped to contend with these issues, even through the routine 
functioning of the marketplace or through the norms of civil society, for its very 
nature disallows involvement in the lives of the individuals that comprise the 
state. There no longer exists a link between the state and the family, or between 
the state and the individual (only the population), and there are no tools available 
to liberalism beyond those provided by the economy (Dean, 1999, p. 127). So, the 
question becomes one of how to bridge the gap between the state and the family, 
or the state and the individual, and how to do so in a way that maintains 
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appropriate juridical boundaries between the public and private spheres of life, so 
that the poor are successfully incorporated into civil society, especially as they 
pertain to participation in the marketplace and adherence to economic norms. 
 A solution presents itself through a new form of rule called welfarism or 
the welfare state (Rose, 1993). Through the governing strategies of the welfare 
state, politics and various forms of expertise assemble to combat the negative 
effects of liberalism’s laissez-faire form of rule by way of the reestablishment of 
the sense of solidarity that is so integral to the continued optimal functioning of 
the marketplace. In this new form of rule, the state is able to sidestep its inability 
to act directly on the individual by governing through society. More specifically, 
the state engenders solidarity by acting upon individuals and their activities in 
relation to the establishment and promotion of social norms (Rose, 1993, p. 285) 
by certain experts. Indeed, “political rule [i.e., the state] would not itself set out 
the norms of individual conduct, but would instill and empower a variety of 
‘professionals’ who would, investing them with authority to act as experts in the 
devices of social rule” (Ibid). Thus, in the welfare state expertise is crucial, for it 
allows the state to govern at a distance. 
 The instrument/object of the welfare state is a reformulation of society 
collectively referred to as “the social” (Donzelot, 1979, p. 88). The social is best 
understood as a terrain of programs, institutions, technologies, and knowledges 
that allow for a new kind of government of the individual (Rose & Miller, 1992, 
p. 191). More pointedly, the social is defined as: 
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The set of means which allow social life to escape material pressures and 
politico-moral uncertainties; the entire range of methods which make the 
members of society relatively safe from the effects of economic 
fluctuations by providing a certain security—which give their existence 
possibilities of relations that are flexible enough, and internal stakes that 
are convincing enough, to avert the dislocation that divergences of 
interests and beliefs would entail. (Donzelot, 1979, p. xxvi) 
In other words, the social works on behalf of the welfare state to solve the 
problems created by liberalism through various techniques that ensure personal 
security while at the same time promoting social norms. These techniques include 
designating certain issues as particularly “social” issues, generating disciplines 
like social work and sociology, creating new socially-oriented legal jurisdictions 
like juvenile and family courts, and designating new professionals like social 
workers and sociologists, all of which seek to better the quality of family and 
individual life (Dean, 1999, p. 53).  
The solutions provided by these techniques to maintain security in the face 
of economic fluctuations and social upheaval are not without cost to the 
individual. Each technique, program, or institution ensures the supremacy of 
newly anointed social experts as they act upon the individual to ensure 
compliance with social norms (Rose, 1996a, p. 40). The techniques of the social 
are only successful when the individual or family upon whom the intervention is 
applied acts as an accomplice in her own normalization (Dean, 1999, p. 53). 
Individuals must exhibit a desire to be functioning members of society—indeed, 
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to be normal—in order for the social intervention to be deemed truly successful. 
This ultimately signifies that the network comprised of truth expounding experts 
and the individuals who play the objects of their interventions allows the state to 
govern at an arm’s length, thus solving the issues created by liberalism without 
foregoing its inherent nature. 
Remaking the Social 
 The philanthropic mode of benevolent service is an integral component of 
the social and its processes of normalization. Through philanthropic benevolence, 
and its constituent organizations and interventions, individuals who require 
assistance to better their unfortunate circumstances can be provided with 
immediate relief, but only in exchange for their acceptance of the benefits of 
certain expertise, such as the “right” way to save money, raise children, and 
maintain employment (Dean, 1999, p. 128). In this process of exchange there is 
an inherent expectation that individuals will continue to use the information 
imparted to them in order to continue bettering themselves and their unfortunate 
circumstances (recall the young man in Benjamin Franklin’s cautionary tale). So, 
even though individuals who have been deemed aberrant receive aid, they are also 
able to maintain a sense of autonomy in their decision-making. Maintaining 
individuals’ ability to exercise knowledge in their own best interest is vital for the 
successful functioning of the marketplace (see Cruikshank, 1999). As was the 
case with Franklin’s unfortunate young man, knowledge frees the individual. 
Only in these particular circumstances, knowledge frees the individual with the 
express purpose to facilitate her full participation in the marketplace. 
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While the philanthropic mode of benevolent service plays an integral part 
in the social (Donzelot, 1979; see also Dean, 1999) through its provision of a 
combination of care and knowledge, the application of the philanthropic 
programme to the practice of benevolent service did not take effect within the 
social in a completely comprehensive way. To put it simply, “things [did not] 
work out as planned” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 80). Rather, philanthropy faced 
“different strategies which are mutually opposed, composed and superposed” to it, 
which produced “permanent and solid effects which … don’t [sic] conform to the 
initial programming” (Foucault, 1991b, pp. 80-81). In this case, the opposing 
strategies consist of two erstwhile discourses which competed with the nascent 
philanthropic programme. First is the form of benevolent service that is based in 
individual acts of goodwill: charity. While philanthropy emerged in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the dominant mode of benevolent 
service, it did not eliminate “the urge to personal service … born of the hunger for 
personal connection to others” (Gross, 2003, p. 48). Then there is the discourse of 
Homo œconomicus whose self-interested and utility maximizing behavior is on 
full display in the decision-making processes of the wealthy industrial barons who 
founded and managed the foundations at the heart of the problematization under 
examination here. 
 The existence of these competing discourses is evidence of a much larger 
issue at work in the social. While the social can be understood as a bounded 
domain that is the instrument/object of the welfare state, it is also fundamentally 
diverse, heterogeneous, and replete with assorted institutions, experts, and 
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knowledges all aimed at responding to the problems posed by liberal government 
(Dean, 1999, p. 128). In other words, its “guts” are neither coherent nor 
particularly unified. Rather, it shares only “a common vocabulary [which] was 
formed [to seek] a general codification of these problems as issues entailing the 
whole of society” (Dean, 1999, p. 129). More pointedly, according to Donzelot 
(1988), the social “was never more than the lumping together under a single label 
of a whole range of concrete solutions to different aspects of social problems. It 
never succeeded in designating its object, concepts and methods with any rigour 
[sic]” (pp. 397-398). This is most likely why its various interventions, including 
the practice of benevolence, remained “tied to the main ideological currents of the 
nineteenth century,” (Donzelot, 1988, p. 397) including the practice of charity and 
the self-interested behavior of Homo œconomicus. 
 The inherent instability of the social ultimately serves to undermine the 
aims of the welfare state. Through the social, the welfare state proves unable to 
successfully reestablish the sense of solidarity that is necessary to promote the 
security of the marketplace. Indeed, the welfare state cannot resolve the 
conundrum posed by interests which are vital to the state’s own security but 
which also oftentimes operate in contradiction with one another.17 As a result, 
beginning in the mid-to-late twentieth century, a collection of governmentalities 
which are commonly referred to as neoliberalism problematizes the welfare state. 
                                                            
17 Foucault refers to this as the “welfare state problem,” in which the individual is 
viewed as both an actor who has equal rights within the political community and a 
person whose welfare is promoted as part of an ongoing system of integration into 
society (see Dean, 1999, p. 82). This conundrum is born from the dual 
imperatives of a Judeo-Christian ethic of care and a Greco-Roman promotion of 
solidarity through citizenship. 
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The aim of these particular governmentalities is to supplant the inherent 
naturalism of liberalism and welfarism with more constructivist tendencies in a 
rather paradoxical effort to reestablish the predominance of forms of government 
that work through the quasi-natural domain of the marketplace (Burchell, 1996).  
The governmentalities of neoliberalism. 
In Europe and the United States, neoliberalism emerged taking on two 
very distinct—though not altogether dissimilar—forms (Foucault, 2008). In 
Europe neoliberalism surfaced post-World War II through a series of essays 
published in the journal Ordo18 which took aim at socialism and the Keynesian 
economic policies that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. In short, 
European ordoliberals criticize states that fail to rely on the mechanisms of the 
marketplace and instead engage with interventionist economic policies that 
undermine both the natural functioning of the marketplace and the legal rights of 
citizens. For them the marketplace does not require planning and intervention, and 
in fact, they assert that Nazism and Stalinism would not have arisen without 
states’ proclivity toward intervention in the marketplace. The ordoliberals contend 
that the marketplace is rather something that can be organized—not planned or 
directed—through social policy (Gordon, 1991, p. 41) so that it functions 
optimally but without impinging upon the legal and social rights of those who 
participate in it. Essentially, they argue for intervention in civil society as a means 
to organize the marketplace. 
                                                            
18 Hence Foucault’s (2008) labeling of this type of neoliberalism as 
ordoliberalism and its purveyors as ordoliberals.  
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In the United States, on the other hand, Foucault (2008) argues that a 
brand of neoliberalism, which he dubs anarcho-capitalism, emerges 
predominantly through the writings of Chicago School economists. Like their 
European counterparts, they also object to interventionist economic policies, 
which in the United States manifest primarily through social programs like the 
New Deal. They believe these policies result in a welfare state run amok, replete 
with rigid bureaucracy, a proliferation of top-heavy state institutions, 
professionals whose authority is unchecked, and a distorted marketplace. Yet, 
American neoliberals differ from ordoliberals in their solution to excessive 
government, most likely because—as Foucault (2008) asserts—“liberalism in 
America is a whole way of being and thinking” (p. 218) and not simply a 
philosophical approach to government. Rather than manage the marketplace 
through carefully implemented social interventions as ordoliberals contend, 
American neoliberals propose the opposite: they propose to extend the rationality 
of the marketplace to all corners of human existence. In other words, in the United 
States economics becomes “an ‘approach’ capable in principle of addressing the 
totality of human behavior, and, consequently, of envisaging a coherent, purely 
economic method of programming the totality of governmental action” (Gordon, 
1991, p. 43). In short, the question of government becomes one not of whether the 
state should intervene in civil society, but how it can intervene in civil society to 
achieve optimal results in the marketplace by utilizing the very principles that 
organize it. 
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Regardless of the form of neoliberalism, though, a notion that becomes 
particularly salient to its development in the twentieth century in both Europe and 
the United States is the injection of the enterprise model into all areas of behavior 
(Burchell, 1996, p. 29). In economic thought the enterprise is an institution whose 
purpose is to facilitate supply and demand through competition. In liberal and 
neoliberal thought, however, the enterprise “is not just an institution but a way of 
behaving … in the form of competition in terms of plans and projects, and with 
objectives, tactics, and so forth” (Foucault, 2008, p. 175). Neoliberalism seeks not 
only to infuse society with the enterprise model so that individuals must engage 
with it in a variety of capacities, but also to encourage the individual to think of 
herself and all her relationships through the framework of an enterprise (Foucault, 
2008, p. 241). Indeed, the individual herself becomes conceptualized as an 
enterprise.  
Of course, this creation of such an “enterprise society” engenders a 
number of significant effects. First, it allows the economic model of supply and 
demand, and competition, to become the model for social and interpersonal 
relations, thereby extending the economic model into civil society (Foucault, 
2008, p. 242). Second, it engenders a highly potent form of self-government:  
The idea of one’s life as the enterprise of oneself implies that there is a 
sense in which one remains always continuously employed in (at least) 
that one enterprise [the self], and that it is a part of the continuous business 
of living to make adequate provision for the preservation, reproduction 
and reconstruction of one’s own human capital. (Gordon, 1991, p. 44)    
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This signals an enhanced period of “responsibilization” (Burchell, 1996, p. 29) 
beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century in which individuals actively 
seek to mitigate the negative impact of their behavior through a responsible 
practice of freedom and individual choice. In other words, neoliberalism 
engenders the specification of a new subject (Rose, 1996a, p. 49; see also Rose & 
Miller, 1992)—one who possesses the ability to freely act, but only in a 
responsible manner and within a prescribed mode of conduct. 
Community government. 
 With the advent of this period of responsibilization and enterprise 
behavior, the conception of civil society is transformed. While the governing 
rationalities of both liberalism and welfarism hold that society is a source of needs 
that “are individually distributed and collectively borne,” neoliberalism views 
society as “a source of energies contained within individuals’ exercise of freedom 
and self-responsibility” (Dean, 1999, p. 152). In other words, society is still 
viewed as a collection of individuals who have a collective impact; but, the source 
of that impact is not individuals’ needs but rather, the force of their autonomous 
decision-making—their entrepreneurialism. Accordingly, the manner in which 
we understand how society should be governed also changes. In liberal society, 
individual interests are shaped in accordance with the domain’s inherent nature 
and internal mechanisms. The welfare state, on the other hand, intervenes in 
society through the use of the experts in order to correct the problems wrought by 
liberalism’s laissez-faire approach to the management of society. For 
neoliberalism, however, the interests of society do not need to be regulated. 
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Rather, the autonomous actions of individuals and groups within society need to 
be cultivated and facilitated (Ibid) in order to affect a more competitive and 
efficient—indeed, a more “marketized”—sphere. Ultimately, the aim of 
neoliberalism is to extend the logic of the marketplace to all areas of life such that 
all “institutional and individual conduct [is reformed] so that both come to 
embody the values and orientations of the market, expressed in notions of the 
enterprise and the consumer” (Dean, 1999, p. 172). 
 To this end, neoliberalism emphasizes association rather than solidarity, 
which is at the heart of the aims of both liberalism and the welfare state. While a 
certain measure of cooperation and esprit de corps amongst individuals and 
groups is necessary in order to stave off complete anarchy, a sense of kinship at 
the societal level is not ideal, for it stifles individuality and its consequent 
entrepreneurialism.19 The ascendency of the governing rationalities of 
neoliberalism signals a reassertion of what Cruikshank (1999) calls the science of 
association (see also Dean, 1999, p. 152). As we have seen, early in the 
development of the United States, individuals became socially isolated from one 
another by the very liberty that underpinned the newly formed democratic nation. 
This social isolation engendered a sense of individualism that undermined the 
social solidarity that is vital to the successful promotion of nationhood (and to the 
                                                            
19 Here the work of Hannah Arendt is a key touchstone. In her discussion of the 
social versus the political, Arendt argues that the predominance of the social 
realm has stifled individual freedom. The social expects a certain kind of behavior 
from individuals, and thus imposes rules upon them to restrict their behavior. This 
restriction of behavior—this normalization of individual behavior—stifles 
individuality and personal achievement. See Cruikshank, 1999, pp. 54-58, for an 
overview. 
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operation of the market). An artificial sense of solidarity was engineered through 
the formation of and participation in voluntary associations (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 
97). If these associations were to be successful in achieving their goals rather than 
dissolve into disorder, members had to exercise a certain level of restraint, or self-
government. In other words, voluntary association engenders a certain measure of 
esprit de corps by way of members’ exercise of self-government.  
The erstwhile science of association is reasserted as a part of a new 
“politics of community” (Rose, 1996b). Community has now replaced the social 
as the instrument/object of the state. More specifically, with the advent of 
neoliberalism, the social fractured into a multitude of “localized, heterogeneous, 
[and] overlapping” communities20 (Rose, 1996b, p. 333). As such, the community 
is defined by its own set of characteristics which serve to distinguish it from the 
social. For instance, while the individual is still self-governing and responsible, 
she is also bonded to others in the community—but only in the community—
whereas in the social, one held collective ties and obligations with the whole of 
society. In addition, the lines of an individual’s sense of personal identity are 
configured through allegiance to the things with which one identifies emotionally 
and traditionally—indeed, directly—rather than as a member of an integrated, 
national whole, or society (a process of identification which is more indirect in 
                                                            
20 Communities are based on the acknowledgement of a shared fate or a common 
claim: “our common fate as gay men, as women of colour [sic], as people with 
AIDS, as members of an ethnic group, as residents in a village or a suburb, as 
people with a disability” (Rose, 1996b, p. 334). 
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nature). Ultimately this creates a new field of dividing practices21 to identify those 
who are affiliated with the community (i.e., those who have the economic and 
moral means to be entrepreneurial) and those who are to be marginalized because 
they cannot enterprise themselves or are part of an anti-community. In either case, 
these groups—these communities—“no longer mediate between society and the 
individual but represent a plurality of agents that are put into play in diverse 
strategies of government” (Dean, 1999, p. 171). 
 The new politics of community necessitates a revised understanding of the 
role of expertise in the government of individuals. As Rose (1996b) states it, 
“social government was [italics added] expert government” (p. 349). In the 
welfare state, experts governed society with authority bestowed upon them by the 
state. In the government of community, however, experts, their organizations, and 
their institutions are being deployed in a new way: 
Locales and activities that were previously part of the assemblages of the 
“social” are being autonomized from the machinery of politics [i.e., the 
state] and novel devices are being used to govern the activities of those 
who work in them. In a plethora of quasi-autonomous units, associations, 
and “intermediate organizations,” experts are allocated and new 
responsibilities and new mechanisms are developed for the management 
of professional expertise “at a distance”—that is, outside the machinery of 
                                                            
21 Foucault (1983) argues that an individual becomes objectified in part by what 
he calls dividing practices, through which “the subject is either divided inside 
himself [sic] or divided from others … examples are the mad and the sane, the 
sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’” (p. 208). For a brief but 
concise overview of this topic and its relationship to other processes of 
objectification, see Rabinow, 1984, pp. 7-11. 
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bureaucracy that previously bound experts into devises for the government 
of the “the social.” (Rose, 1996b, p. 350) 
Rather than glean authority from the state to devise and maintain social norms, 
experts are now largely disconnected from the state22 and must independently 
deploy their authority to govern the community. More pointedly, they oftentimes 
find themselves in “quasi-private” (Ibid) organizations and agencies such as 
nonprofits that facilitate the achievement of priorities once considered the domain 
of the state.  
 Of course, on its face this arrangement may seem little different than it 
was in the social. As a territory of government and as a collection of 
interventions, “the community,” like “the social,” appears to be little more than a 
bounded domain (or group of domains) whose substance is comprised of a 
diverse, heterogeneous, and completely unstable collection of individuals, 
expertise, organizations, and knowledges that are all aimed at addressing 
community (rather than social) problems. Indeed, the most significant differences 
between community government and social government are the aims of 
government (facilitating the exercise of freedom rather than the promotion of 
solidarity) and the change in venue (community rather than society). All of which 
begs the question, what is to prevent the instability and heterogeneity that 
undermined the welfare state from also plaguing neoliberalism? More pointedly, 
                                                            
22 This is not to say that the state does not deploy expertise and experts on its own 
behalf. The experts and expertise in question here relate to anything formerly 
referred to as a “social” issue. This is said, however, with the caveat in mind that 
what is considered a target of “social” or “community” expertise is something of a 
moving target, as priorities change over time. 
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how can the neoliberal state effectively govern at a distance—through 
heterogeneous, unstable communities—while still achieving its aim of promoting 
the marketization of life?  
Normalizing Philanthropy 
The answer to these questions lies in establishing a philanthropic norm of 
benevolent service for the experts deployed through the quasi-private associations 
and intermediary organizations (née benevolent organizations) that govern the 
community. We have already noticed that the philanthropic mode of benevolent 
service suits the aims of neoliberalism, in that it works to engender individuals’ 
full participation in the marketplace. By normalizing the philanthropic mode of 
benevolent service, the neoliberal state is also able to effectively govern at a 
distance through benevolent organizations because norms ultimately work to 
make behavior more predictable. Norms are “a way for a group to provide itself 
with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-
referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point … [by] 
which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself” (Ewald, 
1990, p. 154). Norms act as both a measurement and a form of judgment by which 
individuals within a group can be ordered.  Put simply, they establish the rules for 
behavior and the consequences for deviating from those rules. Group members 
will adhere to the rules of the norm or pay a price: they will be branded as 
abnormal. The philanthropic norm establishes the rules of behavior for the 
practice of benevolence. More to the point, experts engaged in the practice of 
benevolence and the recipients of their services must engage in the application of 
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reason to solve problems or risk being deemed abnormal and then excluded23 
from “normal” society. 
While the philanthropic norm is vital to the success of the aims of 
neoliberalism, the state cannot directly promote its application. After all, the state 
seeks to govern at a distance. What the state can do, however, is enlist the law to 
act on its behalf. With the advent of neoliberalism, the law begins to play a 
particular, centralized role in the administration of the enterprise society. The 
juridical is seen as being concomitant with the economic, such that the “juridical 
gives form to the economic, and the economic would not be what it is without the 
juridical” (Foucault, 2008, p. 163). In other words, in neoliberalism the economic 
realm is considered not the quasi-natural domain of liberalism, but rather as a 
realm of activities which must be regulated by the state through law. However, 
regulation (realized through law) takes on a particular form: “The economy is a 
game and the legal institution which frames the economy should be thought of as 
the rules of the game” (Foucault, 2008, p. 173). The law serves to fix and 
formalize the rules of the game such that both the state, which enforces the laws, 
and the individuals who play the economic game both adhere to them. 24 The law 
                                                            
23 Dividing practices can literally divide the normal from the abnormal through 
the practices of exclusion. Exclusion of the abnormal from society can sometimes 
be spatial (e.g., the removal of the insane to mental institutions), but it is always 
social in nature (see Rabinow, 1984, p. 8). The abnormal are shunned from 
participating in “regular” society. 
 
24 Some scholars argue that this development has led to the “judicialization” of 
administration. In particular, Rosenbloom (1987) contends that neoliberalism has 
signaled a new partnership between the judiciary and public administration in 
which the judiciary acts to ensure that individuals who are subject to 
administrative attention are afforded greater legal protections. In other words, the 
 102 
pursues no particular end except the formalization of the rules of the economic 
game in and of themselves. To this end, the law has become increasingly 
associated with the processes of normalization, such that it “operates more and 
more as a norm … [while] the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into 
a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative and so on) whose functions 
are for the most part regulatory” (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 144). The law supports 
and reinforces the normalization process in that it represents both a codified set of 
norms and the means by which the norms can be coercively enforced. In other 
words, “laws still partake of a juridical system of law, i.e., law as an instrument of 
sovereignty,” (Dean, 1999, p. 120) but their primary function has become to 
enforce the rules (née, norms) of the economic game.  
Within neoliberal governing rationalities, the role of law as both codifier 
and regulator of norms takes on a particular form. Specifically, the state engages 
in what Foucault (2008) calls “framework policy” in an effort to organize all the 
mechanisms that surround the marketplace in order to ensure its smooth 
functioning. While the state cannot work directly on the mechanisms of the 
market (e.g., price, competition, etc.), it can frame “all that does not arise 
spontaneously in economic life,” such as individuals’ needs, natural resources, 
political and legal structures, and scientific knowledge, (Bilger, 1964, cited in 
Foucault, 2008, p. 140n) so as to bolster the functioning of the market. By 
transforming through law the scientific, technical, social, and legal bases upon 
                                                                                                                                                                  
judicial seeks to assert individual rights in relation to the actions of public 
administrators. In addition, judicialization has resulted in public agencies 
functioning more like courts such that they make decisions based on legal values 
(see Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 223).  
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which the market operates, the state is able to organize the conditions of the 
marketplace without directly working on its mechanisms. In other words, the law 
is a tool by which the neoliberal state can effectively govern at a distance.  
The state has employed framework policy to both codify the philanthropic 
norm for the practice of benevolence and to regulate it. First, it codified 
philanthropy as a norm for benevolent service by literally establishing it as the 
measurement by which all benevolent service should be judged (albeit in an 
oblique way). In 1954, the Congress reformed the tax code to establish a section 
strictly for the classification of tax-exempt, benevolent organizations. This is the 
501(c) section of the tax code. Prior to the passage of these sweeping changes, the 
Internal Revenue Code classified all organizations which had some sort of special 
dispensation regarding the payment of taxes under one section (Section 101) 
without any demarcation of their purpose (see Hall, 2006, p. 53). Thus, Section 
101 included organizations ranging from foundations to insurance companies. By 
contrast, the 501(c) section of the tax code classifies organizations of an 
exclusively benevolent nature into one of twenty-eight categories with twenty-
eight specific purposes, which range from the religious/charitable/educational 
(501(c)(3)) to workers’ compensation (501(c)(27). In a 72-page document (see 
Department of the Treasury, 2010), the requirements for meeting the designations 
of each category are spelled out.  
For the state to designate a benevolent organization as a lawful member of 
one of these twenty-eight categories and for the benevolent organization to 
receive all the benefits that accompany one of these designations (e.g., tax-
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exemption, legitimacy from being Government sanctioned, etc.), it must make an 
application to the state. The application consists of a 27-page questionnaire in 
which a benevolent organization must indicate to the state not only the purpose of 
its organization, but also its goals for service and the methods (i.e., its financial, 
human, and physical capital) by which it expects to achieve those goals (see 
Department of the Treasury, 2006). While no question in the application is so 
cheeky as to ask, “By what means to do you intend to engage in the application of 
reason to empower individuals to responsibly practice their freedom so as to 
encourage them to fully participate in the market?” the totality of the 
questionnaire clearly indicates a singular imperative. If an organization is to 
successfully achieve 501(c) status and all the benefits that accompany it, it must 
take up a rational approach to organization management and benevolent service. 
In other words, a benevolent organization cannot successfully complete the 
application process unless it establishes a goal, develops a plan for achieving that 
goal, and then orients itself and its resources toward enacting that plan in the most 
efficient and effective manner possible.  
Of course, the establishment of the 501(c) section of the tax code only 
serves to create—or “frame”—a space in which philanthropy has the opportunity 
to become the norm for the practice of benevolence. Although few benevolent 
organizations can survive (particularly financially) outside the Government’s twin 
blessings of legitimacy and tax-exemption, benevolent organizations can still 
exercise their freedom of choice. They can choose whether or not to apply for 
501(c) status. Of course, if a benevolent organization does choose to become a 
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501(c), then it must adhere to the norms that accompany that designation. If it 
cannot do so, then the law must be enlisted to enforce the norm by which the 
group is measured.  
Even in its role as a regulator of norms, however, the state does not act 
directly on institutions or individuals, but rather on the conditions of their 
operation. For instance, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 serves to enforce the 
philanthropic norm for the practice of benevolence not by directly dictating norms 
of organizational form or service delivery, but by instituting reporting 
requirements. The law requires foundations to maintain more stringent financial 
documentation on its operations to submit to the Internal Revenue Service on an 
annual basis. In order to meet the obligations of these reporting requirements, 
foundations would be compelled to be more rational in their approach to 
organizational management—particularly financial management. Yet, as with the 
establishment of the 501(c) section of the tax code, foundations are free to ignore 
the rules set out for them, for the law only constructs the space in which 
foundations operate. Of course, there are consequences for failing to meet the 
norm established by the law—they risk being deemed abnormal (i.e., non-
compliant) and perhaps excluded from mainstream society (i.e., stripped of their 
501(c) designation). But they still operate in a space in which they have the ability 
to exercise their freedom of choice, and so long as foundations still have a choice, 
the state has met the aims of neoliberal governing rationalities. It is able to govern 
effectively at a distance through the establishment of a philanthropic norm while 
at the same time promoting the marketization of all areas of life. 
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Conclusion 
 Neoliberalism seeks to extend the logic of the market to all corners of life, 
and it will endeavor to create markets where none exist in order to accomplish this 
aim. It seeks to do so because the values of the market, as expressed in the 
enterprise and the consumer, answer the problems posed by the welfare state 
(Dean, 1999, p. 172). In other words, the values of the market embody rules of 
conduct which guarantee an individual’s ability to practice her freedom thereby 
ensuring her full participation in the marketplace. When the state codified the 
practice of benevolence through its application of law, the state effectively 
brought benevolence into the market economy. More pointedly, the state created a 
new market: a market for benevolence (T.J. Catlaw, personal communication, 
March 2, 2011). Through the (lawfully sanctioned) organizations that comprise 
the market for benevolence and through the knowledge and expertise they deploy 
into communities, the state is better able to ensure that individuals “learn to 
exercise their freedom on … a market as a consumer” (Ibid, emphasis in the 
original). So, individuals are able to learn market values not only on the “regular” 
market, but in the benevolent market, too. 
 The development of this market for benevolence has engendered a number 
of significant effects, however. Primary among them is the transformation of the 
philanthropic mode of service that normalizes the practice of benevolence. With 
the fragmentation of the social into localized, heterogeneous communities, 
philanthropy no longer aims to resolve social problems through the application of 
reason. Now it endeavors to resolve community problems through reason. More 
 107 
pointedly, each community—which has been formally disconnected from the 
neoliberal state—works on its own to apply reason to solving its own problems. In 
doing so, each community entrepreneurializes itself. Thus, these communities not 
only comprise the market of benevolence, they also compete in it. Indeed, as 
entrepreneurs these communities compete against one another. This signals not 
only the advent of a market for benevolence, but also the arrival of a marketized 
practice of benevolence.
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CHAPTER 4: STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE 
Introduction 
An analytics of government is concerned with “how we govern and are 
governed within different regimes, and the conditions under which such regimes 
emerge, continue to operate, and are transformed” (Dean, 1999, p. 23). In the 
previous chapter, we detailed the conditions under which the contemporary 
regime of the practices of benevolence has emerged. More specifically, we 
determined that the contemporary regime of practices of benevolence emerged 
under the auspices of a problematization of a liberal governmentality. 
Furthermore, we came to understand how a neoliberal governmentality 
reconstructed the social as a market for benevolence through the establishment of 
a philanthropic norm for the practice of benevolence. By way of this market for 
benevolence, the neoliberal governmentality seeks to create a space through 
which individuals can learn to responsibly exercise their freedom by reforming 
their behavior to align with market values like entrepreneurialism and 
competition. The market for benevolence ultimately allows the state to more 
effectively govern at a distance while at the same time asserting the values of the 
market in an effort to undo the social government of the welfare state. 
In order to continue the work of the analytics of government, we must now 
turn our attention to understanding how this market for benevolence operates. 
More to the point, our task now is to examine how the market for benevolence is 
being constructed. Even though the state effectively demarcated a market for 
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benevolence through the application of law, we should always keep at the 
forefront of our analysis the notion that the benevolent market is a constructed 
market. In other words, it does not possess the inherent character of a market, and 
thus it does not naturally operate like one. To a certain extent it must be “taught” 
to do so. Which poses the following questions: Who or what is teaching the 
benevolent domain to act according to market values? How are the lessons being 
imparted, and what are the lessons to be learned?  
I contend that the mechanisms associated with professionalization in large 
part serve to instruct the benevolent domain on acting in accordance with market 
values. In other words, the academic journals, professional associations and their 
codes of ethics, trade publications, and training programs act as a vehicle to train 
benevolent organizations and benevolent experts in governing themselves and 
others according to the values of the marketplace. The technologies of 
professionalization, which I describe below, seek to constitute as authoritative a 
marketized form of benevolence by strategizing the way in which benevolent 
organizations and benevolent experts care for and aid others. By strategizing the 
practice of benevolence rather than overtly marketizing it, the technologies of 
professionalization are able to assert the values of the marketplace which are so 
vital to the success of neoliberalism while at the same time masking their intent.  
The Technologies of Professionalization 
The marketization of the benevolent domain is in large part being 
facilitated by the technologies of professionalization. Contrary to popular opinion 
(e.g., Frumkin, 1989; Hall, 1992), the presence of professionalism in the practice 
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of benevolence did not commence with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In fact, it 
had long been under way in one form or another since the nineteenth century.1 
However, in order for the mechanisms of professionalization to facilitate the 
marketization of the benevolent domain—indeed, to endeavor to constitute the 
benevolent domain and its component parts as a market—they had to become 
technological. That is, they had to become oriented toward conduct in such a way 
that they took “the form of a strategic rationality2 concerned with the optimization 
of performance, aptitude and states” (Dean, 1996b, p. 48). According to Dean 
(1996b), any form of government (including professionalization, which seeks to 
conduct the conduct of members of a particular occupation) must reach one or 
more3 important thresholds in order to be considered technological in nature. In 
                                                            
1 Nonprofit scholars tend to demarcate the professionalization of nonprofit 
organizations and managers from the professionalization of fields like social 
work, which developed into a profession beginning in the nineteenth century (see 
Trolander, 1987), and charitable fundraising, which became more 
professionalized in the early twentieth century (see Wagner, 2000). When 
juxtaposed with the practice of benevolence, however, we find that there is a 
continuum between the development of professional social workers, professional 
fundraisers, and professional nonprofit organizations and managers. 
 
2 The use of the term rationality here equates to a logic or an approach, and is not 
akin to our notions of, for example, instrumental rationality. 
 
3 According to Dean (1996b), these technological thresholds are not consecutive 
and do not occur in a particular order, nor is it necessary that they all occur within 
a domain or be present at the same time. The other two thresholds he identifies are 
the force threshold and the orientation threshold. In the force threshold, 
government moves beyond simply augmenting existing forces; it becomes an 
integral part of the logistical formation of infrastructures that are necessary for 
making durable certain social, political, economic, and military institutions over 
time. After reaching the orientation threshold, government “approaches the force 
of bodies, and the aptitudes and capabilities of individuals, groups, and 
populations, as something to be intensified, augmented and optimized” (Dean, 
1996b, p. 65) rather than simply something as a requisite for good performance. 
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the late twentieth century, benevolent professionalization crossed one of these 
thresholds—the assemblage threshold—and I argue that it is currently in the 
process of crossing the systems threshold.  
First, at the crossing of the assemblage threshold, government becomes 
technological when “a complex assemblage of diverse elements, held together by 
heteromorphic relations, concerned with the direction of conduct” is identified 
(Dean, 1996b, p. 64). In other words, government becomes technological when 
various means for governing conduct become identifiable as working 
simultaneously to transform conduct in a particular way. As we have seen,4 in the 
late twentieth century, various mechanisms commonly associated with 
professionalization, including professional associations, codes of ethics, academic 
journals, trade publications, and training programs, assembled to simultaneously 
reform benevolent organizations and benevolent experts in an effort to make their 
values and actions more cohesive and consistent. Indeed, scholars have identified 
them as doing so (see Chapter 1). 
Now the mechanisms of professionalization are also being attached to 
other technologies to form a cohesive system of benevolence. At this threshold—
the systems threshold—government becomes technologized when it becomes 
identified as being an integral part of the processes of larger systems like 
consumption, communication, production, care, and so on (Dean, 1996b). In other 
words, specific forms of conduct and ways of thinking about conducting conduct 
                                                            
4 Refer to Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of the technologies which comprise 
the technologies of professionalization and how they have manifested in the 
practice of benevolence. 
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become attached to “technical objects, money, energy sources, communication 
networks, texts, humans, professions, expertise, and so on” (Dean, 1996b, p. 64) 
to form larger systems which maintain explicit objectives. The mechanisms of 
professionalization have not only assembled together and begun working 
simultaneously to reform benevolent conduct, they are also in the process of being 
attached to forms of expertise, technical objects like the audit and other financial 
reporting mechanisms, laws like the Tax Reform Act of 1969, other 
professionalized fields like fundraising and social work, and more, to form a 
larger system (née, a market) for benevolence. 
How exactly the technologies of professionalization are working to 
marketize the benevolent domain is a function of the features which define all 
technologies of government. First, a technology of government “presupposes the 
regular application of some sort of relatively systematized knowledge … to the 
pragmatic problems of the exercise of authority and in the composition of 
practical rationalities, know-how, expertise, and means of calculation” (Dean, 
1996b, p. 59). Oftentimes this involves the application of knowledge drawn from 
the human and social sciences. Here, however, the technologies of 
professionalization presuppose the regular application of the logic of the market. 
More specifically, the values of the market, namely entrepreneurialism and 
competition, inform how conduct is conducted through the deployment of the 
technologies of professionalization. 
Second, as has already been demonstrated, a technology of government 
can be viewed as a collection of “different techniques of government, technical 
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objects, actors, financial and other resources, and ‘sociotechnical’ forces” (Dean, 
1996b, p. 59) that are oftentimes “humble and mundane” but vital for making “it 
possible to govern” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 8). More specifically, a technology 
of government involves a “complex assemblage of diverse forces—legal, 
architectural, professional, administrative, financial, judgmental—[to the extent 
that] aspects of the decisions and actions of individuals, groups, organizations and 
populations come to be understood and regulated in relation to authoritative 
criteria” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 183).5 In other words, once assembled the 
mechanisms and the effects of the technologies of government begin operating “at 
quite a different level” (Foucault, 1995/1975, p. 26), and thus are enabled to 
constitute what is deemed authoritative within a particular domain (e.g., market 
values).6 Indeed, as a collection—or, to borrow Foucault’s phrasing, as “a 
multiform instrumentation” (Ibid)—the technologies of government work to 
“colonize” a domain or space and “reshape it according to its own requisites … 
maintain and intensify the relations of authority it makes possible … [and] 
identify the reverse salient that hinder this ambition” (Dean, 1996b, p. 59). So, not 
only do the technologies of government constitute what is authoritative within a 
domain, they also work to defend that constitution of authority from invading 
                                                            
5 Technologies of government can be viewed as networks rather than 
assemblages. Within the network, technical objects are linked together with 
human and non-human actors in an effort to affect power distributions. See Dean, 
1996b, pp. 55-56. 
 
6 The assemblage of mechanisms into an identifiable technology is an important 
phase in the processes of discursive formation, which is discussed in Chapter 5.  
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forces. The manner in which the professionalization of an occupation unfolds7 is 
certainly indicative of the processes described here. 
Finally, the multiform instrumentation of the technologies of government 
not only makes possible certain capacities for authority, it also produces more 
localized effects as it orients itself toward challenging the composite parts of the 
domain or space which it has colonized. Generally speaking, a technology 
actively seeks to unlock, transform, and distribute nature’s energy (Heidegger, 
1993, in Dean, 1996b, p. 60) in order to compel nature to work on its behalf. In 
other words, a technology sets upon nature to unlock its energy as part of a 
demand that it stand by and be prepared to use its energy to perform certain tasks. 
A technology of government is no different except that it is specifically concerned 
with unlocking the energy of human action. For a technology of government, 
human action “becomes an element of the ‘standing-reserve,’ something to be 
gathered together, so that the powers of its combination and assemblage may be 
unlocked, extracted, stored, transported and distributed” (Dean, 1996b, p. 60). If 
the potential of human action can be assembled with other natural and technical 
resources, then the multiform instrumentation of the technologies of government 
has the ability—through the power of the combined energies—to transform 
particular sites or locales within the domain into “power-containers” (Giddens, 
1985, in Dean, 1996b, p. 60). It is perhaps not surprising that in a contemporary 
society where organizational life dominates human association (see Denhardt, 
1981) organizations within a colonized domain (e.g., nonprofit organizations 
                                                            
7 See Chapter 1 for an overview. 
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within a benevolent domain) oftentimes act as the power-containers that facilitate 
the aims of the regime of practices of government upon whose behalf the 
technologies of government operate. 
The Governmentality of Benevolence 
Regimes of practices of government possess their own intrinsic logic and 
demonstrate an orientation toward a particular purpose (Dean, 1999, p. 22; see 
also Gordon, 1980). In other words, they have a raison d’être. To that end, they 
are comprised of bureaucratic practices; technologies for compiling and 
disseminating information; knowledges and expertise; ways of seeing and 
representing the world and the objects contained therein; and, varying forms of 
agential selves who carry with them particular capacities to govern (Dean, 1999, 
pp. 26-27) to facilitate the accomplishment of that purpose. Within the language 
of the analytics of government, these dimensions of a regime of practices of 
government are referred to as the techne, which are procedures for producing the 
truth; the episteme, which are the specific forms of expertise and knowledge that 
define ways of behaving; the fields of visibility, or ways of seeing who and what 
is to be governed; and, the subject identities that the techne and episteme seek to 
enact (Dean, 1999, p. 23).  
The regime of practices of benevolence that the technologies of 
professionalization are actively seeking to enact is no different in that it possesses 
a techne, episteme, fields of visibility, and subject identities which are assembled 
in a logical way and oriented toward a particular raison d’être. More specifically, 
the technologies of professionalization seek to enact a practice of benevolence 
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which will underpin a market for benevolence (i.e., its raison d’être) by asserting 
a techne and episteme which are informed by the values of the market, and then 
constructing fields of visibility and subject identities which operate according to 
these values. The technologies of professionalization do not overtly promote these 
values, however. Rather, what we find is that they are deployed under the guise of 
the promotion of strategic organization management8 and service delivery. Only 
by examining each in turn the elements of the practice of benevolence being 
asserted by the technologies of professionalization can we uncover the logic of 
their assembly as a regime of practices of government. Not only this, but 
ultimately understand how they collectively serve to advance neoliberalism’s aim 
of constructing a market for benevolence by asserting a strategized rather than a 
marketized practice of benevolence.  
The Techne and Episteme of Benevolence: Strategy 
 The forces for the production of knowledge and expertise, which act to 
constitute truth and, in turn, our behavior, can be found in the techne and episteme 
of government (Dean, 1995; see also Dean, 1996b). The techne of government 
involves the technical, practical, and pragmatic aspects by which authority is 
constituted. Put simply, it is the collection of techniques by which government 
accomplishes its ends. By contrast, the episteme of government refers to the forms 
of thought and the forms of rationality that seek to produce truth through certain 
                                                            
8 My assertion that the technologies of professionalization seek to enact a 
strategized form of benevolent organization management and service delivery 
should not be confused with the strategic management of scholars like Ansoff 
(1979). While the theories and practices of strategic management have figured 
prominently in the technologies of professionalization in recent years, they do not 
equate to a strategized mode of governance in the benevolent domain. 
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knowledges and expertise. This includes but is not limited to political 
philosophies, ideologies set forth by the social sciences, and theories of 
management and administration (Dean, 1996b, p. 59). While the techne and 
episteme of government differ from each other, they fully complement one 
another in their deployment. 
The techne and episteme of the practice of benevolence asserted by the 
technologies of professionalization is infused with a pervasive concern with 
strategy. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines strategy 
in several ways. First it is defined as the “science or art of combining and 
employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements 
and operations” (Flexner & Hauck, 1987, p. 1880). It is also defined as “the 
skillful use of a stratagem,” which itself is defined as “a plan, scheme, or trick for 
surprising or deceiving an enemy” or “any artifice, ruse, or trick devised or used 
to attain a goal or to gain an advantage over an adversary or competitor” (Ibid). 
Accordingly, strategy is also defined as “a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or 
stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result” (Ibid). Collectively these 
definitions hold in common three understandings. First, that there is an articulated 
goal. Second, that there is a plan for achieving the articulated goal. And finally, 
that there exist barriers to achieving the goal, which must be addressed. 
Ultimately a strategy involves the skillful employment of a particular plan to 
overcome barriers in the pursuit of the obtainment of an articulated goal. So, the 
techne and episteme asserted by the technologies of professionalization are 
concerned with developing goals, devising and implementing plans to achieve 
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those goals, and locating barriers which might impede progress toward those 
goals. 
Early on in the deployment of the technologies of professionalization (the 
1970s and early 1980s) and continuing through today, the concern for developing 
a goal for the benevolent domain has been and remains acute. This concern 
manifests itself in discussions of the domain’s purpose or identity. Purposes and 
identities asserted for the benevolent domain have included those that are more 
market-oriented in nature, such as alleviating information asymmetry in the 
marketplace (e.g., Te-eni & Young, 2003) or acting as a bridging or mediating 
domain between the state and the marketplace (e.g., Mendel, 2003). These 
purposes for the sector align with prevailing economic theories of the domain, all 
of which seek to explain the existence of the benevolent organization within the 
larger marketplace by analyzing how individuals allocate resources under 
conditions of scarcity (see Steinberg, 2006, p. 117). In general, these theories 
assert that the benevolent organization is an indirect consequence of such 
decision-making processes. 
More often than not, however, the purposes and identities proposed for the 
sector involve engendering personal (and personalized) interaction. In other 
words, the benevolent domain exists to bring communities together to solve 
problems (e.g., Cohen & Ely, 1981; Kerri, 1972), to facilitate civic engagement 
(e.g., Blum, 2001), or to alleviate the social alienation that comes with dealing 
with Government bureaucracy and the marketplace (e.g., Langton, 1981). Langton 
(1981) asserts an identity for the benevolent domain along these lines which is 
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particularly dynamic and multifaceted. In his view, the benevolent domain serves 
several functions: a prophetic function, a supplemental function, and a modeling 
function. In its prophetic function, the benevolent domain is expected to address 
“the conditions of injustice and depersonalization that are present in post-
industrial society” (p. 9) such that it becomes concerned with “correcting 
conditions, policies, and practices in business and government that are hazardous, 
depersonalizing, or unjust” (p. 10). Benevolent organizations and its experts 
should also take on the functions that have become associated with the welfare 
state in an effort to supplement the state’s efforts to provide for citizens—indeed, 
to reclaim them from the state. In this way, the state becomes less of a “provider 
of service” and more of a “supporter of services” (p. 11). Finally, Langton (1981) 
contends that the benevolent domain should actively create “models of 
organizational life that overcome or reduce depersonalization, bureaucratization, 
and sterile professionalism that we have come to associate with the 
[G]overnmental and corporate sectors” (p. 12). All of which is aimed at bringing 
the care and aid of others back to a more personal and personalized scale.  
While Langton’s (1981) proposed purpose for the benevolent domain 
would no doubt seem appealing to many, it does not serve as the dominant notion 
of the identity or purpose for the benevolent domain. In fact, no singular proposed 
purpose or identity reigns. Whether the articulated purpose encompasses 
correcting market failure or engendering a more personalized space for social 
interaction to combat depersonalization and bureaucracy, they all co-exist within 
the technologies of professionalization. These articulated purposes or identities 
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for the benevolent domain tend to hold in common a number of characteristics, 
however. First, they assert identities and purposes that are distinctly different9 
from that of the state or that of the marketplace. In other words, the benevolent 
domain is unique, and as such, it has something different or special to offer to the 
public. Second, these purposes not only distinguish the benevolent domain from 
the state and the marketplace, they also oftentimes act to alleviate the (negative) 
effects engendered by these other domains. In other words, the purpose of the 
benevolent domain is to aid society (see Sandberg, 2010) when the state and the 
marketplace fail to adequately provide individuals with the necessities of life. 
Ultimately, this pervasive concern with developing a purpose or identity which is 
distinctly different from that of the state or the marketplace serves to orient the 
work of the benevolent domain toward becoming that identity and achieving that 
purpose. In short, it becomes a goal to obtain. 
If the goal of the benevolent domain is to act as an aide to society, then 
plans must be formulated and enacted to achieve that goal. Indeed, the 
technologies of professionalization proliferate with not only techniques for 
implementing formalized plans and planning processes (e.g., Roller, 1996; 
Sheehan, 1999), but also discussions as to why benevolent experts should view 
formal planning as necessary for the success of the benevolent organization and 
the obtainment of its goals (e.g., Lindenberg, 2001; Siciliano, 1997). In short, it is 
                                                            
9 Different does not necessarily mean independent. In recent years, the declared 
and assumed independence of the nonprofit sector (née, benevolent domain) has 
become an area of critical scholarship. For instance, see Hall, 1987; Salamon, 
1987; and, van Til, 1989, all of whom call into question the independence of the 
so-called “Independent Sector.”  
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generally asserted that formalized planning leads to more positive outcomes. 
More pointedly, formalized planning ultimately leads to more effective 
organizations which in turn leads to more effective implementation of services. 
For instance, Wortman (1981) argues that benevolent organizations on the whole 
engage in too little formal planning and thus are more “reactive than proactive” 
(p. 63)—a state of being that is ultimately ineffectual. He advocates for more 
strategic, formalized planning, for it allows organizations to “build appropriate 
organizational structure[s] for … strategic change, and to select and develop 
suitable personnel capable of providing strategic change” (Wortman, 1981, p. 66). 
Siciliano (1997) concurs, contending that formalized planning affords benevolent 
organizations the ability to structure themselves and their experts in such a way 
that it ultimately leads to more favorable outcomes. In other words, organizations 
are enabled to meet their goals.  
Without information, however, developing plans and enacting them in 
order to obtain a goal is an arduous task. Information is needed to not only 
determine the appropriate path toward achieving the goal, but also to assess what 
if any barriers might stand in the way of the obtainment of that goal. Not 
surprisingly, then, the technologies of professionalization display a near-obsessive 
interest in information—not only possessing it, but also acquiring it and using it in 
formulating decisions, especially with regard to strategic, formalized planning 
processes. Not any kind of information will do, however. The technologies of 
professionalization promote a form of information acquisition and usage that is 
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predominantly rational10 in nature. More specifically, they presuppose a positivist 
perspective on knowledge accumulation by which one endeavors to objectively 
gather and examine “facts” through direct observation or logical inference in an 
effort to carefully establish a factual basis for drawing conclusions (Denhardt, 
2004, p. 73). In other words, reason is applied to conceive the appropriate means 
to achieving a predetermined end. Of course, underpinning the rational approach 
to the accumulation and use of information is an emphasis on objectivity. 
Rationality assumes that one can act in an objective manner to gather information, 
and as such, the information that is gathered will be relatively value-neutral. The 
better able one is to acquire value-neutral information, then the more objective the 
decision-making process can be for an organization. Being strategic or 
strategizing, then, clearly involves not only accumulating as much information as 
possible, but also doing so in an objective manner which then allows one to apply 
it to decision-making processes in an equally rational way. 
The technologies of professionalization are rife with techniques which 
promote rational methods for gathering, assessing, and evaluating information; 
however, far and away the most prominent method is program evaluation. In fact, 
a course in program evaluation makes up a part of the core curriculum for nearly 
every graduate program in nonprofit management (see Seton Hall University, 
n.d.), which is in keeping with the curricular guidelines recommended by the 
                                                            
10 Our understanding of rationality here follows from that of Herbert Simon. 
Rather than take up the ancient philosophical view that human reason is integral 
to the foundations of human society, we view rationality here as being concerned 
with coordinating right means to meet pre-determined ends (see Denhardt, 2004, 
pp. 74-75). 
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Nonprofit Academic Centers Council (2007). It recommends that nonprofit 
management programs include a course in “assessment, evaluation, and decision-
making methods” that emphasizes “methods … to evaluate performance and 
effectiveness … and the use and application of … data for purposes of 
strengthening [benevolent] organizations, the … sector and the larger society” (p. 
12). Program evaluation entails the “use of social science research methods to 
systematically investigate the effectiveness of social intervention programs in 
ways that are adapted to their political and organizational environments and are 
designed to inform social action to improve social conditions” (Rossi, Lipsey & 
Freeman, 2004, p. 116). While various social science research methods can be 
employed to gather information on an organization’s programs and services and 
while evaluators increasingly seek to incorporate the opinions of numerous 
stakeholders in the evaluation process, the primary objective of program 
evaluation remains methodological rigor (see Fine, Thayer & Coghlin, 2000). The 
assumption being that methodological rigor promotes and maintains the 
objectivity that is vital to the processes of rationalized information gathering and 
usage. 
Fields of Visibility: The Benevolent Organization 
 The benevolent organization and its internal and external environments 
serve as not only the primary targets of information gathering, but also as the 
essential vehicles for facilitating the collection of information and decision-
making involving accumulated information. They are the objects of study while 
also housing the examiners (benevolent experts). In other words, they are the 
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power-containers by which the benevolent domain can achieve its goal of aiding 
society. In the language of the analytics of government, the benevolent 
organization and its internal and external environments constitute the field of 
visibility for a strategized practice of benevolence. Through texts, drawings, 
maps, charts, tables, and more, a field of visibility constructs our ways of seeing 
and perceiving, which “make it possible to ‘picture’ who and what is being 
governed, how relations of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how 
different locales and agents are connected with one another, what problems are to 
be solved and what objectives are to be sought” (Dean, 1999, p. 30). Examination 
of a regime of government’s field of visibility involves understanding how it 
renders things both visible and opaque.  
 The visible. 
In terms of what is rendered visible in the technologies of 
professionalization, very few aspects of the benevolent organization remain 
unexamined. More specifically, no stone has been left unturned as both the 
internal and external environment of the benevolent organization has been 
exposed to rational examination in an effort to expose any potential barriers to the 
obtainment of the goal of aiding society. Primary objects of examination include 
individuals who are vital to the daily functioning of the benevolent organization, 
such as employees, volunteers, and members of boards of directors. Discussions 
of individuals such as these often focus on their intrinsic motivations. For 
example, the technologies of professionalization push to understand what 
motivates employees, especially with regard to their performance. Is the level of 
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their performance tied to the mission of the organization (Brown & Yoshioka, 
2003), service to others (Ebener & O’Connell, 2010), pay rates (Anft, 2001; 
Deckop & Cirka, 2000), or the work itself (Borzaga & Tortia, 2006)? Similarly, 
the technologies of professionalization analyze the motivations of individuals who 
volunteer with benevolent organizations. This includes members of benevolent 
organizations’ boards of directors whose motivations and performance seem 
particularly integral to organizational effectiveness (e.g., Green & Griesinger, 
1996; Jackson & Hollan, 1998). The technologies of professionalization seek to 
expose whether volunteerism is simply a lifestyle choice (Heidrich, 1990; Watts 
& Edwards, 1983) or if it is something more, such as a measure of one’s 
psychological or personal makeup (Liao-Troth, 2005) or a choice based in self-
interested behavior (Govekar & Govekar, 2002). Ultimately the technologies of 
professionalization seek to lay bare the motivations of individuals who are 
integral to the success of benevolent organizations in order to harness their energy 
and put it to work toward the achievement of goals. In other words, if we can 
understand the motivations of employees and volunteers, then we can optimize 
their performance which serves to enhance the overall effectiveness of the 
benevolent organization as it seeks to obtain its goal.  
In much the same way, the technologies of professionalization seek to 
harness the energy of organizational resources and reduce the risk that they 
become barriers to the obtainment of goals by subjecting them to scrutiny. Most 
prominently this includes financial capital. Financial capital is a vital resource for 
any organization, including benevolent organizations; therefore, the technologies 
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of professionalization illuminate not only the processes by which organizations 
acquire financial capital but also the methods required to ensure its successful 
implementation toward achieving goals. More specifically, the merits of various 
methods for raising funds are debated. These include corporate matching gift 
programs (Greene, 2001), for-profit enterprises (Dart, 2004; Pope, 2001), planned 
giving programs (Blum & Marchetti, 2000), and government funding (Kingma, 
1993). At times these methods intersect with a concern for technological 
resources as is evidenced by the discussions of fundraising trends like e-
philanthropy (e.g., Cohen, 2002; Lewis, 2000). The lesson here is that if we can 
determine which of these methods is the most successful in garnering financial 
capital, then the better able we might be to enhance the effectiveness of the 
benevolent organization and its ability to successfully achieve its goals. This also 
requires that the benevolent organization begin thinking of itself as a financial or 
“economic enterprise” (Bryce, 2001) such that its own internal financial 
operations become the subject of scrutiny as well. One must analyze the 
organization’s “financial self” through budgets, financial statements, and fund 
allocation (Bryce, 2001; see also Kingma, 1993; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003) in 
order to understand how financial capital impacts a benevolent organization’s 
overall effectiveness. 
The organization must also understand itself as a part of a larger 
environment in which it is but one player amongst many. Thus, the external 
environment of the benevolent organization is also subject to examination through 
the technologies of professionalization. More specifically, there is a clear 
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imperative that benevolent organizations know and understand the potential 
barriers posed by the state and by other benevolent organizations, including 
foundations. First and foremost, benevolent organizations must understand the 
state as both a financial partner and a service partner through the devolution of 
programmatic responsibilities from the state to the benevolent domain. In both 
cases, the partnership poses both risks and rewards for the benevolent 
organization and its pursuit of goals, for the state proves to be a powerful partner 
who can easily alter the fortunes of a benevolent organization through its 
offerings of financial capital, administrative support, and legitimacy (e.g., 
Alexander, 1999; Clolery, 2001; Cohen, 2005; Rosenbaum, 1981; Vanderwoerd, 
2003). The benevolent organization should also understand the risks and barriers 
the state poses through the passage and implementation of law. In other words, 
the benevolent organization must recognize the state as a regulator (e.g., Berger, 
Goller & Murphy, 2003; Blum, 2000; Gardner, 1987; Lipman, 2001; Greene, 
2003; Wolverton, 2004) who might deter benevolent organizations from the 
pursuit of their goals. Likewise, other benevolent organizations who are providing 
services and providing funds (e.g., foundations) can act as barriers to the 
obtainment of goals. While collaboration between benevolent organizations is 
often touted in the technologies of professionalization (e.g., Lippett & van Til, 
1981; Semel, 2000; Whelan, 2002; York & Zychlinski, 1996), it is done with the 
understanding that the environment in which they operate is inherently 
competitive (Lippett & van Til, 1981; York & Zychlinski, 1996). Benevolent 
organizations oftentimes seek to draw from the same sources of financial and 
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human capital to facilitate the obtainment of their own goals, thus engendering a 
collaborative spirit which can prove challenging to overcome in order to facilitate 
collaborative relationships. 
Of course, in order to get information, benevolent organizations must be 
able to give up information. In other words, in order for benevolent organizations 
to gather knowledge about themselves and their environment to facilitate plans to 
achieve their goals, they must conduct their operations in a manner such that 
information can be easily accessed during the processes of examination and 
knowledge accumulation. Consequently, the technologies of professionalization 
strongly emphasize the necessity of organizational transparency and information 
access. Oftentimes, this comes in the form of financial transparency. For example, 
the Nonprofit Academic Centers Council (2007) recommends that nonprofit 
management programs include a course in “financial management and 
accountability” which emphasizes “financial literacy, transparency and 
stewardship in the effective oversight and management of … resources” (p. 10). 
In addition, in their published code of ethics, the Association of Fundraising 
Professionals (AFP) (2004) strongly asserts that good (i.e., professional, ethical) 
fundraisers work diligently to provide accurate organizational information both to 
funders and to their own organizational management. Not only this, but AFP also 
contends that the professional and ethical benevolent organization is one that 
makes itself accountable through the provision of information. In other words, the 
professional benevolent organization “freely and accurately shares information 
about its governance, finances, and operations, … [and] is open and inclusive in 
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its procedures, processes and programs” 
(http://www.afpnet.org/Ethics/EnforcementDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=3262). 
While these directives are oftentimes associated with funder relationships, they 
are also indicative of a particular mode of operating for professionalized 
benevolent organizations, namely one that is transparent, accountable, and 
information driven. 
The invisible. 
For everything that is made visible in relation to the benevolent 
organization as it seeks to determine whether barriers exist to its pursuit of the 
obtainment of its goal of aiding society, one finds the beneficiary11 of benevolent 
organizations’ services strangely invisible. The benevolent domain is a varied one 
in that it encompasses organizations whose aims are to alleviate or end 
homelessness, feed the hungry, preserve historic landmarks, prevent the abuse of 
animals, conserve natural habitats, and more. Yet, one finds that individuals who 
are homeless or hungry, historic landmarks and frail natural habitats that are in 
danger of being bulldozed, or helpless animals whose very lives are at risk are 
rarely directly discussed within the technologies of professionalization. Rather, 
what are discussed are organizational missions and mission statements.12 
                                                            
11 I have deliberately chosen the term “beneficiary” rather than “client” or “end 
user” here so as to not limit the discussion to only those organizations which aim 
to serve humans. The beneficiaries of the benevolent domain’s services can and 
do include humans, non-human animals, the natural environment, cultural 
artifacts, and more.  
 
12 In their examination of the role missions play in measuring success in 
benevolent organizations, Sawhill and Williams (2001) provide some helpful 
examples of missions for a number of prominent benevolent organizations: The 
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Generally speaking, the mission of a benevolent organization encompasses the 
goal, purpose, or aim of the organization. More specifically, according to 
organizational guru Peter F. Drucker (1989), the mission of a benevolent 
organization and its requirements: 
… focuses the organization on action. It defines the specific strategies 
needed to attain crucial goals. It creates a disciplined organization. It alone 
can prevent the most common degenerative disease of organizations, 
especially large ones: splintering their always limited resources on things 
that are “interesting” or look “profitable” rather than concentrating them 
on a very small number of productive efforts. … A well-defined mission 
serves as a constant reminder of the need to look outside the organization 
not only for “customers” but also for measures of success. (p. 89) 
Furthermore, the organizational mission and its correlative mission statement 
serve to define the value that a benevolent organization provides for not only the 
stakeholders who are involved with the organization (i.e., beneficiaries, funders, 
employees, volunteers, etc.), but also for society at large (Moore, 2000).  
 Since the mission of a benevolent organization serves to define the value 
the organization brings to stakeholders and to society at large as well as to drive 
the very purpose of its existence, organizational missions and mission statements 
have become topics of paramount importance in the technologies of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
American Association of Retired Persons, or AARP (addressing the needs of 
people fifty and older); the American Heart Association (reducing disability and 
death from cardiovascular disease and stroke); The Nature Conservancy 
(conserving biodiversity); and, The National Campaign to Prevent Teen 
Pregnancy (reducing teen pregnancy by one-third by 2005). 
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professionalization.13 More pointedly, achievement of the organizational mission 
has become a profoundly important topic, which is evidenced by the significant 
role it plays in discussions surrounding assessments of organizational 
effectiveness. In particular, these discussions revolve around how best to assess 
organizational effectiveness in relation to the organizational mission—something 
which is oftentimes imprecise (i.e., not easily quantifiable) in nature (see Banoli 
& Megali, 2011; Eisinger, 2002; Krug & Weinberg, 2004; Sawhill & Williamson, 
2001; Sheehan, 1996; Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004; Stauber, 2001), unlike the 
financial bottom lines of their for-profit counterparts. The result of these 
discussions has been the proliferation of models and evaluative frameworks which 
seek to assess the benevolent organization’s “mission impact,” (Sawhill & 
Williamson, 2001) or the extent to which an organization is able to achieve its 
mission. To this end, these models include in part searches for an analog to profit 
(Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), a focus on an organization’s ability to “do the 
right thing,” (Krug & Weinberg, 2004), checks on “institutional coherence” 
(Bagnoli & Megali, 2009), assessments of institutional capacity (Eisinger, 2002), 
and a full-fledged multidimensional, integrated model of nonprofit organizational 
effectiveness, or MIMNOE (Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004).  
Through these and other like models and evaluative frameworks (e.g., 
Christiansen & Ebrahim, 2006; Forbes, 1998; McDonald, 2007; Rojas, 2000; 
Schoichet, 1998; Shaw & Allen, 2009; Wing, 2004), the presence of the 
                                                            
13 For example, a search for articles and book reviews in the journals Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership and Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 
which discuss missions and mission statements, produced no fewer than 492 and 
602 results, respectively. 
 132 
beneficiaries of benevolent organizations—whether they are humans, non-human 
animals, cultural artifacts, natural habitats, etc.— is often implied rather than 
explicit. Their presence is implied because they appear in the discussion of 
organizational missions and mission achievement nearly solely as performance 
indicators or as measurements of success as the objects of organizational 
missions, programs, and services. For example, Sowa, Seldon, and Sandfort 
(2004) allude to the beneficiaries of benevolent organizations in their MIMNOE 
by including surveys designed to assess client satisfaction in their evaluation of 
program effectiveness. Similarly, in his evaluation of The Excellence in 
Philanthropy Project, Sheehan (1996) touches upon beneficiaries in his discussion 
of the relationship between a number of benevolent organizations’ mission 
statements and their corresponding performance measurements which aim to 
capture whether the organizations are having “mission impact.” For instance, the 
mission of the Charles County Homeless Services organization is “‘to end 
homelessness in Charles County,’” a goal whose success is measured by the 
“‘number of homeless people in Charles County, as reported by county officials’” 
(Sheehan, 1996, p. 113). Likewise, the mission of the Merle County Infant 
Nutrition Project is “‘to assure that infants born in Merle County begin life 
healthy and well-nourished,’” the success of which is measured by “‘county birth 
weights and county infant mortality rates’” (Sheehan, 1996, p. 113).  
The focus here remains squarely on the benevolent organization and on 
the achievement of its mission through programs and services, so there is little 
substantive discussion about the individuals or other beneficiaries which are the 
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objects of these organizations’ missions and whose adherence to organizations’ 
programs and services is crucial to determining the level of effectiveness with 
which the organizations achieve their aims. As such, the beneficiaries of 
benevolent organizations are opaque within the technologies of 
professionalization, and possess little semblance of the individuality that is 
bestowed upon other individuals (e.g., volunteers, employees) and acquire little of 
the import which is accorded to organizational resources and relationships. Rather 
than entities whose energies can be harnessed toward the pursuit of organizational 
goals, beneficiaries of benevolent organizations seem to be viewed only as 
indicators of organizational outcomes or outputs. Only a small handful of 
nonprofit management programs run contrary to this trend of rendering opaque 
the beneficiary of benevolent organizations. Nonprofit graduate programs offered 
by The University of San Francisco (n.d.), Seattle University (n.d.), and Regis 
University (n.d.) place unambiguous emphasis on individualized service to the 
benevolent organization’s beneficiary as a core competency for managers within 
benevolent organizations. Interestingly, each of these universities was founded 
and continues to operate under the Jesuit Catholic tradition, which maintains its 
strong historical commitment to charity.  
Benevolent Subjects: Info-Managers and Info-Resources 
The identity (or lack thereof) assigned to the beneficiary of benevolent 
organizations’ services is only one such subject identity which the technologies of 
professionalization seek to enact in support of a strategized practice of 
benevolence. The technologies of professionalization seek to enact particular 
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forms of identity and associated forms of conduct on both those who possess 
authority and those who are governed.14 The field of visibility dictates the 
formation of these identities; therefore, the identities and associated forms of 
conduct sought by a strategic practice of benevolence are constructed in relation 
to the benevolent organization and to the acquisition of information about the 
organization and its environment. In general, in the strategic practice of 
benevolence, individuals are constituted as either info-managers or info-
resources. Info-managers are those individuals with authority who not only 
facilitate the acquisition of information, but also its usage. They oftentimes also 
act as info-keepers within an organization in that they are viewed as possessing 
the information required to make effective decisions, especially with regard to 
formalized, strategic planning processes. Info-resources, on the other hand, act as 
the object of information gathering processes. These are individuals who are 
studied by info-managers and about whom information is gathered to be utilized 
in goal oriented planning and decision-making processes. 
The info-managers. 
 The primary info-manager in the benevolent domain is the benevolent 
organization manager.15 The technologies of professionalization are primarily 
                                                            
14 Here it is important to note that regimes of practices do not create forms of 
subjectivity—“they elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various 
capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (Dean, 1999, p. 32). 
Through the analytics of government, one ultimately endeavors to expose these 
efforts and gauge how successful they actually are in eliciting their sought-after 
capacities, qualities, and statuses. 
 
15 There are other individuals and organizations within the scope of the 
benevolent domain that can be considered information consumers, such as 
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directed at individuals operating at executive and middle management levels 
within a benevolent organization, for they are most likely to join professional 
associations, read the trade publications and journals, and enroll in management 
courses at their local university. Indeed, they are regarded as the individuals 
within the benevolent domain who have the requisite authority to implement the 
practice of benevolence as it is being articulated through the technologies of 
professionalization. As the primary info-manager, then, the benevolent manager is 
responsible for (rationally) gathering and keeping information on the risks posed 
to the benevolent organization and the barriers which might obstruct the 
attainment of goals. As such, she is expected not only to be well-versed in all 
areas of the organization and its environment, but also in rational data collection 
processes. This is no doubt why the curricula which comprises nonprofit 
management programs across the country (see Nonprofit Academic Centers 
Council, 2007; see also Seton Hall University, n.d.) includes courses on the scope 
of the nonprofit sector, nonprofit law, nonprofit finance, public policy affecting 
nonprofits, fundraising, human resource management, marketing, technology, 
and, as mentioned, program evaluation and decision-making. If a benevolent 
manager is to successfully complete a graduate degree in nonprofit management, 
then she must become intimately familiar with the internal and external workings 
of her organization and with the benevolent domain as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
members of benevolent organizations’ boards of directors, Government 
regulators, and watchdog groups; however, within the technologies of 
professionalization these individuals and organizations are more often than not 
regarded as information resources. That is, they and their habits, motivations, and 
actions are objects of analysis. 
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Clearly the benevolent manager is expected to become the benevolent 
domain’s expert in (rationally) acquiring information about the organizational 
field. At the same time, she is also expected to apply what she has learned toward 
advancing the domain’s goal of aiding society; she must help meet its purpose. 
Professional development programs like that of Arizona State University’s 
Lodestar Center for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Innovation stress the applicability 
of the knowledge of the benevolent domain that they offer to info-managers. With 
this kind of training, the info-manager will be able to “manage” more effectively, 
“stretch” limited dollars, “succeed” in a competitive environment, and “make” the 
media work for them (http://www.asu.edu/copp/nonprofit/edu/nmi_front.htm, ¶6). 
The emphasis here is unquestionably on knowledge-in-action. The info-manager 
is expected to actively use the information she has gleaned about her organization 
and its environment to ensure that her benevolent organization operates more 
efficiently and effectively within the wider benevolent domain as it seeks to meet 
its goals. 
There is also an expectation that she will manage and deploy knowledge in 
an ethical manner. In other words, the info-manager is a rational, active, and 
(now) ethical expert on the practice of benevolence. Nonprofit management and 
professional development programs all offer courses or training in ethics and the 
application of ethical frameworks to decision-making within the benevolent 
organization. These courses promote learning values such as “trust, stewardship, 
service, voluntarism, civic engagement, freedom of association and social justice” 
(Nonprofit Academic Centers Council, 2007, p. 8), all of which accord well with 
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the purposes and identities for the benevolent domain expressed through the 
technologies of professionalization, especially those which argue that the purpose 
of the benevolent domain is to facilitate personal and personalized social 
interaction. These courses also advocate adherence to “standards and codes of 
conduct that are appropriate to professionals and volunteers working in 
philanthropy and the nonprofit sector” (Ibid). As we have seen, professional codes 
of conduct within the benevolent domain tend to emphasize the role of 
information in ethical, professional behavior (see Association of Fundraising 
Professionals, 2004). More specifically, ethical, professional conduct is 
oftentimes associated with the gathering, keeping, and sharing of information in a 
manner that is open, transparent, and accountable to both the public and to the 
benevolent organization.   
The info-resources. 
 As an employee of a benevolent organization the benevolent manager—
while still an info-manager—can also act as an info-resource. In other words, her 
habits, motivations, and actions can become the object of analysis for use in 
strategic decision-making processes. As such, she acts as one part of a collection 
of individuals whose energies serve to provide the benevolent organization with 
information about its own internal operations. As we have seen, employees and 
volunteers act as info-resources, as they provide info-managers with data on the 
best ways to harness their energies (i.e., to motivate them) toward the 
advancement of benevolent organizations’ strategic aims. They are info-resources 
within benevolent organizations.  
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As we have also seen, there exist info-resources outside the benevolent 
organization as well. They include donors, Government regulators, Government 
agency funders, members of watchdog groups, and representatives of other 
benevolent organizations who act to provide information on the state of the 
benevolent organization’s external environment. Info-managers approach info-
resources outside the boundaries of the benevolent organization in much the same 
way as those within the organization (e.g., as data sources), but because they exist 
outside organizational boundaries, they are regarded more as potential barriers to 
the obtainment of strategic goals. These info-resources operate outside the 
benevolent organization, so their motivations are oftentimes unknown. At the 
same time, they are vital to security of the benevolent organization. In other 
words, their inscrutability represents a danger to the benevolent organization, and 
must be assessed as such. So, info-managers endeavor to gather information on 
whether donors, Government regulators, Government funders, watchdog groups, 
and other benevolent organizations intend to be collaborators or rivals. By 
assessing the threat level these info-resources and their organizations pose to the 
benevolent organization, info-managers and benevolent organizations are better 
able to design and implement plans to achieve their goals. 
Beneficiaries of organizations’ services occupy a gray area both within 
and outside the benevolent organization. Like the info-resources within the 
organization, they are vital to the success of the organization in that they provide 
information about the organization’s operations. Indeed, they provide the info-
manager with information on whether the organization is meeting its aims, as they 
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are primarily viewed as an indication of organizational outcomes or outputs. At 
the same, however, they can be viewed as existing outside the organization, for 
unlike other individuals and resources within the organization, their energies 
cannot be harnessed toward the achievement of organizational outcomes—they 
are the organizational outcomes. As such, their motivations—like the motivations 
of other external info-resources—can seem inscrutable and thus dangerous. In 
other words, they can pose a threat to the security of the benevolent organization. 
So, beneficiaries of benevolent organizations’ services hold a rather paradoxical 
subject position in that they are viewed both as vital to the success of benevolent 
organization (as outcomes of organizational efforts) and as a potential threat 
toward the achievement of organizational efforts.  
The Strategization of the Benevolent Domain 
If the benevolent domain is to make an effective conversion to a market 
for benevolence, then it must become marketized. In other words, it must learn to 
take on the traits of a market and begin functioning like a marketplace. Only then 
will neoliberalism be able to achieve the cultural transformation it seeks from a 
social government to one in which the rules of the market dictate individual 
conduct (Dean, 1999, p. 172). What, then, does strategizing the benevolent 
domain have to do with marketizing it? To answer this question, we must first 
understand what it means to operate like a market. At its most basic level, we can 
understand a market as a space where goods and services are exchanged. Within a 
neoliberal governmentality, however, acting in accordance with market values 
and extending the logic of the market to all corners of life takes on a particular 
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meaning. It distinctly does not entail establishing a “society of commodities, of 
consumption” by which the exchange value acts as the measure of all things 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 146). Rather, the marketized society envisioned by 
neoliberalism is one in which all things are measured by their worth as enterprises 
and by their ability to compete. It is worth quoting Foucault (2008) at length to 
appreciate the nuances of a neoliberal market: 
The society regulated by reference to the market that the neo-liberals are 
thinking about is a society in which the regulatory principle should not be 
so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition. 
It is these mechanisms that should have the greatest surface and depth and 
should also occupy the greatest volume in society. This means that what is 
sought is not a society subject to the commodity-effect, but a society 
subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a super-market society, but an 
enterprise society. The Homo œconomicus sought after is not the man [sic] 
of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and 
production. (Foucault, 2008, p. 147) 
Likewise, the benevolent organization and the benevolent expert sought in the 
marketization of the benevolent domain is not one that acts as the consumer, but 
rather as the enterprise. More pointedly, the benevolent organization and the 
benevolent expert desired is one which behaves “in the form of competition in 
terms of plans and projects, and with objectives, tactics, and so forth” (Foucault, 
2008, p. 175). 
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 If becoming marketized entails learning to behave as an enterprise, then it 
also means learning to contend with the dangers that are associated with 
competing in the marketplace. To a great extent, becoming entrepreneurial affords 
one the freedom to behave as she wishes (Foucault, 2008, p. 175) in the 
marketplace as she employs plans to pursue objectives. Indeed, 
entrepreneurialism presupposes the existence of a free subject who can act on her 
needs, desires, interests, and choices (Dean, 1999, p. 165). Full participation in 
the marketplace through the exercise of free choice in the pursuit of plans and 
objectives, however, exposes one to the dangers that are posed by the marketplace 
(e.g., other competitors, environmental effects, production errors, etc.). In other 
words, by virtue of being entrepreneurial and engaging fully in the marketplace, 
one places both herself and her objectives at risk. As such, she must do what she 
can to minimize the risk she faces in the marketplace in order to sustain her plans 
and objectives—her very ability to be entrepreneurial. In the neoliberal 
marketplace, this entails learning to be prudent.  
O’Malley (1996) refers to the trend of individuals, organizations, and 
communities assuming responsibility for managing their own risks as a new sense 
of prudentialism (see also Dean, 1999, p. 166). In the new prudentialism, one 
assumes responsibility for minimizing one’s own risk by making more prudent 
choices about individual and institutional behavior. This movement toward the 
assumption of individual responsibility for risk has required the slow retraction of 
the social methods for contending with risk that are associated with the welfare 
state and replacing them with more private methods. These private methods 
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include not only the acquisition of insurance (see Ewald, 1991) but also behavior 
modification. One indemnifies herself against potential dangers by behaving in a 
manner so as not to invite the specters of unemployment, ill health, violence, and 
crime. In the neoliberal marketplace, privatizing risk in such a manner is seen as 
more efficient, “for individuals [as well as organizations and communities] will be 
driven to greater execution and enterprise by the need to insure against adverse 
circumstances—and the more enterprising they are, the better safety net they 
construct” (O’Malley, 1996, p. 197). Of course, only those who are active and 
entrepreneurial are capable of managing their own risks—“target” groups need 
help doing so (Dean, 1999, p. 166). As such, sovereign and disciplinary 
techniques accompany these private methods for mitigating personal risk in order 
to move the individuals, organizations, and communities toward assuming more 
and more personal responsibility. In short, in the new prudentialism, relying on 
the state to manage one’s own risk has come to indicate personal failing. 
This form of prudentialism is facilitated by what scholars have deemed the 
technologies of performance and the technologies of agency. The technologies of 
performance have been most commonly asserted in the rhetoric and practices 
stemming from movements that advocate, for example, the reinvention of 
Government (e.g., Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), which includes most prominently 
the approach to Government referred to as New Public Management (see 
Barzelay, 2001; see also Kaboolian, 1998; Lynn, 1998). Within this framework, 
the technologies of performance aim to minimize the sense of privilege that was 
afforded to experts under the welfare state (Rose & Miller, 1992) by subjecting 
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their authority to “enumeration, calculation, monitoring, [and] evaluation” in 
nearly every way (Rose, 1996a, p. 54).16 This includes the systemic institution of 
measures for performance evaluation, including benchmarks and performance 
indicators (Dean, 1999, p. 169), as well as the “monetarization” of the 
bureaucratic professions such that all individuals and activities become budgeted 
and, ultimately, calculable in cash terms (Rose, 1996a, pp. 54-55). While the 
technologies of performance allow the state to govern from above through these 
indirect means (Miller & Rose, 1990; see also Rose & Miller, 1992), they also 
establish institutional spaces which are self-managing (Dean, 1999, p. 169) by 
rendering everything and everyone not only accountable in a quantifiable manner, 
but also calculable and predictable. In other words, the technologies of 
performance allow institutions and their experts to independently regulate 
themselves and their environments as they endeavor to minimize the risks they 
face as they navigate the marketplace. 
The technologies of performance remain useless, however, without the 
presence of active and free individuals who are informed about the marketplace 
and engage in it as responsible consumers. While the technologies of performance 
provide information about institutions, institutional environments, and experts’ 
activities, the technologies of agency endeavor to create subjects who know how 
to use information to maintain a sense of individual accountability and risk 
management. There are two types of technologies of agency: the technologies of 
                                                            
16 The result is what Power (1997) refers to as an audit society in which trust in 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic professionals is won only through the rituals of 
verification provided by the audit and like measures. 
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citizenship and an enhanced form of contractualism. First, Cruikshank (1999) 
argues that individuals become citizens through the application of the 
technologies of citizenship, which are “discourses, programs, and other tactics 
aimed at making individuals politically active and capable of self-government” (p. 
1). These include any programs that promote self-empowerment and aim to 
engender self-sufficiency. As has already been discussed, successful 
entrepreneurialism presupposes a free citizen such as the one envisioned by the 
technologies of citizenship.  
The neoliberal marketplace also promotes an enhanced form of 
contractualism between various entities in an effort to create active, responsible 
citizens (see Dean, 1999). The ultimate purpose of this enhanced contractualism is 
to displace the responsibility for risk from the welfare state into communities and 
onto the individuals and institutions that comprise them. To this end, 
contractualism is “premised on the active participation of the individual in his or 
her welfare through a negotiated set of arrangements” (Jayasuriya, 2002, p. 310). 
In other words, she is “given” agency to act in her own best interest, within reason 
(i.e., within prescribed contractual limits). Contractualism can encompass both 
implicit17 and explicit contracts between the state and individuals or organizations 
seeking assistance from it, as well as efforts to marketize state institutions by 
forcing them to purchase in the marketplace through the contracting out of public 
services to private institutions (Rose, 1996a, pp. 54-55). Oftentimes implicit and 
                                                            
17 An example of an implicit form of contractualism would be an unemployed 
person “contracting” with the state to seek work in return for receiving 
unemployment benefits. 
 145 
explicit forms of contractualism work in concert with one another to achieve a 
more “responsibilized” citizenry.  
 When juxtaposed with the strategized practice of benevolence which the 
technologies of professionalization present to us, the features of the neoliberal 
marketplace (i.e., enhanced contractualism, prudentialism, a responsibilized 
citizenry, technologies of performance, and the central figure of the enterprise) 
seem kindred spirits with the strategic organization and its dedication to planning, 
rational information gathering processes, info-managers, and goal of aiding the 
public. In fact, when viewed side by side (see Table 4.1), we can identify many 
corresponding characteristics: 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Marketized v. Strategized Benevolence 
 Neoliberal Marketplace Strategic Benevolence 
Model The enterprise The strategic organization 
Field of play Marketplace Market for benevolence 
Behavior Entrepreneurial, risk minimizing, competitive 
Goal-oriented, planning, 
reducing barriers 
Ethos Prudence (i.e., minimization of risk) 
Identification of and 
minimization of barriers 
Key Personnel The free, responsibilized citizen 
The rational, active, ethical 
info-manager 
Key Tactics 
Measuring performance (e.g., 
audit, performance 
evaluations, financial 
statements, budgets, etc.) 
Rational information gathering 
and assessment (e.g., program 
evaluation tools, financial 
statements, budgets, etc.) 
Contract The state/Enterprise The public/Benevolent domain 
 
What ultimately links together a marketized form of benevolence and a 
strategized form of benevolence, however, is the twin imperatives of competition 
and responsibility. In other words, in the end both the enterprise and the strategic 
 146 
organization are responsible for their own fate as they compete against others to 
sustain their very existence. 
The question remains, however, as to what the purpose of a strategized (as 
opposed to a marketized) practice of benevolence achieves on behalf of 
neoliberalism. In other words, what is the ultimate function of a strategized 
discourse? What does it achieve that a marketized discourse cannot? In the 
benevolent domain, the terms “market” and “marketize” tend to be dirty words 
(see Drucker, 1989, p. 89), and they are often associated with “acting like a 
business.” More to the point, these terms are often associated with acting like a 
private business whose sole objective is to make a profit. While some in the 
benevolent domain contend that there are benefits to adopting a more business-
like approach to organization management and service delivery (e.g., Kass, 2001; 
Shoham, Ruvio, Vigoda-Gadot, & Schwabsky, 2006), many others view such an 
approach as antithetical to the higher (i.e., more laudable) purpose of benevolent 
organizations (e.g., Eisenberg, 2004; Langton, 1981; McLaughlin, 2008; 
Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006). The organizations and individuals which comprise 
the benevolent domain are the inheritors of a complicated, intertwined history of a 
Judeo-Christian ethic of care and what historian Paul Veyne (1990/1976) calls 
euergetism—a pervasive expectation that the wealthy will use their private gain to 
benefit their community as a whole—a practice which has its roots in ancient 
Greece. Together these two conceptions provide the benevolent domain with a 
mutually reinforcing sense of obligation to care for others in society—indeed, to 
care for and protect society at large. This legacy persists in the benevolent 
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domain, and neoliberalism must contend with it in order to effectively assert a 
marketized form of benevolence. 
Neoliberalism contends with this legacy by appropriating it. More 
specifically, neoliberalism turns an obligation to care for others and for society 
into a goal for the organizations and individuals which comprise the benevolent 
domain to achieve. Furthermore, through the technologies of professionalization, 
it orients the organizations, communities, and individuals which comprise the 
benevolent domain such that they will not only assume the care of others as a 
goal, but also enable themselves through training, instruction, and professional 
norms of service to successfully achieve this goal. In other words, neoliberalism 
masks its intentions—a tactic which proves critical to its ability to successfully 
achieve its aims. According to Foucault (1990/1976) “power is tolerable only on 
condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its 
ability to hide its own mechanisms. … Secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it 
is indispensable to its operation” (p. 86). By orienting the benevolent domain 
toward goal-driven behavior rather than the marketized behavior it finds 
objectionable, neoliberalism is able to make the marketization of the benevolent 
domain not only tolerable but desirable, for failing to meet one’s goals here means 
failing to properly care for others and maintain society. 
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CHAPTER 5: CARING FOR SELF/CARING FOR OTHERS 
Introduction 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we employed an analytics of government to examine 
the prevailing discourse of professionalization in the nonprofit sector. The results 
of this analysis indicate that contrary to prevailing opinion, the professionalization 
of the nonprofit sector is not the result of a state-initiated effort to rationalize the 
sector and its service. Rather, it is but one part of a much larger effort of 
neoliberal governing rationalities to create an enterprise society. For the 
benevolent domain, this has meant the assertion of a marketized approach to the 
practice of benevolence through the domain’s technologies of professionalization. 
This marketized approach to benevolence has resulted in the ascendance of the 
benevolent organization into a position of paramount importance within the 
benevolent domain—a development which has occurred at the expense of the 
individual, most prominently the beneficiary of benevolent service. 
 In this our final chapter, we turn our attention to determining how we 
might be able to counteract the efforts of neoliberal governing rationalities to 
marketize the practice of benevolence through the technologies of 
professionalization, and in turn reassert a place for the individual within the 
practice of benevolence. This requires that we revisit Michel Foucault’s notion of 
power relations, which underpins the analysis that has been undertaken here, in an 
effort to locate an agential self. Without locating a sense of individual agency 
within the Foucauldian conception of a pervasive system of power relations, we 
cannot hope to endeavor to affect change in regard to the technologies of 
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professionalization or to the overall practice of benevolence. I contend that while 
locating an agential self in a Foucauldian framework of power relations proves 
challenging, his work on what he calls the “practices of the self” provides us with 
an opportunity to do so. I also argue that one formation of the practices of the 
self—the “care of the self”—specifically allows us to create spaces in which 
alternate discourses can develop and challenge the marketized discourse which 
dominates the technologies of professionalization and thus the contemporary 
practice of benevolence. Only by creating spaces in which alternate discourses 
can develop to challenge the marketized discourse of benevolence can we also 
hope to reclaim some sense of the individual, which has become lost in the 
organization-centric marketized practice of benevolence.   
Change and the Agential Self 
This study was initiated under the notion that if we change the method by 
which we analyze the nature of events, then we might afford ourselves the 
opportunity to change what is possible to say about those events. Not only this, 
but also to create an opportunity to change “what is possible to do, to think, or to 
be” in relation to those events (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 21). To that end, we have 
analyzed the prevailing narrative associated with the professionalization and 
rationalization of contemporary benevolent service through a framework of 
government. In other words, we have situated the contemporary practice of 
benevolence as an issue of government. In doing so, we have been able to lay bare 
some of the historical and political forces that have worked to transform the 
practice of benevolence over time. We have come to understand that the practice 
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of benevolence has been informed and transformed over time by liberal governing 
rationalities and that neoliberal governing rationalities are currently at work 
through the technologies of professionalization to transform the benevolent 
domain to constitute a market for benevolence. The consequence has been the 
marketization of the benevolent communities, organizations, and experts that 
comprise the benevolent domain, such that the market values of 
entrepreneurialism, prudentialism, and competition infuse the practice of 
benevolence. This in turn has served to centralize the benevolent organization in 
the practice of benevolence, making individuals of secondary import.  
Clearly this analysis has demonstrated that the practice of benevolence is 
changeable. Over the course of several centuries our understanding of what it 
means to care for and aid others transformed from charity to philanthropy and 
from philanthropy to strategy. Indeed, each of these modes of benevolent service 
has in turn been deemed the “right” way to care for others. What these 
transformations demonstrate is that our understanding of what it means to care for 
and aid others is not “natural” and “self-evident,” nor is it “indispensable” 
(Foucault, 1991b, p. 75). In other words, our conception of the practice of 
benevolence is not finite. The question remains, however: Are we as benevolent 
practitioners and scholars now better able to change how we think about and 
engage in the care and aid of others? From what we have seen thus far, the role of 
the individual in these processes of transformation is not one of change-maker. 
Rather, she—or more accurately, her identity—seems little more than an object or 
a product of the larger-than-life historico-political forces which seek to constitute 
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our understanding of the practice of benevolence. How then can we find a more 
active role for the individual—indeed, for ourselves—in relation to the practice of 
benevolence and in relation to the historico-political forces which seek to shape 
it? Furthermore, how can we find a role for ourselves as benevolent practitioners 
and scholars that affords us an opportunity to close the loop between our 
newfound understanding of the practice of benevolence and the ability to actually 
affect change with regard to it? Answering these questions necessitates that we 
locate a sense of agency for ourselves within this analytic framework. 
Locating the Agential Self 
 An analytics of government is deployed under the auspices of Michel 
Foucault’s particular conception of power relations. Prevailing notions of power 
relations presuppose that power is an asset to be acquired and then used to 
influence and control organizations, situations, environments, other individuals, 
and so on. Indeed, influential scholars ranging from Max Weber (1958) to French 
and Raven (1959) and from Emerson (1962) to Pfeffer (1992) proffer theories on 
power relations which presuppose power’s inherent nature as an asset. 
Underpinning this influential literature is the fairly straightforward notion that 
power—possessing it, in particular—simply means getting other people to do 
what you want (see Hardy & Clegg, 2006). Michel Foucault’s notion of power, on 
the other hand, represents a critical alternative to this prevailing stance, in that his 
conception of power and power relations makes untenable the idea that power can 
be an asset and thus an object to wield over others. He argues (1990/1976) that 
power is in actuality a productive and not necessarily negative force—not a 
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possession or an asset—from which no one is immune. In fact, he contends that 
power does not function “in the form of a chain;” rather, it is “employed and 
exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98) which is 
virtually inescapable. In other words, power is everywhere, and we engage with it 
every day and in nearly every context. As we have seen, discourse is central to its 
operation.1 More specifically, it is primarily through discourse that the objects of 
our knowledge (including ourselves) are created, as power and knowledge are 
conjoined into an irreducible power/knowledge complex. 
By challenging the prevailing notion of a sovereign form of power, 
Foucault makes it possible to envision human relations in such a way that power 
is “no longer a deterministic resource, able to be conveniently manipulated by 
[some] against recalcitrant, illegitimate resistance by lower orders” (Hardy & 
Clegg, 2006, p. 763). Rather, “all actors operate within an existing structure of 
dominancy—a prevailing web of power relations—from which the prospects of 
escape [are] limited for dominant and subordinate groups alike” (Ibid). To a 
certain extent, Foucault’s conception of power relations levels the playing field 
for human interaction. In terms of locating a sense of individual agency, however, 
this viewpoint has not proved particularly pragmatic, for Foucault has effectively 
decentered the role of the individual in his notion of power relations. If one 
cannot attain—and thus, wield—power and if one is, in fact, constituted by power 
relations rather than an entity with an intrinsic nature, how then can one act as an 
agent in her own interests? Newton (1998) explores this very question when he 
                                                            
1 Refer back to Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of the relationship 
between power, knowledge, and discourse. 
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states that “within a Foucauldian framework it is hard to gain a sense of how 
active agential selves ‘make a difference’” (p. 425).  
While locating an agential self within a Foucauldian framework of power 
is challenging, such a criticism seems somewhat misguided, in that it is implicitly 
based within a particular conception of agency, one which is individuaded and 
atomistic in scope (see Clegg, 1989). Here agency is equated with the exercise of 
moral responsibility in decision-making as a measure of one’s intrinsic nature (see 
Lukes, 2005). More in keeping with Foucault’s contingent conception of reality 
would be a conceptualization of agency in which the active agent is a product of 
the relations of power rather than something that is true and inherent within the 
nature of the individual. If power is a productive force, then power can 
conceivably produce a subject identity which possesses the capacity to act 
independently and to make decisions in its own interests. Indeed, Clegg’s (1989) 
conception of agency asserts as much when he contends that “agency is 
something which is achieved [italics added]” (p. 17). Individual agency can exist 
without attributing power (and thus, a sense of inherent moral responsibility) to an 
individual, for while a system in which power relations “restricts what an agent 
can do,” it does not necessarily mean that “such a system determines what an 
agent will do” (Hoy, 1986, in Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, p. 254, 
emphasis in original). Thus, individual choice in decision-making can 
conceptually co-exist alongside a pervasive system of power relations. 
Beyond this issue of defining and locating agency within a Foucauldian 
conception of power relations, however, lays the much thornier issue of the rather 
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ambiguous connections Foucault makes between discourse, power relations, and 
the constitution of subject identities. A common and well justified critique of 
Foucault’s and others’2 genealogical projects is that they “offer much insight into 
the everyday processes through which … regimes [of government] are 
accomplished … [but the] hows [by which these regimes of government are 
accomplished] … are largely missing from their analyses” (Holstein & Gubrium, 
2005, p. 492, emphasis in the original; see also Howarth, 2000, pp. 83-84). In 
other words, they fail to illuminate the more localized mechanisms by which 
discourses become authoritative and begin to constitute the objects of our 
knowledge and act to subjectify the individual.  
Foucault (1972) contends that certain statements3 make claims to be 
knowledge and, more pointedly, to be truth. Sometimes in the course of history 
complex interrelationships between statements develop, during which time sets of 
statements assume a sense of regularity through systems of dispersion4—a process 
that Foucault (1972) refers to as discursive formation (pp. 37-38). In other words, 
through the processes associated with discursive formation, certain statements 
(i.e., certain serious speech acts, or serious “talk”) become discourses, such that 
they assume the ability to constitute certain objects. However, what is largely 
missing from his conception of discursive formations is a discussion of the 
                                                            
2 Holstein and Gubrium (2005) name the work of Nikolas Rose in particular. 
 
3 Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) refer to these as “serious speech acts” to avoid 
confusion. 
 
4 As opposed to the notion that discourses maintain a unified internal structure 
due to similarities between ideas, objects, or statements (see Howarth, 2000). 
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mechanisms by which discourses begin to attach themselves to objects and begin 
to work on forming their identities. This is a particularly relevant issue for our 
analysis here, as these connections are necessary to understanding and explaining 
how power and subjectivity play out in the constitution of agential selves and the 
individual exercise of choice. As Newton (1989) asserts: 
[While] agency may be “a product or an effect,” this does not mean that 
we can ignore how it affects both the establishment and the deployment of 
discursive practices. … The problem is that Foucault leaves us with an 
inadequate framework to explore how agency is played out in particular 
contexts … or how decisions are made in particular local situations. (pp. 
425-426) 
Indeed, without such a framework, we are left with few tools to understand not 
only how we might actually achieve agency, but also how we then might exercise 
it.  
The Practices of the Self 
The work Foucault produced in the twilight of his life provides an 
intriguing entrée by which we can contend with this issue. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, Foucault engaged in an extended study of sexuality in the West 
(Foucault, 1988/1984, 1990/1976, 1990/1984), with the final two volumes of his 
study (1990/1984, 1988/1984) dedicated to what he terms the practices of the self. 
This work represents a fundamental shift away from the study of the 
manifestations of power to “the forms and modalities of the relation to self by 
which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself [sic] qua subject” 
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(Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 6). His work in this arena in large part constitutes the 
following: 
A history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute 
themselves as subjects of moral conduct … with the models proposed for 
setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, 
self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by 
oneself, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself 
as object. (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 29) 
In other words, the practices of the self articulate the methods by which an 
individual can become an agent, at least of a particular kind (i.e., a moral agent). 
Consequently, the practices of the self enable us to tentatively articulate a 
framework to examine how individuals might make decisions and how their 
agency might be exercised.5  
Understanding the practices of the self and how they might relate to the 
development of agential selves within a framework of power relations first 
requires that we situate them within the conception of government which has 
                                                            
5 I have deliberately chosen to use the word “might” here, for critics such as 
Newton (1998) argue that Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality does not provide an 
adequate framework by which to understand agency and subjectivity because he 
does not provide any clear guidance on how individuals are supposed to engage in 
decision-making processes or engage in change management (p. 436). I argue that 
this criticism does not follow the logic of Foucault’s arguments. A phrase like 
“supposed to” implies that there exists a “true” or “right” way of engaging in 
decision-making or change management which is utterly antithetical to Foucault’s 
contingent conception of social reality. 
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informed our analysis. To recall,6 within Foucault’s work the term government 
holds a very particular meaning: it is a form of power that is concerned with the 
“the conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2) or any attempt to direct human 
behavior and actions (Foucault, 1983, pp. 221). This conception of government 
implies that there exist a host of methods or types of government which can be 
employed. Gordon (1991) articulates these forms of government as being 
activities that “could concern the relation between self and self, private 
interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations 
within social institutions and communities, and, finally, relations concerned with 
the exercise of political sovereignty” (pp. 2-3). Foucault contends that these forms 
of government are interconnected (recall his net-like vision of power relations) 
and he seeks through his genealogical projects to examine those connections.  
While his examination of the practices of the self specifically focuses on 
government as a relation between the self and the self, it also concerns the 
methods by which other governmental forms influence these practices. On the 
whole, the practices of the self are concerned with “the manner in which one 
ought to ‘conduct oneself’—that is, the manner in which one ought to form 
oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that 
make [a] code [of action]” (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 26). The ultimate goal of 
these practices is to generate a relationship with the self such that it involves “not 
simply ‘self-awareness’ but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’” (Foucault, 
1990/1984, p. 28). Yet, these practices are not born of the self; they are, in fact, 
                                                            
6 Refer back to Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of government and 
governmentality. 
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produced by certain accepted “truths” regarding the nature of acceptable conduct 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 285), which are imparted to the individual by an advisor 
through his/her teachings. In sum, the practices of the self as a form of 
government, which are produced by socially accepted norms of personal conduct, 
serve to form the individual as an ethical subject, replete with a set of prescribed 
beliefs and modes of acting in the world. More to the point, the practices of the 
self produce an agential self. 
How then can we begin to understand the methods by which the individual 
exercises her agency within a framework of pervasive power relations? Here we 
are at a disadvantage, for the vast majority of scholars engaging in studies of 
government and governmentality tend to focus on the processes by which regimes 
of government produce (in part) particular practices of the self, rather than 
methods by which particular practices of the self inform individual action and, in 
turn, serve to influence or produce particular regimes of government at any level 
within society. To answer our question, then, we must revisit the notion of 
government as a form of power. Government involves conducting conduct, 
whether this amounts to one’s own conduct, the conduct of others, or the conduct 
of political and social institutions. Such a conception of government implies that 
it is active, mobile, and forever seeking to modify the practices and behavior of 
others. It also implies that government is active at multiple levels of society—
individuals seek to govern others; institutions seek to govern other institutions and 
the actions of individuals; groups of individuals seek to govern other groups’ 
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behavior, and so on—which is in keeping Foucault’s notion that power is net-like 
and productive in its scope.  
The notion that underlies this conception of power, though, is that 
government is not only at work at multiple levels of society, but it also does not 
privilege any of these levels of influence. Scholarly focus tends to be at the 
institutional level, however, with particular emphasis on political and social 
institutions and the roles they play in the processes of subjectification. While the 
technologies of power do become more functional and effective in an institutional 
setting (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185), they are not restricted to institutions. 
The technologies of power are also at work through the individual—particularly 
in the form of the agential self—and not simply on her by way of the processes of 
subjectification. Recognition of the notion that government is at work at the 
individual level through the form of the agential self allows us to understand how 
power operates at a localized level. More specifically, by analyzing how 
discursive formations produce particular practices of the self, and then how these 
practices of the self in turn influence or produce particular interpersonal, social, 
and/or institutional discursive formations, we can begin to understand how agency 
can be exercised and thus how change might be affected within Foucault’s system 
of pervasive power relations. 
  We have already seen one example of a discursive formation acting to 
produce particular practices of the self which then seek to create a particular 
ethical subject. A discourse based in the promotion of market values and spurred 
by neoliberal governing rationalities is facilitating a formation of the practices of 
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the self by which individuals learn to conduct themselves according to the 
morality of the marketplace. By morality, we mean the “set of values and rules of 
action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various 
prescriptive agencies” as well as “the real behavior of individuals in relation to 
the rules and values that are recommended to them” (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 25). 
In this case, the values and rules of action by which one is expected to operate are 
based in entrepreneurialism, prudentialism, and competition, and are promoted by 
the technologies of professionalization. Ultimately, the ethical subject sought is 
the responsible entrepreneur. 
We can understand how the moral code which neoliberal governing 
rationalities seek to enact is borne out at the individual level by unpacking the 
practices of the self they engender. More specifically, we can begin to understand 
how the marketized discourse of neoliberal governing rationalities affects 
decision-making at the individual level by examining “the part of ourselves we 
seek to work upon, the means by which we do so, the reasons we do it, and who 
we hope to become” (Dean, 1999, p. 17) in relation to the practices in which 
individuals are engaged. In the language of an analytics of government, these are 
the determination of the ethical substance, the mode of subjection, the elaboration 
of ethical work, and the telos of the ethical subject (Foucault, 1990/1984, pp. 26-
28). First, the determination of the ethical substance involves understanding what 
it is that we seek to act upon or govern (Dean, 1999, p. 17; see also Foucault, 
1990/1984, p. 26). This can be the body, the soul, individual pleasure, and so on. 
The marketized discourse we have discussed clearly aims to act on individual 
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decision-making with regard to the care and aid of others. Second, we must 
understand the methods by which we govern this substance—the how of 
governing (Ibid; see also Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 27). This might include 
surveillance, spiritual exercises, processes of memorization, and more. In our 
case, this involves the technologies of professionalization and the standards of 
professional and ethical conduct which they promote. Third, we must locate who 
we are or who it is we become when we govern ourselves in such a manner (Ibid; 
see also Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 27). When governed through particular means, 
we might become the active citizen or the weak individual in the face of worldly 
temptation. Here we become the strategic manager of benevolence or, ultimately, 
the entrepreneurial, competitive manager. Finally, the telos of the ethical subject 
involves why we are governed in such a manner (Ibid; see also Foucault, 
1990/1984, pp. 27-28). In other words, what is the goal to be achieved through 
these processes of governance? The goal of the marketized discourse we have 
discussed is to underpin a market for benevolence and, ultimately, to promote an 
enterprise culture. 
 The form of agential self which is being produced by the practices of the 
self that are influenced by a marketized discourse is an entrepreneurial one. In 
other words, our agent here makes choices in relation to the morality of the 
marketplace. More specifically, within the framework of the morality of the 
market (i.e., acting in accordance with the values of entrepreneurialism, 
prudentialism, and competition), the agent-as-entrepreneur is expected to exercise 
choice in the marketplace as she seeks to strategically place herself and her 
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organization in more advantageous positions as they compete with other 
entrepreneurs. Whether and how much the agent-as-entrepreneur acts according to 
the moral code set forth for her in the marketized discourse of the technologies of 
professionalization becomes a function of her identity as a particular agential self. 
Even as she operates within a particular moral code, she still has a choice as to 
whether she obeys or resists, and respects or disregards the moral code (see 
Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 25). Of course, failure to follow the moral code will lead 
an individual to be constituted as “immoral” and thus, as abnormal.  
Beyond Entrepreneurialism 
 This may seem a rather contrarian notion of agency and of choice. Indeed, 
for many the choice between treating everyone and everything as an object of 
strategic competition and being labeled as abnormal or immoral seems not much 
of a choice at all. Which brings us back to our original question: Can we find a 
way to change our understanding of the practice of benevolence and how we 
engage in it? The answer is a qualified yes. As in, yes, if … We can change our 
understanding of the practice of benevolence and how we engage in it if alternate 
discourses exist and if we are willing to challenge our conception of change. We 
now know that we can locate a sense of agency for ourselves within a pervasive 
framework of power relations. We also now understand that this sense of agency 
(i.e., the form of agential self) is dependent upon the formation of discourses and 
the particular practices of the self and accompanying moral code they engender. 
So, in order to challenge the prevailing discourse of entrepreneurialism, we need 
alternate discourses and their accompanying alternate formations of the practices 
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of the self, moral codes, and agential selves. In other words, we need a space in 
which “different ways for the acting individual to ‘conduct oneself’ morally, 
different ways for the acting individual to operate, not just as an agent, but as an 
ethical subject of this action” (Foucault, 1988/1984, p. 26) exists in order to 
challenge the dominance of a marketized discourse of benevolence. The existence 
of alternate discourses, formations of the practices of the self, moral codes, and 
agential selves serves to constitute a counter-strategy of resistance (see Howarth, 
2000, p. 81) against other discourses, thereby precluding the ability of any one 
discourse or moral code to dominate a regime of government.  
Understanding how the mere existence of alternate discourses, practices of 
the self, moral codes, and agential selves can act as a form of resistance against 
domination necessitates a revised interpretation of domination and its relationship 
with power. For some (e.g., Lukes, 2005) power essentially equals domination. In 
a Foucauldian conception of power relations, however, power and domination are 
inherently different concepts. To recall, in Foucault’s terms, power “is not a 
commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185) to 
wield over others, but rather a productive force that seeks to modify that with 
which it comes in contact. As such, it is not an inherently negative7 or positive 
force; it is simply productive in that it engenders new forms and effects. 
Furthermore, individuals “are in a position to both submit to and exercise … 
power” (Foucault, 2003, cited inClegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, p. 250) because 
                                                            
7 Critics have argued that until the appearance of Foucault’s The History of 
Sexuality, his representations of power in society were nearly uniformly 
oppressive and repressive, and hardly positive in nature (see Clegg, Courpasson, 
& Phillips, 2006, pp. 249-250 for an overview of this issue). 
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power is “possible only insofar as the subjects are free” (Foucault, 1997, p. 292) 
to make choices, even if those choices are constrained by the discourses which 
seek to constitute them.  
Domination, on the other hand, entails a situation in which power relations 
cease to be free-flowing thus constraining one’s ability to make choices: 
Power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing various participants to 
adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an 
individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, 
immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by 
economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be 
called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of 
freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained 
and limited. (Foucault, 1997, p. 283) 
A state of domination, then, while a distinct possibility in the exercise of power is 
also entirely preventable, for its existence depends upon the mode of governance 
employed by an individual or group of individuals. 
 The existence of alternate discourses ensures that the control of any one 
discourse remains somewhat mitigated and thus maintains the flow of power 
relations (see Howarth, 2001, p. 81). At the same time, however, the existence of 
a multitude of discourses and their corresponding role in thwarting our own 
domination necessitates a reformulation of how we envision change. We cannot 
solve a marketized discourse of benevolence. In other words, if we seek to replace 
a marketized discourse of benevolence with another discourse—something 
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“better” … perhaps a return to a more charitable form of benevolence or perhaps 
at least a less rationalized one—the result will simply be the repetition of the 
cycle already being played out now. In other words, “any struggle designed to 
modify existing social relations and to institute a new system of domination 
encounters resistance that has to be overcome ... [and] any drive to create a new 
system of power will itself be an unstable configuration, always vulnerable to 
change and transformation” (Howarth, 2001, p. 81). Moreover, by actively 
seeking to replace one discourse with another, we risk engendering a state of 
domination ourselves. Rather than the dominance of the market, we would have 
the dominance of, for example, a Judeo-Christian charitable ethic, which then 
serves to constrain the choice of those who would disagree with it. What we are 
left with, then, in terms of affecting change with regard to the contemporary 
practice of benevolence is an opportunity not to necessarily change the practice of 
benevolence itself, but rather to create spaces in which alternate discourses on the 
practice of benevolence can flourish and co-exist. By endeavoring to encourage 
the presence of alternate discourses, we can maintain the flow of power relations 
and perhaps at the same time stave off our own domination by any one conception 
of benevolent service.     
The Care of the Self 
Of course, this naturally leads one to wonder, how exactly does one go 
about encouraging the presence of alternate discourses to maintain the flow of 
power relations and stave off domination? In the final volume of his The History 
of Sexuality (Foucault, 1988/1984), Foucault details a particular practice of the 
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self—the care of the self, or the cultivation of the self—which might hold some 
answers for us. Foucault argues that the care of the self has been at work since 
antiquity, and it is “dominated by the principle that says one must ‘take care of 
oneself’” (Foucault, 1988/1984, p. 43). In late antiquity this theme of taking care 
of oneself was combined with the ideal of knowing oneself, and through Socrates’ 
assertion of its import in the Alcibiades, this principle became the center of a 
particular “art of existence”: 
It … took the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled 
in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, formulas that 
people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It … came to 
constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between 
individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to 
institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and 
to the elaboration of a science. (Foucault, 1988/1984, pp. 44, 45)  
As such, the care of the self became not just a principle, but a full-fledged practice 
that was to be a lifelong pursuit. And this lifelong pursuit is to be understood not 
just as a method by which one “pay[s] attention to oneself, avoid[s] errors, and 
protect[s] oneself” but rather as “a whole domain of complex and regular 
activities” (Foucault, 2001, p. 493). More pointedly, the care of the self became “a 
duty and a technique, a fundamental obligation and a set of carefully fashioned 
ways of behaving” (p. 494).  
 The practices that comprise the care of the self are known as askēsis, and 
they involve training with the purpose to acquire both theoretical and practical 
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knowledge (Foucault, 2001, p. 316) toward eliciting “the full formation of a full, 
perfect, complete, and self-sufficient relationship with oneself, capable of 
producing the self-transfiguration that is the happiness one takes in oneself” 
(Foucault, 2001, pp. 319-320). Training in thought primarily involves meditating 
on future evils and imagining the worst thing that might occur as if it were already 
taking place in the present so as to “convince ourselves that in no way are they 
real evils and that only our opinion of them makes us take them for true 
misfortunes” (Foucault, 2001, p. 502). In doing so the meditation acts to nullify 
both the future and the evil for the individual. Training in the practices of reality, 
on the other hand, encompasses a number of methods. First there are the exercises 
of abstinence or physical resistance whose purpose is “to test the individual’s 
independence in relation to the external world” (Ibid). Only by testing oneself can 
one truly know whether she has attained self-formation as an ethical subject or 
whether there is still work to be done. Then there are those practices designed to 
test oneself in the face of adversity, in order to “know whether or not we are 
affected or moved by the thing represented and what reason we have for being or 
not being so affected” (p. 503). These tests are fundamentally designed to control 
our representations of the world and the phenomena in it. Finally, there is the 
training for death: “one lives each day as if it were the last;” thus, “by considering 
oneself as at the point of death, one can judge the proper value of every action one 
is performing” (p. 504).   
 In articulating the objectives of these practices, Foucault frequently calls 
forth the metaphor of an athlete. For example, he states that, “like a good wrestler, 
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we should learn only what will enable us to resist possible events; we must learn 
not to let ourselves be disconcerted by them, not to let ourselves be carried away 
by the emotions they arouse in us” (Foucault, 2001, p. 498). In other words, the 
practices of askēsis serve to allow the individual to develop and maintain personal 
control in the face of worldly events. More pointedly, askēsis acts to form certain 
“true and rational” discourses within the individual such that she is able to “face 
up to the future” (Ibid). The individual is able to draw upon these discourses when 
she needs them because they have been fastened “to our minds, to the point of 
making them a part of oneself, and … through daily meditation, [we] arrive at the 
point where healthy thoughts arise by themselves” (Foucault, 2001, p. 499). This 
is more than simply drawing upon memories; rather, this process is akin to 
drawing upon a potent medicine or the sturdy shoulders of old friends to guide 
and bolster us through life’s difficulties.  
It is important to note that the internalization of these discourses does not 
represent some hidden truth within the individual, but is rather the result of a 
number of processes by which the individual appropriates certain accepted truths, 
which are communicated to her through teaching, reading, and the offering of 
advice. The care of the self is a fundamentally social practice in which the 
teacher/student (or, advisor/disciple) relationship is key (see Foucault, 1988/1984, 
pp. 52-53), for the teacher is responsible for imparting the “truths” associated with 
the care of the self. Indeed, an advisor’s teachings effectively link together the 
“truth” and the subject: “it is a question of arming the subject with a truth that he 
[sic] did not know and that did not dwell within him; it involves turning this 
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learned and memorized truth that is progressively put into practice into a quasi-
subject that reigns supreme within us” (Foucault, 2001, p. 501). In other words, 
the discourses that comprise the truth of the teachings that are vital to the practice 
of the care of the self are communicated through social means, and serve to allow 
the individual to act on her own behalf to form an ethical self.  
 Supporting and accompanying the practices of askēsis and the relationship 
between the teacher and pupil are particular forms of listening, reading and 
writing, and speaking. First, within the care of the self, one must learn to listen 
properly. This involves mastering certain practices of silence, demeanor, and 
attention. With regard to silence, one must “impose a sort of strict economy of 
speech on [herself] … [and] keep as quiet as [she] can” (Foucault, 2001, p. 342). 
Furthermore, one must learn to be actively silent in relation to speech. In other 
words, one must “not immediately convert what [she has] heard into speech [but 
rather] … keep hold of it … preserve it and refrain from immediately converting 
it into words” (Ibid). When what has been said is immediately converted back to 
speech rather than retained and contemplated, its power is lost on us. Active 
silence requires an active demeanor on the part of the listener, one which indicates 
to the speaker that she is not only calm and able to receive what is being said, but 
also guarantees her full and active attention. Not only this, but active listening 
also requires that “we … grasp what is said” (Foucault, 2001, p. 349). More 
pointedly, we must actively direct ourselves toward understanding what the 
speaker is actually saying—what Foucault refers to as pragma or the expression’s 
referent—rather than “the beauty of the form … the grammar and vocabulary … 
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[or] philosophical or sophistical quibbles” (Ibid). Only by focusing on the pragma 
or the referent can the student discern what is most important to the teacher and 
thus most important for her to understand. 
 One must also learn to properly read and write in relation to active 
listening. In the language of the care of the self, reading and writing are 
considered meditative practices. Here meditation has a particular meaning. It is 
not “an attempt to think of something with a particular intensity without 
deepening its meaning;” rather, “it involves … ensuring that [a] truth is engraved 
in the mind in such a way that it is recalled immediately [when] the need arises … 
making it a principle of action” (Foucault, 2001, pp. 356-357).  In other words, 
meditation inscribes on the self the truths to which one has been actively listening. 
Reading texts related to the truths that one has heard and which are being 
imparted by advisors and then contemplating and memorizing them through 
practices of personal writing serve to facilitate meditation.  
 Finally, within the care of the self, there is an obligation on the part of the 
teacher/advisor to engage in proper speech. While both the teacher and student 
must engage in active listening, it is the teacher who must learn to properly speak 
the truth which she is imparting to students. In short, the teacher must obey the 
principles of parrhēsia, which is “an act of telling all [and involves] frankness, 
open-heartedness, plain speaking, speaking openly, speaking freely” (Foucault, 
2001, p. 366). Engaging in parrhēsia holds a particular moral quality to it for the 
teacher because her responsibility is to impart the truth to the student. It is worth 
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quoting Foucault (2001) at length to understand the importance of parrhēsia as 
moral undertaking: 
If the disciple’s silence is to be fruitful, if the master’s truthful words are 
to settle properly in the depths of this silence, and if the disciple is to make 
of these words something of his [sic] own which will one day entitle him 
to become the subject of veridiction himself, then the master’s discourse 
must not be an artificial, sham discourse subservient to the rule of rhetoric, 
seeking only to produce effects of pathos in the disciple’s soul. It must not 
be a discourse of seduction. It must be a discourse that the disciple’s 
subjectivity can appropriate and by which, by appropriating it, the disciple 
can reach his own objective, namely himself. (p. 368) 
A teacher’s obligation, then, is not only to speak the truth but to do so in a way 
which obliges the teacher to the student. In other words, the teacher’s moral 
obligation is to ensure that through proper speech, the student comes to know the 
truth, and ultimately, to know herself. 
Key to understanding how these practices and how the care of the self 
overall might allow one to create spaces in which alternate discourse might 
flourish and maintain the flow of power relations is understanding the care of the 
self as a practice of freedom—a conception he articulates via the writings of 
ancient Greek philosophers. In short, freedom finds concrete expression through 
an ēthos, or an ethical practice: “Ēthos [is] a way of being and of behavior. It [is] 
a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible 
to others” (Foucault, 1997, p. 286). In order for freedom to not only become fully 
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vested as a concrete shape in the form of an ēthos, but also become one that is 
specifically “good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary,” 
then “extensive work by the self on the self is required” (Ibid). Of course, the care 
of the self entails extensive training and practice on the self toward the objective 
of self-formation such that one can face the future and all it entails with a sense of 
mastery and control. Thus, the care of the self can be considered a practice of 
freedom in which one engages toward fulfilling an ēthos of freedom that is not 
only masterful, but good and honorable. More importantly, as a master of one’s 
own appetites and representations of the world, one can be considered free. 
 Individual freedom is essential for the proper care of others, for an ēthos 
of freedom also implies an art of governing. If one is able to master her own 
appetites and the way with which she views the world through the care of the self, 
then one is enabled “to occupy his [sic] rightful position in the city, the 
community or interpersonal relationships, whether as a magistrate or as a friend” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 287). This is so because: 
If you take proper care of yourself, that is, if you know ontologically what 
you are, if you know what you are capable of, if you know what it means 
for you to be a citizen of a city, to be a master of a household … if you 
know what things you should and should not fear, if you know what you 
can reasonably hope for and, on the other hand, what things should not 
matter to you, if you know, finally, that you should not be afraid of 
death—if you know all this, you cannot abuse your power over others. 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 288) 
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And an abuse of power over others essentially engenders domination over them. 
Conclusion 
 Nearly a century ago, Mary Parker Follett made a case for foregoing 
dominating others in favor of cultivating a culture which seeks to enhance others’ 
individual freedom and choice. Although she believed that power is inevitable, it 
did not mean that its exercise had to be authoritarian in nature. In fact, she 
distinguished between two conceptions of power: power-with and power-over. 
She defined power-over as the “the power of some person or group over some 
other person or group” while power-with is “jointly developed power, a co-active, 
not a coercive power” (Follett, 1965, p. 101). While she maintained that one could 
never fully do away with power-over, she also contended that it behooves one to 
reduce power-over and promote power-with. Follett ultimately believed that doing 
so actually facilitates problem-solving and thus efficiency because it allows the 
situation to dictate the decision rather than the maintenance of authority by one 
individual over another. Moreover, she maintained that engendering power-with 
would go a long way toward reinstituting civility, society, and fellowship over 
rampant individualism.  
The agential self that is promoted by the practices of the care of the self 
seeks to act in accordance with a moral code that is defined by an obligation to 
engender power-with rather than power-over. Indeed, the “cared-for” agent can be 
seen as preventing power-over (i.e., domination) and encouraging power-with 
through the limitation of the exercise of one’s own power. By way of the practices 
of the care of the self, one can begin to know herself and have mastery over 
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herself and thereby allow for the cultivation of growth and the facilitation of new 
possibilities. 8 One encourages states of domination or power-over as the result of 
an abuse of power, as “one exceeds the legitimate exercise of one’s power and 
imposes one’s own fantasies, appetites, and desires on others” (Foucault, 1997, p. 
288). In such a state one has become a slave to her own appetites and desires, and 
thus, is not in control of them—the very antithesis of the purpose of the care of 
the self. The cared-for agent “is precisely the one who exercises power as it ought 
to be exercised, that is, simultaneously exercising his [sic] power over himself. 
And it is the power over oneself that thus regulates one’s power over others” 
(Ibid). In other words, the cared-for agent is able not only to control herself, but 
also the methods by which she governs others. As such, she is able to maintain the 
mobile, flowing, and unstable relations of power to prevent a state of domination 
in which the freedoms of others are limited or eradicated altogether. When the 
freedom of others is promoted rather than limited then there exists an opportunity 
for the generation of alternate discourses. And as we have seen, when alternate 
discourses are present, we are better able to change what we do, what we think, 
and who we are. 
                                                            
8 In this respect, the cared-for agent is akin to the conception of the administrator-
as-midwife set forth by scholars like Stivers (2002) and Catlaw (2007). Like the 
midwife, the cared-for agent acts as a facilitator of new possibilities and the 
cultivator of growth rather than the limitation of them. 
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